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ABSTRACT 
The many high-speed developments since China implemented its policy of Opening 
and Reforming in 1978 include more freedom for women to work and choose lifestyles. 
However, many studies claim that women still face challenges and gender discrimination in 
their work environment and in the family. This study addresses one area that has received 
little attention, which is the question of gender equality in media discourse. My aim is to 
identify gender images in news reports and news stories about corruption, including power 
relations behind those images, by addressing three research questions: (1) How are women, 
overall, described in news reports and comments about corruption in China; (2) Is there any 
difference between the ways in which women and men are depicted in news reports about 
corruption? If so, what is the difference; and (3) What do any observed differences reveal 
about the nature of power and gender relations in contemporary China? 
My analysis employs quantitative Content Analysis and qualitative Critical Discourse 
Analysis, applied to media reports and articles from the Central Committee for Discipline 
Inspection (CCDI) and four commercial websites - Sina, Sohu, Fenghuang, and Wangyi - for 
the period from 2012 to 2017. The data reveal that women are under-represented with respect 
both to the number of corrupt cadres cited in the reports and in reporting on personal life 
issues. The analysis highlights the role that traditional cultural expectations continue to play 
in influencing the ways in which women are described in the news stories about corruption. 
Women are depicted as people who violated their family duties in family as well as 
individuals who caused much corruption among men. By analysing the relations between 
male cadres, women and the ruling party, I demonstrate that by owing corruption to 
individuals, the government mitigates its pressures and covers up systematic flaws in causing 
corruption. By decoding the nature and role of gender images in news reporting on 
corruption, my study contributes to understanding the influence of political power and 
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patriarchal power in constructing gender norms in corruption news, showing how traditional 
culture can intertwine with contemporary political and media systems. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Confucianism has greatly influenced Chinese history, dominating Chinese society and 
regulating its social relations since the Han Dynasty (汉朝, 206 BC – 220 AD). According to 
Confucianism, a woman’s role should be limited to the domestic sphere, while women should 
not have rights regarding education, choosing whom they marry, or dealing with family 
properties.  
Although the status of Chinese women has undoubtedly improved since the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), gender discrimination and gender inequality still 
exist. In the Maoist era, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committed itself to emancipate 
women by incorporating them into the workforce. In addition to gaining the right to work 
outside of the home, women also gained a number of other rights relating to areas such as 
education and marriage. However, the CCP’s decision to implement its open-door policy and 
shift to a market economy in 1978 has complicated matters, as women face more challenges 
from work-family conflicts and work-related discrimination. In this sense, studying gender 
representation in media discourses provides opportunities to know how these conflicts and 
discriminations shape people’s thoughts on women and gender equality.  
Upon taking power in 2012, President Xi and the CCP launched an anti-corruption 
campaign that is widely considered to be the most expansive and influential in contemporary 
Chinese history. However, the Chinese government also recognizes that the media is a critical 
tool for promoting propaganda; as such, it has required that corruption news reports and 
comments adhere to the standard drafts provided by state-owned news agencies. In this sense, 
studying how gender is represented in corruption news reports and comments can be a useful 
method for verifying whether the Chinese government is living up to its promise of 
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promoting gender equality or, alternatively, whether gender images in corruption scandals 
may be presented in particular ways in order to help the government build its legitimacy. 
This study uses Foucault’s power-knowledge theory to examine how women are 
portrayed in both official and commercial media discourses related to corruption news and 
power relations behind media images. Specifically, both Content Analysis (CA) and Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) are used to explore the organization of words, sentences and 
paragraphs regarding gender relations in news reports and news articles. The results of this 
study verify that traditional gender ideology plays an important role in defining proper 
behaviours of women in corruption scandals, revealing particular ways in which the ruling 
party exerts its influence on women via attributing corruption to women. Quantitative 
Content Analysis results indicate that women are under-represented in the number of reported 
cases of corruption, while Critical Discourse Analysis provides details about women’s 
positions and status in corruption cases. This analysis reveals that women are frequently 
compared in corruption news against traditional expectations, such as the image of “the 
greedy wife,” which serves to generate negative public opinions. Even though men’s images 
are also related to traditional cultural expectations, males are less likely to be represented as 
sources of trouble. However, systematic factors that may cause corruption are seldom 
touched by news coverage, and the ruling party appears blameless in corruption scandals. In 
order to examine how patriarchal power and political power are exercised on women via 
corruption news, some institutional factors are discussed; then, attention is given to the 
reasons why the ruling party utilizes gender images in corruption. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing detailed gender 
discourses and comparing them with traditional gender norms and examining how power is 
exercized in multiple intersecting ways in constructing gender inequalities in both private and 
public places. By describing women involved in corruption as “sources of trouble,” the news 
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reports draw on traditional gender norms. The media reports represent the exercise of 
patriarchal and political power on women as one apparatus of a more omnipotent 
pervasiveness of the penetration of power throughout daily life via the All-China’s Women 
Federation(ACWF), the education system, family, and the media system. These images of 
women suggest that China is still a patriarchal society in which men and male-dominated 
institutions set rules and norms for women to follow. Gender equality is an empty 
discourse. My thesis explores gender images in Chinese news reports about corruption news, 
revealing how the Chinese political system utilizes traditional culture through a state-
controlled media system in order to maintain power relations. 
1.1 Gender Inequality: From Past to Present 
Confucianism played a key role in shaping Chinese society via the creation of gender 
norms and a gender-based hierarchy. Traditional Confucian culture is a patriarchal culture, as 
it emphasizes the dominance of men over women. Biographies of Exemplary Women, the 
“earliest extant book devoted solely to the moral education of women” (He-Yin, 1907, p.125) 
says a woman should follow all decisions made by her husband after getting married (Ji 
fengchang junzi, weiming shi cong;即奉承君子，惟命是从) (Gushiwenwang, n.d.). Mann 
(2011) claims that many ancient stories, in addition to the classic book, also indicate the 
unbalanced power relations between men and women: women need to stay at home to avoid 
meeting men outside the family in order to maintain their chastity and virtue. On the other 
hand, according to Confucianism, a man should strive to be a morally superior person (junzi, 
君子) who lives in a big house and has a good position in the government (Clark & Wang, 
2004; Jiang, 2009). According to these precepts, women should remain in the home and 
oversee domestic affairs, while men should deal with affairs outside the family. The 
separation between men and women is essential for cultivating proper behaviours (Mann, 
2011; Huang, 1984). A wife’s lifelong responsibility is to raise children and manage the 
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household, so women were deprived of basic freedom, while men should abide by traditional 
rituals and laws (He-Yin, 1907). On the whole, Confucianism devalued women, and boys 
were regarded as being considerably more valuable than girls. In traditional Chinese culture, 
once women married, they were considered to leave the family. As such, a man raising 
daughters was seen as “watering another man’s garden” (Rai, 1992, p.20). Given that women 
had a diminished status under Confucian, it is unsurprising that they did not have equal rights 
in a number of areas, including education, employment, and marriage.  
Concubinage in ancient society also demonstrated gender inequalities and social 
inequalities. Unlike wives who joined the husband’s family via the betrothal process (Ebrey, 
1986), concubines were from poor families and were sold to rich families (He-Yin, 1907; 
Mann, 2011; McMahon, 2010). Concubines were supposed to be reproductive tools to give 
birth to sons or daughters (Mann, 2011; Du, 2017; Ebrey, 1986). Concubines could never 
have the same status as the wife (Mann, 2011). Du (2017) used examples from the Qing 
dynasty to demonstrate that concubines who gave birth to sons could have a social and legal 
status protected by the Confucian filial piety, and they could control and manage household 
properties. However, those examples also revealed unequal gender status, as the same rights 
were not extended to concubines who gave birth to daughters and to those who were not able 
to give birth. Generally, concubines could be discriminated against and abused by the wife, 
while sons who were born to concubines would be counted as the wife’s sons (Mann, 2011). 
Qiu (1905) described in her novel Stones of the Jingwei Bird how the concubine was ill-
treated by the wife who regarded the concubine as a prisoner at home. 
While some changes occurred over time, the influence of Confucianism on women 
and family life remained powerful into the twentieth century. Some possibilities for change 
were influenced by the May Fourth movement as women in the Republic of China period 
(1911-1949) experienced the development of modernity and new culture. The New Culture 
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Movement, which aimed at building a modern nation with “freedom, equality, and 
independence” (p.12), attacked Confucianism norms and rules (Wang, 1999). Through these 
movements, women learned about the right to choose people to marry, the right to divorce, 
the right to enter schools and universities, and the right to deal with family property, and so 
on. However, such rights did not guarantee that society had achieved gender equality, as most 
of the movements did not spread to the whole of China, and the major beneficiaries were 
women in urban areas. Although some women had freedom in choosing people to marry, 
some of them became concubines and replaced the wife to accompany their husbands on 
formal occasions, as many cadres’ wives felt uncomfortable to do so (Shi, 2018). According 
to Guomindang (GMD) civil code, concubines tended to be regarded as household members 
(Shi, 2018), while social circles tended to identify them as minor wives (Tran, 2009; Shi, 
2018). The concubines of cadres were college-educated and young. However, even though 
those concubines were elite women, `they also suffered social discrimination and stigma (Shi, 
2018). This period, as a whole, did not emancipate the majority of women in China, and the 
boundaries between old and new cultures were blurred. 
Women’s social status changed greatly following the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), although these improvements were based on rights granted by the 
party. Following the revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a series of 
initiatives to increase women’s social status, but perhaps the greatest of these was the 
decision to give women the right to work outside of the home. The CCP believed that labour 
force participation was critical to the emancipation of women so that women were fully 
capable of contributing to economic productivity (Landes, 1998; Q. Chen, 2012). In this 
period, the famous slogan was “women can do what men do;” however, this led women to be 
measured by male standards, many of them had to do jobs which were not suitable for 
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women, such as the rebar worker, and women also had additional responsibilities related to 
domestic roles and political activities.  
Although women’s equal rights to family property, education, and work had been 
guaranteed by legislation and policies during the Maoist period, women continued to 
experience various forms of gender discrimination in the post-reform period. In 1978, China 
adopted an open-door policy, which marked the beginning of its transition towards a market 
economy. Besides promoting a market economy, there were many tremendous 
transformations, including promotion of “privatization, increasingly stark social inequalities, 
rent-seeking and corruption, a consumer-oriented popular culture, vast amounts of foreign 
direct investment” (p.155) in free trade areas, increasing investments in energy resources, and 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Rofel, 2013). However, this transition has 
posed a number of problems for women attempting to find jobs, as it has led to greater levels 
of various forms of gender discrimination, such as unequal hiring requirements, lower 
salaries and wages, reduced access to good jobs, and forced early retirement (Summerfield, 
1994; Du, 2016). For instance, based on the 1990 Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status 
(Zhongguo funv shehui diwei diaocha, 中国妇女社会地位调查), women earned 77.5%, on 
average, of the earnings of their male counterparts while, by 2010, the figure had fallen to 
65.8% (Sohu.com, 2016; Fincher, 2018). In short, from the distant past to the present, gender 
equality has not been achieved by women in China.  
With respect to domestic relationships, in contemporary society, polygyny has been 
banned. However, with the rapid development of the economy, many economically 
developed places report that many people keep second wives (Xiao, 2011). For instance, in 
Guangdong province, the ACWF received 20,246 complaints about keeping second wives in 
1996 (Sina News, 2000). Gerth (2011) points out that mistresses are a way that cadres can 
transform political power into wealth and lead a luxurious life. Keeping a mistress or second 
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wife is sometimes seen as the resurgence of traditional concubinage, as mistresses tend to 
have long-term extramarital relationships with men and are economic dependents on those 
men (Xiao, 2011). Mistresses or second wives seldom receive respect from the public. 
Given this persistent gender inequity across several dimensions of family and public 
circumstances, an examination of gender discourses in daily life, especially as framed 
through representations of men and women in mass media, can offer important insights into 
contemporary gender roles and expectations. According to Fairclough (1995, p. 2), media has 
power which can influence “knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, social identities.” . 
In the case of China, the state has had the potential to shape these discourses through the role 
that the CCP has had through several decades of control over the media system. This thesis 
investigates the ways in which gender images are represented in news reports about 
corruption news in order to shed light on how gender discourses in news media may reflect or 
contribute to prevailing gender inequalities in Chinese society.  
1.2 Media Discourses and Social Changes 
Since 1978, the Chinese state has exerted control over the media discourses about the 
state although other forms of media have also emerged in relation to different kinds of 
content. During the Maoist period (1949-1979), the media was entirely funded by the state, 
which meant that the state exerted strict control over the number of media outlets that existed, 
as well as the length, content, and format of any content produced by these outlets (Hassid, 
2008). All the financial support came from the government (Hassid, 2008). During this 
period, in order to stress gender equality, all men and women were called comrades (tongzhi, 
同志). Women were often portrayed as genderless mothers (clothes did not indicate gender, 
and gender was rarely spoken about publicly), peasants, and workers. However, with the 
Opening and Reform Policy in the 1980s, the state media system started to move from 
totalitarianism to market authoritarianism, resulting in what Winfield and Peng (2005) have 
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described as a system with two lines: the bottom line and the Party line. Media institutions 
can be divided into three categories based on their positioning in the field: the official 
mainstream media; trade papers and regional media; and fringe media (Winfield & Peng, 
2005). Official mainstream media, such as Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily and CCTV, 
are directly owned and operated by the state (Winfield & Peng, 2005). Trade papers and 
regional media are not directly controlled by the state government, while fringe media, such 
as internet websites, are financially and managerially independent and have the most freedom 
from government control, although, in reality, the CCP also has the “great firewall” that 
censors the Internet.  
In China, media content and discourses work for political power but reflect the 
contemporary social context and culture as well, so there are some interesting characteristics 
since media reform. On the one hand, the media representation of women has shifted to 
reflect changing roles within emerging social and cultural contexts. As more and more 
women entered the labour force and began to assume different work and family roles, a new 
depiction of a “strong woman” who focused more on professional success than family began 
to emerge; however, in the late 1990s, media depictions of women once again shifted, placing 
more emphasis on beauty and sexuality (Yuxin & Ho, 2006). On the other hand, state media 
continued to promote President Xi Jinping’s image as “Xi Dada” (big daddy Xi) during the 
first several years of his presidency (Fincher, 2018). “Xi Dada” reflects President Xi 
Jinping’s aspirations to manage the nation as the father of the Chinese nation (Fincher, 2018). 
Since China does not have an independent media system, it is necessary to examine how 
women are portrayed in official media discourses, particularly with respect to whether 
women have achieved gender equality as the Chinese government claims. One way to assess 
this is to understand how women are represented in news reports concerning corruption, 
which is a major focus of government attention. If women have truly achieved equality with 
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men, it would be expected that they would be similarly positioned to be involved in corrupt 
activities and to be depicted and treated in the same way as men when they are accused of or 
exposed for committing corrupt acts. 
1.3 Anti-Corruption Campaign and Corruption in Media Discourses 
Launched in 2012, China’s anti-corruption campaign has generated considerable 
media discourse on corruption, all of which is tightly controlled by the CCP. My analysis 
follows that of Keliher and Wu (2016), who define corruption broadly as cases in which 
public officials or government officials obtain personal gain by abusing their power and at 
the expense of the public interest. In China, this type of corruption includes economic crimes, 
official malfeasance, and individual misbehaviour indicating moral decay (Zhu, Lu, & Shi, 
2012). For instance, bribery and embezzlement belong to the category of economic crimes, 
while having a mistress is an example of individual misbehaviour (Zhu et al., 2012). At 
present, Chinese officials are in the midst of the nation’s biggest anti-corruption campaign to 
date, as President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has spread throughout the whole 
country. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is regarded as “higher profile, less compromising, and 
more sustained than those of the past” (Keliher & Wu, 2016, p. 6). Based on data obtained 
from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s (CCDI) website, 414,000 officials 
have been disciplined by the party for corruption, with another 201,600 having been 
prosecuted since November 2012 (Keliher & Wu, 2016). Keliher and Wu (2016) argue that 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has changed China’s political culture in various ways, such as 
not giving a red-envelope. Although many studies examined Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
from a political perspective, few studies have analysed gender dynamics and representations 
of gender in these corruption cases. 
State ownership of the media enables the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to 
manipulate the information the public receives, which in turn allows it to shape the dominant 
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political narrative (Walker & Orttung, 2014). For example, both the Xinhua News Agency 
and the People’s Daily are supposed to influence public opinion about national and 
international events. Although China has so-called fringe media, and its media system has 
changed its framework in recent years by adopting “Western news values and practices to 
sustain operations or to flourish in China’s authoritarian market economy” (Luther & Zhou, 
2005, p. 857), the media system is not free from censorship. Instead, it is still largely 
controlled by the Chinese government, as has been illustrated by key examples such as the 
firewall software used by the government to block Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—actions 
which have led to Google dropping its service to mainland China. The government fully 
controls the coverage of official cases of corruption that are highly politically sensitive and 
that could potentially cause social unrest. For example, in high-profile cases “such as the 
former Beijing party secretary Chen Xitong and mayor Wang Baosen in 1995, newspapers 
[were] required to use the so-called standard draft (Tonggao, 通稿) provided by the Xinhua 
News Agency” (Zhu, et al., 2012). Such rules can be found in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
articles in the Provisions for the Administration of Internet News Information Services 
(Hulianwang Xinwen Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding [2005]): “units of Internet News 
Information Services should forward public news (including political news, economic news, 
military news, diplomatic news, and comments) from central, provincial, and local news 
units.” This thesis has been motivated by these special features of the Chinese media system 
and its approach to reporting on official corruption, and it seeks to identify and highlight the 
rules relating to the reporting of political news. Moreover, this thesis is centrally concerned 
with developing an understanding of differences in how men and women are represented in 
the media’s coverage of corruption cases and identifying the factors that contribute to these 
differences. 
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1.4 Research Questions and Chapter Organization 
While the CCP has created a great number of job opportunities for women since 1978, 
female cadres in China have always been significantly outnumbered by their male 
counterparts. According to the Xinhua News Agency’s report, The First Time that the 
Chinese Government Clearly Decided the Ratio of Female Suffragettes (Wu & Zhang, 2007), 
it was decided at the Tenth National People's Congress that women should represent at least 
22% of the total representatives at future Congresses. However, the election results showed 
that women ultimately only accounted for 20.24% of the elected representatives, which was 
slightly lower than the regulated ratio (Wu & Zhang, 2008). Besides low ratios, there are very 
few opportunities for women to become high-profile-level cadres. For instance, since the 
PRC was founded in 1949, only five women, including Wu Guixian, Chen Muhua, Wu Yi, 
Liu Yandong and Sun Chunlan, have been the Vice-Premiers of the State Conucil (Guan, 
2018).  
Despite persistent female underrepresentation in government positions, the Chinese 
government continues to claim that it has made great efforts to promote gender equality. 
According to the white paper Gender Equality and Women’s Development in China (The 
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015), the total number 
of women employed nationwide in 2013 was 346.6 million, which accounts for 
approximately 45% of the total employed population. However, throughout the white paper, 
there is no mention of whether women have been treated equally in media discourses. This 
gap raises the need to examine how gender is portrayed in news discourses, and especially in 
those related to corruption.  
This study’s main purpose is to utilize an analytical framework (Foucault’s power-
knowledge) to explain gender inequality in media discourses and to answer the following 
research questions:  
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(1) How are women, overall, described in news reports and comments about 
corruption in China? 
(2) Is there any difference between the ways in which women and men are depicted in 
news reports about corruption? If so, what is the difference? and 
(3) What do any observed differences reveal about the nature of power and gender 
relations in contemporary China? 
A review of women’s roles and status in contemporary China can provide insights 
into the relationship between expectations towards women and the broader social and 
political environment. Insights into these issues are particularly important for policymakers 
who wish to promote gender equality. 
Using the power-knowledge theory as a framework, this study draws upon content 
analysis and critical discourse analysis to identify media discourses that reproduce and 
promote traditional gender expectations. This theory is applied to two aspects of these 
discourses: first, to explore how power is exercised in media discourses, that is, what do the 
media representations in news reports on corruption reveal about traditional gender relations 
and the nature of government power and interests in contemporary China and, second, to 
make possible an understanding of the ways in which traditional discourses about gender and 
politics represent the penetration into daily life of broader power/knowledge relations. 
 This study has nine chapters. Chapter One provides an introduction to the study, 
including a brief summary of gender inequality, media systems and the government’s recent 
anti-corruption campaign, and a discussion of the key research questions. Chapter Two 
contains a literature review that focuses on how women’s duties changed following the 
founding of the PRC, as well as the existing research on gender representation in news media. 
Chapter Three details this study’s theoretical framework, including the relationship between 
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power and knowledge, traditional feminity and masculinity, the ruling party’s construction of 
its image, the function of leader’s speeches and three power-knowledge apparatus (the 
ACWF, the family system and the education system), and the relationship between the 
Chinese media system and the Panopticon. Chapter Four describes the methodology that is 
used to conduct this research, including a detailed account of the research methods, research 
data, and how that data will be used. News reports from the Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (CCDI) are used to a conduct content analysis of numerical 
representations of female cadres and depictions of females. Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) is applied to news articles from the CCDI and the commercial websites, Sina.com, 
Sohu.com, Ifeng.com, and 163.com, to determine whether and how women and men are 
depicted differently by governmental and commercial news media sources. Chapter Five, 
Chapter Six and Chapter Chapter Seven present the findings of the CA and CDA. As will be 
shown in Chapter Five, the CA results indicate that female cadres are under-represented in 
corruption news reports, while the CDA results suggest that women in corruption news 
stories are more likely to be portrayed as “sources of trouble.” Chapter Six and Chapter 
Seven also explore the relationships between men, women and the ruling party. Chapter Eight 
discusses factors which influence gender relations that are found in corruption news. 
Specifically, this chapter explains how the ACWF promotes the CCP’s ideologies and 
policies while ignoring women’s issues, how the family imparts traditional ideologies, how 
the education system normalizes the CCP’s achievements and how media censorship works 
to tighten the ideological control. Chapter Eight also provides insights into the relationship 
between traditional culture and the legitimacy of the CCP. Finally, Chapter Nine provides an 
overview of the research findings, outlines directions for future research, and offers some 
concluding thoughts.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter addresses the literature that analyses women’s social positions and media 
representations. It first reviews studies that highlight women’s roles and status in 
contemporary China, then summarizes the literature on gender representation in the news 
before reviewing studies that explore gender inequality in news media. Because there is 
relatively little literature on gender representation in the news about corruption, I focus on 
gender issues in news media.  
2.1 Women’s Roles and Status in Contemporary China 
In this section, I discuss women’s roles after 1949 ---- the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). There are three periods in the post-revolution era: the Maoist era, 
the Cultural Revolution, and the Opening and Reform era.  The Chinese government 
continues to claim in official propaganda that it is committed to gender equality, but in many 
aspects, this is not the case. Although the infamous oppression towards women in traditional 
society was considered the worst period, current society is still a patriarchal society (Jiang, 
2009; Xiao, Mehrotra, & Zimmerman, 2011). 
2.1.1 Women’s Roles and Status in Maoist Era (1949-1966) 
In this period, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believed that women were 
emancipated through their participation in work and being given a series of rights by law. 
However, it turned out that these forms of women’s emancipation were for the country’s 
economic growth and women’s images were genderless.  
The Maoist era, which was from 1949 to 1966, was a period during which the CCP 
was struggling to maintain their power and dominance, while individuals were expected to 
subordinate their interests to the party (Leung, 2003). At that time, the way to indicate power 
and dominance was to control the means of production and distribution of resources and to 
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develop the economy (Leung, 2003). In this sense, women’s participation in work came to be 
regarded as a way to advance the new country’s economy and a way to promote gender 
equality (Stacey 1984; Schein 2001; Du 2016; Chen, 2009). To motivate women’s 
participation, Chairmen Mao Zedong proposed a famous slogan: “women can hold up half 
the sky.” Women participated in almost all industries just as men did, even doing some jobs 
that required heavy labour. To help the development of society and gain support from 
women, besides encouraging women to participate in work, the central government sought to 
emancipate women via revising the Marriage Law and the Land Reform. The new Marriage 
Law was implemented in 1950, under which women were entitled to equal rights with men 
with laws to ensure that they had joint property rights to inheritance, marriage and divorce; 
and some age-old practices were banned, including concubinage, dowry, child marriage, and 
foot binding (Hershatter, 2004; Sargeson, 2013; Xiao et al., 2011). Later, Land Reform was 
implemented, under which land was allocated to individual peasants, no matter male or 
female, and women were motivated to participate in production activities (Leung, 2003).  
However, such changes after the foundation of the People’s Republic China (PRC) 
were regarded as supports for the state rather than as a means for women’s liberation. First, to 
prove gender equality in labour participation, women had to contribute to production equally 
with men (Wolf, 1985). Mao did not truly respect women as individuals but encouraged 
women to work to bolster economic production. Second, the Marriage Law did not change 
much, compared with the achievement of the May Fourth Movement. Third, for the Land 
Reform, women did have the right to take part in production activities; however, the land was 
still registered under the names of men who were still considered as the heads of the family 
(Leung, 2003). These strategies were meant to support the state, the power of CCP, and 
economic production. Although Mao claimed that the Marriage Law and Land Reform were 
to liberate women and construct a liberal socialism social order, such measures did not 
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change the gender order or gender relations radically. At that time, women’s associations 
were founded nationwide, and women were working outside just like men. Simultaneously 
women took part in domestic labour, such as cooking and washing. This was still a gendered 
division of labour, however, as “little had been done to remove the feudal patriarchal 
attitudes and concepts that gave rise to gender relations of male dominance” (Leung, 2003, p. 
365). What’s more, women’s behaviour was sexually conservative, and men were still the 
breadwinners (Xiao et al., 2011). For instance, women at that time were genderless, depicted 
as soldiers, mothers, peasants and workers. Women’s images were highly connected with the 
family and the party. 
2.1.2 Women’s Roles and Status in Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), class differences were greatly 
emphasized by official propaganda, and daily life was highly politicalized, while gender was 
considered as secondary to the large project of the revolution. From the mid-1960s, the 
government built a restricted political hierarchy based on individuals’ family origins. For 
instance, if an individual belonged to the “good class,” which included peasants, workers, 
revolutionary cadre, and revolutionary soldiers, he or she would benefit from a series of 
benefits in “job allocation, promotions, wages, housing, migration to cities, and social 
services” (Yang & Yan, 2017, p.66). Another political campaign which greatly influenced 
people’s lives were “the Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement” 
(shangshan xiaxiang yundong,上山下乡运动), in which millions of educated youth in cities 
were sent for reeducation to rural areas to work as farmers and workers. As women gained 
public roles as proletarian fighters and revolutionaries in that period, gender equality was 
promoted by the state in the form of encouraging women’s participation in the labour market 
and encouraging women to dress as men. In some extreme cases, women wore shapeless 
clothing just like men and behaved in a masculine manner. Such women were so-called “iron 
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women.” In official propaganda, notions of “iron girls/ iron women” were used to praise 
women who did work in traditionally male-dominated area (Yang & Yan, 2017; Honig, 2000; 
Yihong, Manning, & Chu, 2006; Sun & Chen, 2015), although these women still needed to 
carry on the noble functions of mother and wife at home (Leung, 2003). In the Cultural 
Revolution, women in the public realm were desexualized and expected to be completely 
loyal to the party. At that time, gender issues were largely replaced by class conflicts and 
gender inequality was masked by men-like working standards and images.  
In sum, from 1949 to 1976, although CCP tried to change women’s status to more 
equal levels, gender inequality still perpetuated throughout society. Women’s participation in 
work contributed to the nation’s production rather than gender reform, and the government 
did not change gender inequalities in many areas, including the gendered division of 
household labour and gender discrimination in wages and the workplace (Sun & Chen, 2015; 
Bian, Logan & Shu, 2000). To some degree, women suffered triple burdens during the 
Maoist period: perform duties as a wife, a worker and a party member. 
2.1.3 Women’s Roles and Status after 1976 
In 1978, the Chinese Government decided to implement a policy of Opening and 
Reform. This reform aimed at economic development. However, this reform caused women 
to suffer even more discriminations in social life and serve as tools for political power, while 
anti-discrimination legislation became an empty discourse. 
Such reform brought changes to many aspects of life, especially in the labour market, 
and changed the working environment (Westwood, 1998; Leung, 2003). According to 
Gender Equality and Women’s Development in China (The State Council Information Office 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2015), women’s status has been greatly improved over the 
past two decades, and the state ensures equal employment rights for women. However, the 
reform did not greatly improve women’s social status, but made women suffer even more 
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gender discrimination in labour market, including gender income gap, gender inequality in 
high-level positions, forced early retirement, high rates of being laid-off, and gender 
discrimination in hiring (Summerfield, 1994; Du, 2016).  
The Labour Insurance Regulations of 1984 clearly stated that women in high-risk 
professions could retire five years earlier than men who do the same job (Leung, 2003), and 
women would have to retire at the age of 55, while men would have to retire at the age of 60. 
These regulations appeared to be trying to protect women from discriminatory practices, but 
in practice, they placed women in a weaker status and prohibited women from working in the 
same conditions as men (Leung, 2003). Many forms of discrimination against women are 
evident. One example is that women are discriminated against in college admissions. Many 
of China’s top universities set gender ratios for enrollment, which female applicants need to 
have much higher scores than their male counterparts, as men were supposed to be more 
employable than women after graduation (Sharma, 2013). Another example is that many 
companies did not want to pay women for maternity leave, so they claimed in the job 
advertisement that they would prefer men in the position. Ironically, even some women in 
leadership positions wanted fewer women in their companies (Rai, 1994). In 1993, in order to 
protect women’s equal rights to employment, housing and education, the government 
released anti-discrimination legislation (Xinhua, April 14, 1992; as cited in Leung, 2003). 
Although legislation ensured equal treatment between men and women in the working 
environment, actual practices did not guarantee gender equality. Also, many employers and 
companies cut welfare, such as medical care, for working women (Leung, 2003). What is 
more, by the reform, much social welfare provision and social services which used to belong 
to the state responsibility were privatized, such transitions have changed care responsibilities 
to the family, especially women (Du & Dong, 2010; Cook & Dong, 2011; Ji & Wu, 2018; 
Qian & Jin, 2018; Ji et al., 2017; Sun & Chen, 2015; Kan & He, 2018; Yang, 2013; Li & 
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Jiang, 2019). In Confucianism, women were expected to take care of the whole family, so 
China has a long history of leaving the care of the elderly and children to women 
(Abrahamson, 2016). However, such transitions created double labour for women, as they 
needed to work outside but take care of the family at home as well. 
On the other hand, women’s rights to give birth were also subject to government 
policies. Under the One-Child Policy, implemented in 1979, one married couple could only 
have one child, although some exceptions were made, such as for members of ethnic minority 
groups, who were allowed to have two children. Generally, couples were encouraged to do 
sterilization after having one child, two children or three children, and wives were 
encouraged to do IUD insertions (White, 2006). In extreme cases, if a married couple had a 
second child, this woman would be compelled to undergo abortion (Howden & Zhou, 2014). 
According to BBC News (2000), since 1980, at least 250 million births were aborted (Yun, 
2013). However, things became worse when such a policy combined with male-favouritism, 
which was deeply rooted in China’s traditional culture (Howden & Zhou, 2014). In some 
cases, people would seek an abortion if they were not pregnant with a baby boy. This issue is 
more serious in the countryside, as ultrasonography is widely available. However, based on 
the Article 35 (Congressional – Executive Commission on China, n.d.), Population and 
Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou 
Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa), “use of ultrasonography or other techniques to identify fetal sex of 
non-medical purposes is strictly prohibited.” Another issue related to male-favouritism is 
female infanticide, which is an ancient traditional practice in China. In terms of female 
infanticide, female newborn children would be killed by drowning or being exposed to the 
elements. Yun (2013) argues that, “The unprecedented oppressive practice and trend of 
female infanticide in China has immeasurable negative social implications not only on gender 
imbalance but also on perpetuating sexism and oppression against women in Chinese 
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society” (p. 590). Critics claim that the One-Child policy violates human rights, could cause 
emotional hardship for some families which lost their only child, and could cause difficulties 
for the family’s second child to get a legal identity (Howden & Zhou, 2014). However, in 
order to solve problems with an ageing population and a shrinking labour force, the Chinese 
government had relaxed the one-child policy in 2011 by allowing both parents come from 
one-child family to have two children, while in 2013, families with one parent from a one-
child family could have two children (Howden & Zhou, 2014). What is more, the government 
announced at the end of 2015 that all married couples could have two children (Fincher, 
2018). Since no baby boom has yet appeared, the government has promoted the policy by 
considering the provision of birth rewards and subsidies and lowering the legal marriage age. 
Fincher (2018) observes that media campaigns have been launched to improve birthrates, 
encouraging urban, educated women to marry and have babies.   
These transitions mainly happened in urban areas, while in rural places, the situations 
have not changed much. According to Jiang (2009), women are still subservient to men, do 
all housework, and do not make important decisions. In some cases, women cook a lot of 
dishes for guests, but cannot sit with men and guests at the table (Jiang, 2009). What is more, 
after Deng’s reform, many men went to cities to look for jobs, and because of the Hukou 
system (Household register system), they did not have access to welfare services in the city, 
so their wives and children had to stay in the countryside, contributing to a system of “men 
working, women farming” (Liang et al., 2014, p. 908). While these men were undocumented 
migrant workers, the number of women who stayed at home in rural places was more than 47 
million in 2005 (Liang et al., 2014). In this sense, some rural places still have traditional 
labour divisions in which women stay at home and men do jobs outside. 
Although the Constitution says individuals have the freedom of assembly and the 
freedom of speech, women’s movements and feminists’ activities are restricted or controlled 
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by the state. While the market economy allows news media to produce sensational news and 
attention-grabbing news on women’s issues, issues related to women’s rights are seldom 
reported by news agencies (Chen, 2009). In recent years, after President Xi Jinping took 
power, the government has exerted ideological control more tightly. Voices representing 
women’s rights and feminists’ activities have been muted. There are various tools to control 
their voices, including restricting NGO registrations and deleting blogs and posts on social 
media (Fincher, 2018). In 2017, when the #METOO movement spread to China, many 
women tagged this topic in Weibo (Chinese version of Twitter) and shared their experiences 
and ideas about sexual harassment; however, Weibo authorities deleted all posts related to the 
#METOO movement.  
In sum, despite Deng’s reform, women still suffered discrimination, especially in the 
workplace and in public discourse, as well as in domestic spheres, reinforced by regulations 
as well as in practice, maintaining long traditions in which China’s society has not fully 
respected women. In many aspects, Chinese women do not receive equal treatment as men.  
My research focuses on whether women receive equal status as men in the news about 
corruption and how these representations may be related to broader gender patterns in 
Chinese society. The following section will review gender relationships in news media and 
the relationship between gender and corruption news in China.  
2.2 Research on Gender Representation in News Media 
2.2.1 Gender and News Media 
The central issue in the analysis of gender representations in the media is whether the 
media has played a role in promoting particular images of femininity and masculinity 
(Lemish, 2008). This issue has been explored in different contexts with reference to different 
forms of media and media content such as commercial advertisements, newspapers, 
television news, and dramas. In terms of gender relations in the news media, various aspects 
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are typically explored, including differences between male and female images (Bogren, 2013; 
Armstrong, Boyle, & McLeod, 2012; Niemi & Pitkänen, 2017; Grandy, 2014; Patterson, 
Emslie, Mason, Gergie, & Hilton, 2016; Simon, 2014; Zhang, Bang, & Jamil, 2015; 
Maiorescu, 2016; Sendén, Sikström, & Lindholm, 2015; Musto, Cooky, & Messner, 2017; 
Wang, 2009), reporters’ perspectives on news selection (De Cabo, Gimeno, Martínez, & 
López, 2014; North, 2016; Liao & Lee, 2014; Shor, van de Rijt, Miltsov, Kulkarni, & Skiena, 
2015; Astafurova & Aleksandrova, 2016), viewers’ selection of news (Kleemans, Hendriks 
Vettehen, Beentjes, & Eisinga, 2012), elder women’s underrepresentation on news media 
(Lemish & Muhlbauer, 2012), and negative and positive images of women (Debbagh, 2012).  
In the literature on gender representation in news media, gender boundaries which 
exist between male and female images represent the most heated topic. With respect to 
women, gender differences in media images are negative; that is, such differences are related 
to female underrepresentation, male overrepresentation, and gender stereotypes. Cullity and 
Younger (2009) found that in some pre-eminent media sources, such as BBC, women were 
under-represented in headlines and images in the news front pages. Armstrong, Boyle, and 
McLeod (2012) observed news coverage of protests and found men were more likely to be 
subjects of stories, and appeared more frequently as sources in stories and bylines, while 
women were more likely to appear in non-political news. Sendén et al. (2015) found that 
females were under-represented in news messages, as he was mentioned about nine times 
more than she. Even in Finland, a “female-friendly” country, women were found to be under-
represented as experts in the news (Niemi & Pitkänen, 2017). Women’s under-representation 
in news media contributes to broad gender inequalities (Sendén et al., 2015; Niemi & 
Pitkänen, 2017). However, such an imbalance in media representation is found in other kinds 
of news all around the world. For instance, females and males were connected with different 
features in the news about alcohol, but changing these images was not easy. While women 
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who drink were more likely to be described as problematic, men’s drinking problems were 
connected with violence or disorder (Patterson et al., 2016). Wang (2009) claimed that 
tabloid news in Taiwan focused on physical attractiveness and marriage issues which 
presented women as “money worshipers,” “belligerent,” and the focus of family and social 
pressures regarding marriage and sexuality. Wang (2009) concluded that such stereotypes 
used to describe female artists’ representations were heavily based on gendered ideas and 
prevailing thoughts on marriages. However, gender boundaries in media representations is a 
worldwide persistent question. Wang (2009) observed that gender stereotypes persist in 
certain social contexts, while Simon (2014) argued that changing these negative images 
required a power struggle. These results show that media images tend to be highly 
stereotyped and deep-rooted in cultures. 
Although gender representation is conveyed through news texts to audiences, news 
reporters’ preferences also contribute to this representation. Studying British news texts, 
Astafurova and Aleksandrova (2016) argue that reporters’ gender identity has an influence on 
how news is reported. Female reporters typically pay more attention to the economic, legal 
and political consequences of disasters in relation to certain social groups or individuals, 
while male reporters tend to use political, economic, legal and scientific terms in their reports 
(Astafurova & Aleksandrova, 2016). Similarly, De Cabo et al. (2013) claim that female 
reporters tend to include more females than males in their reports in Spanish online 
newspapers. However, by interviewing 459 professional journalists in Hong Kong, Liao and 
Lee (2014) claimed that married journalists were more likely to show gender preferences in 
selecting news topics. Besides reporters’ gender and marital status, Chen (2009) pointed out 
that uncritical and patriarchal social contexts could lead media workers to be unconscious 
with respect to gender issues or to be unable to offer alternative perspectives due to pressures 
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from institutions. Changing gender representation in news media is not only about changing 
content, but also changing attitudes of reporters and social environments.   
Other literature depicts gender relations in news media from specific perspectives. 
From the viewers’ perspective, Kleemans et al. (2012) argued that men were more likely 
targets than women for tabloid packaging, while Wang (2009) concluded that one main focus 
of audiences when reading tabloids is physical attractiveness. Things become worse when 
gender is combined with age. According to Lemish and Muhlbauer (2012), old women are 
under-represented in popular culture. However, female images can appear in two different 
forms. For example, studying Moroccan broadcast news and comparing news content from 
two channels, Debbagh (2012) claims that both traditional women’s roles and independent 
women’s roles are portrayed in news media. While women are associated with domesticity 
from conservative perspectives, women are also depicted as economically independent 
(Debbagh, 2012).  
In sum, the literature on gender and news summarized in this section reveals that 
gender boundaries between female and male images in news media were widely found by 
previous studies. Gender issues exist in various aspects, including reporter and viewers’ 
preferences in selecting the news and other media representations. Although things appear a 
little better in the study of news in Morocco, reasons for these differences should be explored, 
by expanding the analysis beyond a few specific social contexts and societies, and by 
drawing on a wider range of methodologies than the most commonly used ones that focus 
only on either content analysis or critical discourse analysis solely in order to provide a more 
thorough picture of gender representations in news media. In order to study the portrayal of 
gender in the news about corruption, I also examine gender relations in reporting on political 
issues. 
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2.2.2 Gender and Political News 
Many publications explore the relations between gender and news concerning politics. 
Generally, these studies can be divided into three categories: gender representations in news 
coverage about female political candidates (Kittilson & Fridkin, 2008; Major & Coleman, 
2008; Meeks, 2013; Hayes, Lawless, & Baitinger, 2014; Gershon, 2012; Zurbriggen & 
Sherman, 2010; Hooghe, Jacobs, & Claes, 2015; Bode & Hennings, 2012; Kim, 2012), 
politicians’ wives’ images in news coverage of election campaigns (Higgins, & Smith, 2013; 
Harmer, 2016; Winfield & Friedman, 2003), and women’s images in news about political 
criminals (Lavie-Dinur, Karniel, & Azran, 2015). 
Gender differences in political candidates are the main focus of scholarship related to 
gender and political news. Studying editorial cartoons during the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election campaign, Zurbriggen and Sherman (2010) claimed that Barack Obama was more 
likely than Hilary Clinton to be favoured by the cartoons, whereas Clinton, in contrast to 
Obama, was more likely to be portrayed as ugly. Similar results were found in Belgian News 
Broadcasts (2003-2011). According to Hooghe et al. (2015), female politicians were 
allocated less speaking time in general news broadcasts, compared to their male counterparts. 
Studying election news coverage in Canada, Australia, and the United States, Kittilson and 
Fridkin (2008) claimed there tended to be fewer media coverage devoted to female 
candidates, but also such reporting was more likely to describe candidates’ traits by gender. 
However, studying news coverage of four female politicians - Elizabeth Dole, Claire 
McCaskill, Hillary Clinton, and Sarah Palin - Meeks (2013) found that women received more 
news coverage than their male peers, though gender stereotypes existed in terms of novelty, 
issues, and trait coverage. For instance, women who successfully won political office were 
described as novelties and norm breakers, although the number of these women has been 
increasing for ten years (Meeks, 2013). Another study, focusing on Vice Presidential 
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Candidates in the 2008 U.S. elections, had similar results. Although Sarah Palin received 
more coverage than Joseph Biden among newspapers, televisions, and blogs, gender gaps 
existed in such coverage (Bode & Hennings, 2012). While news articles were likely to 
mention Palin’s family and physical appearance, news articles about Biden were likely to 
mention electability and issues (Bode & Hennings, 2012). The significance of gender 
representations in press media coverage was also verified in a study of New York Times’ 
articles related to Clinton and Palin, which concluded that the newspaper reinforced gender 
stereotypes by emphasizing women’s novelty (Meeks, 2013). The situation tends to be worse 
if gender intersects with race identity. According to Gershon (2012), female politicians who 
were minorities received less, and slightly negative media coverage compared with their 
counterparts. On the contrary, Major and Coleman (2008) argued that media coverage had 
different foci based on candidates’ gender and identity. While female candidates received 
more attention in relation to female issues, minority candidates received more coverage on 
race issues (Major & Coleman, 2008). Although news media portrays female candidates in 
stereotyped ways, female candidates can manage their images on their own websites. 
Studying news coverage of a Korean election campaign, Kim (2012) concluded that the 
female candidate, Geunhye Park, tends to build a diverse image on her personal websites by 
showing interest in various social aspects. However, in most cases, in these studies, no matter 
where female candidates are from and how much news coverage female candidates or 
politicians received, long-standing gender stereotypes, including a focus on physical 
appearance, existed in the coverage, especially for female candidates who were racial or 
ethnic minorities. 
There has been some analysis of media coverage of First Ladies’ physical appearance 
as well as that of female candidates (Major & Coleman, 2008). For instance, Winfield and 
Friedman (2003) found four major types of representation of “First Ladies: as an escort, in a 
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protocol role, in anoblesse oblige role, and as a policy advisor” (p.548). The news media in 
the U.S. tend to focus less on politicians’ wives’ physical appearance than is the case in 
Britain, where politicians’ wives are still struggling with expectations to be an omnipotent 
role model for the public. Studying the 2010 General Election, Higgins and Smith (2013) 
claimed that mainstream newspapers still focused on wives’ physical appearance, and Labour 
and the Conservatives were more likely to integrate politicians’ wives into the election 
campaign. Specifically, based on coverage of British election campaigns from 1918 to 2000, 
Harmer (2015) argued that politicians’ wives were described, variously, as clever and 
beautiful women, traditional stay at home wives, and having their own ideas on politics. 
Because the number of women candidates is less than male candidates, wives can be a means 
to attract women voters (Harmer, 2015). Do media portrayals of politicians’ wives have the 
same qualities as female candidates? Apart from physical appearance, both politicians’ wives 
and female candidates should be traditional and political. But female candidates were given 
more coverage on their opinions on policy issues. Female images in political news tend to be 
shown based on gender traits; female candidates tend to have fewer media coverage 
compared with male candidates; and wives of politicians should be traditional and political.  
We have seen that most news coverage conveys positive images about politicians’ 
wives and gender gaps between male and female politicians’ images, but what is the case for 
females who committed or are implicated in political crimes? Gender representations in the 
news about corruption is an under-researched area. By studying news coverage of Israeli 
female political criminals, Lavie-Dinur, Karniel and Azran claimed (2015) that news 
coverage described the motivations of female political criminals as failure to fulfill their 
traditional roles. Traditional roles or gender stereotypes are connected with women in the 
public sphere, and gender stereotypes can become criteria which people may use to judge 
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women’s behaviour. The next section discusses the relatively limited studies of women’s 
images and gender relations in news media in China.  
2.2.3 Gender and Corruption News in China 
As the discussion of previous studies has shown, media representations of gender are 
complex, influenced by factors that include social environments and patriarchal ideologies, 
reporters’ personalities, and viewers’ selections. Although news about corruption can be 
categorized as political news, very little literature has addressed gender discourses in the 
news about corruption in China. Using discourse analysis to study 28 news reports on official 
corruption in state media, Chen (2017) found that “keeping a second wife” (bao ernai,包二
奶 ) was emphasized by news media when reporting officials’ corruption. By doing this, the 
gendered narrative has transformed the official corruption from a matter of political failure to 
sexual issues (Chen, 2017). Such a narrative came from traditional political storytelling, such 
as describing women as foxy witches (hulijing, 狐狸精) while owing the collapse of a 
dynasty to women, and was utilized by the government when talking about corruption cases. 
However, after interviewing 35 women, Chen (2017) found that interviewees resisted the 
official gendered narrative.  
There are two points worth discussing here. First, the article focused on “keeping a 
second wife” as the central point of the description of women in corruption news. Chen 
(2017) explained this phrase to refer to having concubines in traditional society, a practice 
condemned by the CCP in the 1950s. However, I would suggest using the word “bao ernai” 
directly without translation, as this phrase carries more information than just being translated 
as “keeping a second wife.” Many previous studies translated “bao ernai” as keeping a 
mistress or keeping a second wife. Superficially, “bao ernai” and mistress and second wife 
have one thing in common: they are affairs outside legal marriages. However, the Chinese 
phrase “bao ernai” is a conjunction between Chinese history, traditional culture and laws. 
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First of all, in traditional Chinese society, a man could have one wife (qi,妻) and many 
concubines (qie,妾). In a rich family, the wife is called “shaonainai (少奶奶),” and “ernai (er 
means second in English, nai short for shaonainai)” can be understood as a way to 
distinguish another woman from the wife. However, as this word originally stems from 
concubines, nowadays, it is discriminatory to call women who are not the wife but the 
mistress as “ernai.” Second, to know the reason why “ernai” is discriminatory, we must 
decode concubines’ status. In traditional society, concubines had lower status in a family, as 
illustrated in two ways. As observed in chapter 1, women had a lower status than men in 
ancient society, but there was also a hierarchy among women. In traditional society, if a 
woman was a wife, then she had a higher status than a concubine; if a woman was a 
concubine, she was considered to have higher status than a prostitute; if a woman was a 
prostitute, she had a higher status than a female slave. On the other hand, women had no 
choice to be concubines, as they came from poor families and were usually sold to rich 
families (He-Yin, 1907). However, a female slave or a prostitute could be concubines of the 
rich families if the husband of the family wanted. In ancient society, a female slave or a 
prostitute could be daughters from poor families or from criminal families, while a wife 
should come from a family which had a similar social status to the husband’s family. So, 
concubines could be abused by the wife of the family. So, concubines in ancient society did 
not only mean that a woman came from a poor family but also that she had a lower status 
than a wife. Keeping concubines carried information about social structure and hierarchy, and 
was banned by the CCP. In contemporary society, “bao ernai” is illegal. From the above 
analysis, “bao ernai” is a discriminatory phrase for women, so translating this as mistress or 
concubine might miss historical backgrounds and discrimination against certain women. In 
this sense, examining the social context behind phrases in news about corruption would help 
to determine whether these phrases actually impart discrimination against women. 
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The second point to mention here is political storytelling. Chen (2017) observes that 
China has a long history of blaming women for dynastic political crises, and the CCP had 
used this tradition to describe Jiang Qing (江青), who was Mao’s wife, as a ‘foxy witch’ 
when the state media talked about Mao’s mistakes in the Cultural Revolution. Although foxy 
witch has its cultural script, such a female image cannot be understood fully through a 
cultural approach, as political power controls the media system. As Fincher (2016) observes, 
media, especially state media, works to support government decisions and propaganda. 
Therefore, it is important to explore how, besides traditional cultural influences on women, 
the CCP exerts its power on gender issues or corruption issues.  How does the CCP 
intertwine with the traditional culture script to form gender discourses in China? How does 
media censorship promote this tradition, especially in a period in which that media system 
has become more commercialized?  
2.3 Explanations of Gender Representations in News Media 
This section focuses on theoretical frameworks employed in previous studies. Within 
existing research, there is very limited analysis that focuses directly on gender representation 
in Chinese news about corruption, although several studies focus on gender representation in 
news media. Most of these studies are empirical or descriptive empirical studies though some 
employ feminist theory or cultural approaches to understand gender representation. Feminist 
theories have been used mostly to understand resistance and ways to empower women, while 
cultural approaches are more likely to be used to explain gender stereotypes.  
According to Chen (2017), women were depicted in news reports on corruption as “a 
source of trouble.” However, by interviewing 35 participants, the author argued that people 
who participated in the interviews did not refer to women as a source of trouble. Based on the 
feminist politics of media, such counter-narratives could be regarded as resistance. After 
pointing out that older women were under-represented in popular culture, Lemish and 
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Muhlbauer (2012) suggested that feminist therapy could empower older women by having 
them watch movies and television programs which involved powerful female roles. On the 
other hand, some studies explained gender gaps in news media with reference to cultural 
factors (Chen, 2017; Bogren, 2013). Referring to the descriptions of women in news reports 
about corruption as “a source of trouble,” Chen (2017) pointed out that such narratives came 
from enduring misogyny within political storytelling traditions, which prevented women 
from participating in politics. Similarly, Bogren (2013) claimed that women’s images in news 
about psychotropics use and drinking depended on how certain cultures recognized the 
psychoactive substance and whether “bad” characteristics were connected with drinking 
among women. A cultural approach is powerful when analyzing cultural backgrounds which 
generate women’s images. But it is only one part of the picture for analyzing news about 
corruption. In order to study Chinese corruption news, it is important to know not only how 
Chinese traditional culture defines gender relations, but also how the political system utilizes 
such gender relations, and how media systems help to reinforce gender differences in news 
reports and comments about corruption. 
In sum, although most previous studies on gender images in news reports about 
corruption have tended to be empirical, the most commonly employed theoretical 
frameworks - a feminist approach/theory that pays attention to resistance and empowerment 
of women, and a cultural approach that focuses on reasons that produced gender images in 
news media – have not been able fully to provide an integrated picture to explain gender 
representation in news about corruption in China. In the next chapter, I outline an alternative 
approach, based on Foucault’s analysis of power-knowledge relations, as the theoretical 
framework for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Limitations of Existing Related Literature 
On the whole, academic literature on gender representations in news media reveals 
that women are under-represented or stereotyped in media coverage, demonstrating and 
reinforcing significant gender boundaries. The literature concerning gender representation in 
political news is mainly focused on media coverage and images of female politicians. It 
reveals that despite increased media coverage for female politicians, women are still 
stereotyped. As observed in the previous chapter, women who do not conform to expected or 
normative gender roles, such as those who commit corruption or resist official propaganda, 
are described as “bad women” or depicted as “a source of trouble.” 
I question whether cultural approaches used in some previous studies to explore the 
cultural roots of media representations are adequate for understanding gender representation 
in news about corruption. The scholarship of cultural approaches demonstrates that media 
content is presented in ways that are deeply-rooted in traditional gender norms. However, 
some issues require understandings that take into consideration factors beyond the cultural 
approach. For instance, in China, state-media continue to use the phrase “bao ernai” – 
originally related to ancient China’s social hierarchy and discrimination towards women who 
were concubines - to describe officials’ extramarital affairs. To know the reasons why they 
use this phrase, one author (Chen, 2017) traced the traditional cultural norms and rules used 
to describe women as sources of trouble ---- women were considered to be responsible for the 
crackdown of a dynasty. However, traditional discourses are not produced and reproduced 
automatically, but are embedded in processes related to the exercise of power. According to 
Foucault (1990; 1979), this power is omnipresent and everywhere, and determines domains 
of knowledge. In his work The History of Sexuality Volume I (1990), Foucault found that 
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educational institutions and devices had imparted discourses of children’s sex, that is “since 
the eighteenth century it has multiplied the forms of discourse on the subject; it has 
established various points of implantation for sex; it has coded contents and qualified 
speakers” (p.29). In this sense, Foucault’s analysis of power-knowledge relations makes it 
possible to decode power operations in the process of imparting aspects of traditional cultures 
within modern societies. Gender discourses are widely imparted across social settings 
through school, family, media, and other institutions. 
The media system is especially significant in shaping and conveying regulatory 
discourses in contemporary China. In previous chapters, it has been observed that China does 
not have a fully independent media system, and corruption-related news is tightly controlled 
by the state. Given this situation, how does the government of China execute constant 
surveillance and censorship of the media system, and what messages does it convey through 
these media? How can state power be exercised in an overt or hidden way? What is more, 
according to Foucault (1990), power extends far beyond the state and its regulatory 
mechanisms, as “a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (p.93). A focus on 
this invisible power, as well as more visible power relations, is a useful analytical tool for me 
to explore why certain discourses, including some elements of traditional cultures, circulate 
in modern Chinese society. My research, which addresses the extent to which these 
representations may or may not be indicative of contemporary media coverage of women in 
reports about corruption in China, is informed by Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge but 
not limited to this model. Based on the research questions, this study focuses on the way 
women’s images are constructed within this media coverage and seeks to identify power 
relations that are related to discourses about women. Because these news reports and news 
articles come especially from the government’s official news agency, it is important to pay 
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attention not only to cultural factors, but to the power structures embedded within the broader 
social – political context in China in order to understand this issue. 
I am particularly interested in what this may reveal about power relations and the 
construction of gender roles in a society that maintains an official policy of gender equity. In 
other words, in what ways do cultural traditions and political systems intersect to influence 
these descriptions of women? Do cultural traditions form the power that is invisible in daily 
life? Do political systems exert direct power exercise on gender discourses? 
Foucault’s power-knowledge model focuses not so much on the subject of knowledge 
as on mechanisms by which knowledge is produced (Mills, 2003). The relations of power-
knowledge enable me to explore how power-structure influences everyday life and how 
knowledge reflects power. This study focuses on how traditional characteristics related to 
women became descriptions of women in corruption news, and how public discourses 
influence people’s attitudes on women, especially “bad women” in corruption news. In terms 
of methodology, I use critical discourse analysis, so Foucault’s theory is aligned with this 
method. 
3.2 Foucault’s Theory of Power-Knowledge 
One of the major topics of Foucault’s work is the relation of power-knowledge, which 
he developed in many of his works, including History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish. 
This theory is quite powerful, as it challenges the status quo by deconstructing the self-
evidence of institutions and their power-knowledge base (Newnham, 2014). Foucault used 
power-knowledge to analyze various social problems and topics, such as madness, clinical 
practice, medicine, sexuality, and prisons. I first review the relations between power and 
knowledge and the Panopticon, and then I will map out my use of this theory for my analysis. 
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3.2.1 Power-Knowledge 
Foucault’s notion of power is different from traditional power, which allows one to 
exert influence upon another person without consent. In Foucault’s masterpiece, History of 
Sexuality, he analyzes the power mechanisms behind sex discourses in everyday life. 
According to Foucault (1990), “power is everywhere… permanent, repetitious, inert, and 
self-reproducing….” (p.93). By analyzing the historical process of sexuality, Foucault points 
out that sex discourses were incorporated into medical and scientific discourses, emphasizing 
how such combinations operate as mechanisms of control over the entire population. 
Controlling the population helps to strengthen the state, so a series of mechanisms developed 
to make people’s biological features become a focus of political strategy (Foucault, 2007; 
Ahonen, Tienari, Meriläinen, & Pullen, 2014). This power is named as biopower, which 
refers to ways in which humans may be governed or controlled as living beings, guiding, 
regulating and directing individuals at a distance (Foucault, 1979, 1990, 2007, 2008; Power, 
2011; Ahonen et al., 2014). In other words, power is not related to an entity that exists in 
specific locations but is, rather, decentralized, silent, inconspicuous and pervasive (Joas & 
Knobl, 2009). By directing people’s actions and attitudes in everyday life, power produces 
knowledge and language to depict a discourse (Foucault, 1979; Malatzky & Bourke, 2018). 
As a way to transform power relations and produce power, discourses are powerful in 
constructing objects and the truth (Pitsoe & Letseka, 2013). In this sense, biopower works 
through corruption news discourse by sending messages about behavioural standards related 
to people involved in corruption scandals. News discourse transforms power relations 
through the ways in which it constructs the “truth of corruption.” Because corruption news 
discourse contains traditional gender ideologies (Chen, 2017) and is controlled by the ruling 
party, I decode the news discourse from two aspects - traditional gender relations and 
politicians’ words. Specifically, as Figure 3.1 shows, I focus on how these discourses 
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represent women, men, husband-wife relationships, and politicians’ slogans. Then, I focus on 
power relations behind news articles; and relations between the traditional culture and the 
political power. To illustrate power relations, I will focus on several structural factors. Figure 
3.1 shows the main elements in the theoretical framework.  
Figure 3.1 Elements of the theoretical framework 
Throughout China’s history, Confucianism has restricted women’s body and thoughts 
in two ways. First, women should be chaste (jie) and virtuous (zhen); that is, women’s bodies 
can only belong to their husbands; if the husband dies, the wife has to commit suicide to 
remain her faithful to him (Du & Mann, 2003). The best example is suicide committed by 
widows, as 12,323 widows committed suicide during the Qing dynasty (Du & Mann, 2003). 
It should be noted that widow suicide also happened at the fall of the Song dynasty and the 
Ming dynasty, because of fear of rape. Chastity and virtuousness strictly controlled women’s 
bodies. Requirements related to chastity and virtuousness did not solely emerge as 
requirements or speeches from intellectuals but reflected the government’s recognitions as 
well (Du & Mann, 2003). The government praised women who committed suicide after the 
death of their husbands, as those women were recorded by the Biographies of Exemplary 
Women (lienü zhuan). Women who refused to follow those requirements would receive 
punishment and condemnation from the public. In this sense, those women whose body did 
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not belong to husbands or who had extramarital relations with men were intolerable in 
ancient society. They were recognized as unchaste and unvirtuous. Many ancient proverbs 
and stories condemn women as sources of trouble, but seldom condemn wives as sources of 
trouble. It is necessary to know whether women, who did not appear as wives, received 
criticism from authors who produce news about corruption. 
Second, the husband-wife relationship is the core of Confucian norms and rules 
(Zang, 2003), emphasizing that women should put the family as the priority in showing their 
gender identity. Actually, a wife should marry the husband and put the husband’s family as 
the first priority (Ko, Haboush, Piggott, 2003). In the Maoist period, women attained the 
ability to pursue careers outside of the home, which represented a great leap forward in terms 
of gender equality (Yunjuan & Xiaoming, 2007; Xiaoying, 2010; Sun & Chen, 2015). 
However, due to the withdrawal of publicly funded services in the market transition, women 
had to work outside of the home and take care of the family at the same time. In order to 
understand how these dual responsibilities are represented in media discourse, I will focus in 
part on whether authors of news reports about corruption refer to traditional wifehood to 
judge women’s behaviours and how women are expected to behave in terms of their roles in 
the private sphere and in the public sphere.  
In Foucault’s terms, bio-power is used to examine attitudes and power exercised on 
women’s bodies and behaviours. I examine both state and commercial media’s discourses – 
the words, phrases and sentences they use to describe women involved in corruption 
scandals.    
As traditional gender power structures suggest that men were breadwinners, it is 
important to examine gender relations in news about corruption. I will focus on discourses 
related to men and the relationship between men and women. Traditionally, both men and 
women were required to be virtuous and moral. The ideal men should be morally superior 
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and would be called “junzi” in Chinese (Clark & Wang, 2004). The core virtues of 
Confucianism for a man are “ren (humanity, benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (property), 
zhi (wisdom), xiao (filial piety), ti (brotherly love-love and respect for one’s elder brother)” 
(Jiang, 2009, p.232). Both education and rituals are ways for a man to become virtuous in the 
Confucianism sense; after being educated by Confucian classics, a man would be recognized 
as a good person and citizen (Clark & Wang, 2004). As ancient China was a scholar-gentry 
class dominated society (Leung, 2003), the ultimate goal of education was to pass the 
imperial examinations, to be an official and to govern the state with virtuous leadership. 
Nowadays, at an individual level, the ideal man has changed a little bit, as Liu (2019) 
observes that hegemonic masculinity has changed from the traditional “wen-wu” ideal (“wen” 
refers education attainment, and “wu” means physical power) to a complex model with "sex 
differentiation; heterosexuality; virility; consumerism; and achievement of status, power, and 
wealth” (p. 298). In order to understand these discourses, I will focus on the way men are 
depicted in news stories about corruption, including any expectations conveyed for male 
cadres, and whether different expectations are attributed to corrupt cadres. Then, I will 
examine the gender relations in the news reports, including whether men take the most 
responsibility for corruption scandals as they are supposed to be more powerful than women.  
The Chinese government likes to build a positive image of Chinese history to make 
the current system look like the only possible mode of rule for Chinese society. The CCP 
highlights what it considers to be great achievements, such as the return of Hong Kong, so 
the CCP emphasizes achievements through different media forms, such as middle school 
textbooks, TV programs and movies. For instance, the film My People, My Country (wo he 
wode zuguo), which is a movie to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Foundation of PRC, 
consists of seven achievements, including the Foundation of PRC, the successful explosion of 
first atom bomb in the 1960s, the event of the Chinese women volleyball team’s Olympic 
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gold medal in 1984, the return of Hong Kong, the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the celebration of 
the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the event of the 
manned spacecraft Shenzhen-11’s return to Earth (Zhang, 2019). On the other hand, for 
social issues or disasters caused by the CCP or other sensitive matters, such as the brutal 
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests and the Cultural Revolution, the CCP 
simplifies these issues or avoids touching them in various media platforms and historical 
inquiry. Ironically, Hong Kong’s months-long anti-government protests in 2019 have made 
Hong Kong issues become sensitive, but the state media try to avoid reporting news that is 
not good for CCP ruling. It is noteworthy that the textbook of a course about politics does not 
mention corruption issues (Wang, 2011). In this sense, it is necessary to know how the CCP 
views corruption scandals and what causes it attributes to corruption, including how 
corruption can be linked to gender issues, in the ways that news reports about corruption are 
framed. 
Chinese politicians play an important role in establishing gender norms in 
contemporary China and influencing people’s perceptions of gender. According to Scott 
(1986), gender is a social construction which is focused on a sexed body and penetrates into 
various spheres; specifically, “gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based 
on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying 
relationships of power” (p.1067). Even traditional gender discourses that are outdated are 
utilized by politicians. Premier Zhou Enlai, for example, proposed a role model for women 
that continued to be connected with traditional women’s roles. He said that women had two 
production tasks: one is material production; another one is to give birth to more children 
(Xue, 2016). The slogans of Chairman Mao, as the first Chairman of the PRC, had great 
influence in Chinese society. Deng Xiaoping, as the person who changed China into a 
modern society with the opening and reform policy, also employed gender discourses to 
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support his policies. Similarly, President Xi Jinping also proposed many patriarchal slogans 
in conjunction with his efforts to strengthen controls on the media system and public speech 
(Fincher, 2018). For corruption news coverage, I will examine slogans proposed by the 
current leader of China, President Xi Jinping, to see how the interaction between knowledge 
of sexuality and political power can influence what people may believe. My analysis will 
address the content of slogans, how they function in corruption news coverage and the 
connections between slogans and policy-making.  
Both biopower and disciplinary power combine to explain why people believe and 
normalize their behaviours in order to meet politicians’ requirements. According to Foucault 
(1990), power, when exercised through discourses about sex, operates in four ways: 
prohibitions on children’s sex; individualization of sex issues; constant presence in the 
exercise of power; and devices of sexual saturation. Power cannot exist without an apparatus 
which produces and reproduces an ever-greater quantity of discourse about sex (Foucault, 
1979). One of my research questions, to find out power relations and power structures behind 
gender discourses in news reports about corruption, seeks to address how institutions govern 
the knowledge about gender and promote the interests of the CCP. There is a quasi-
government organization that is mandated to solve women’s issues and promote gender 
equality. The organization is the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) (quanguo fulian;
全国妇联). An exploration of this organization can provide insights into how the state 
represents Chinese women’s day-to-day experiences (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998). 
Specifically, I will pay attention to relationships between the ACWF and the ruling party, 
how the ACWF uses disciplinary power to normalize government policies, and how the 
ACWF establishes norms for “women” via the exercise of biopower.  
The second apparatus is the family system. According to Foucault (1979, 1990, 
2008), the family is an example of sovereign power, while disciplinary power could be 
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regarded as a supplemental power exercise in the family. Sovereign power, which is related 
to blood-conquest, reconfirms its authority via rituals (Foucault, 2008). In this sense, the 
family is a power hierarchy with unequal positions among its members (Taylor, 2012). 
Considering that the family plays essential roles in socialization, I will examine whether the 
family power structure reproduces patriarchal norms. Whereas the disciplinary system 
involves permanent supervision, supervision is supplementary to the family (Foucault, 2008). 
As a sovereign institution, the purpose of a family is to be solid and static (Foucault, 1990). 
Specifically, via the gradual exercise of disciplinary power, the goal of the family is to 
produce healthy, normal adults (Taylor, 2012). In this sense, parents monitor their children's 
behaviour or ask their children to perform certain behaviours, such as reciting ancient poems. 
My study will explore whether parental disciplinary power over children reproduces 
traditional norms. 
Foucault’s biopower and disciplinary power work in explaining how school programs 
could be effective in controlling the student population. For instance, by using Foucault's 
biopower, Kalmbach Phillips and Nava (2011) point out that some Latino\a-clustered schools 
in the USA hire Latino\a teachers to establish role models for Latino\a students in order to 
control the population of Latino\a students. One way to normalize the power is to emphasize 
the English language ability of teachers, as speaking English is the norm (Kalmbach Phillips 
& Nave, 2011). As a socialization institution, education is one of the daily bases for the CCP 
to indoctrinate the population with state propaganda (Huang, 2015). To establish “the ruling 
party,” the Chinese government has exerted ideological-political education among young 
people since 1949 (“Chinese ideo-political education,” 2014). Ideological-political education 
contains moral education, psychological education, patriotic education, civic education, and 
professional ethics classes (“Chinese ideo-political education,” 2014; Wang, 2018). 
Specifically, ideological-political education in China is carried out from elementary school to 
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universities. I am less interested in whether passing those ideological-political courses is an 
important criterion for receiving further education than in how this ideological-political 
education normalizes the CCP's leading roles in social events in key ways, such as changing 
the history textbooks or making political education courses compulsory in universities. 
In sum, for Foucault, power is fundamentally relational (Foucault, 1979, 1980, 1990, 
2002; Heizmann & Olssen, 2015), and no structure in social and personal life can escape 
from the exercise of power (Ghinăraru, 2014). Using Foucault’s power-knowledge enables 
me to examine discourses and various power structures employed through various 
institutions, including family, education, the All-China Women’s Federation, and politics, 
and integrate the exercise of overt and hidden forms of power. However, we cannot fully 
understand gender relations without analyzing these in conjunction with the media system in 
China, as it is necessary to know how this media system makes traditional gender roles 
omnipresent. Because the Chinese media system is not independent and bears some special 
characteristics, I analyze it with reference to Foucault’s concept of Panopticism. 
3.2.2 The Media as Panopticon 
There are several issues that should be considered for an understanding of China’s 
media system. Firstly, unlike in western countries, China’s media system cannot empower 
different voices. Most western countries have powerful and independent media systems based 
on principles of freedom of speech and human rights. Although the Chinese government has 
claimed continuously that Chinese citizens have freedom of speech, it is an empty discourse, 
as the government treats the media as its mouthpiece and propaganda tool. Secondly, the 
management of the media system is based on visible regulations and invisible censorship. 
Here, the Chinese government exerts media censorship without legislation. Thirdly, in recent 
years, the central state authority has controlled the media system more and more tightly and 
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applied punishments for people who disobey their requirements. All the above characteristics 
make the media system special and worthy of separate analysis.  
Foucault uses the concept of the panopticon to illustrate how the exercise of power 
can be practiced in daily life via discourses and gestures. In the book Discipline and Punish, 
“Foucault uses this juxtaposition (of two events) to argue that the public infliction of pain has 
been displaced by a new mode of discipline of the body, via surveillance, correction, and 
training in an enclosed space” (Power, 2011, p.39). Prisons designed in accordance with 
Bentham’s model of the panopticon are the tool to exercise power over individual bodies and 
coordinate individual bodies with others (Foucault, 1975; Power, 2011; Ghinăraru, 2014; 
Garrison, 2017). In the panopticon, the supervisor from the central tower can see all 
prisoners, but prisoners cannot see the supervisor. In this sense, prisoners are objects of 
information, and they are not allowed to have communicational exchanges (Ghinăraru, 2014). 
Prisons are not only for observation but for changes and corrections to behaviour as well 
(Foucault, 1979; Ghinăraru, 2014). However, while defining the generality of the panopticon, 
Foucault claimed that the purpose was for the relation of discipline rather than the relation of 
sovereignty, and discipline in this context means a type of power (Ghinăraru, 2014). In 
Foucault’s explanation of prisons, individuals are not pre-given and atomized individuals but 
focal points in a focal-field model; that is, individuals are subjects in a broad social context 
with discourses and gestures which are mandated by the network of power (Garrison, 2017). 
Power (2011, p.39) emphasizes that, “The prison is the exemplary organizational location for 
a double sense of discipline in Foucault’s sense ---- both as constraint over the individual and 
as an individuating positive body of knowledge.” 
I apply this model of the Panopticon to an understanding of the Chinese media system 
by demonstrating how regulatory power and disciplinary power work together to make 
people follow government propaganda and requirements. Special attention will be given to 
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regulations, laws, and censorship related to the Internet. Before the Internet was introduced 
into China, the main source that Chinese people got information was from newspapers and 
television (Yu, 2006). However, the Internet seriously changed the media culture, as people 
can get information from different sources and can express their ideas and thoughts. Now, 
China has the largest population of netizens in the world. The Chinese government always 
controls the media system, and the Internet has become a site of disciplinary power (Yu, 
2006). Voices can be muted if they violate the CCP’s bottom line. As punishment is a 
political strategy (Foucault, 1979), I will analyze how such a strategy works well in aligning 
people’s voices in accordance with the CCP’s expectations. In reviewing the way state 
authorities mute different voices, I will identify aspects related to the bottom line of the CCP 
and the way the party monitors the media system.  
The final question concerns aspects of traditional gender discourses that may continue 
to be conveyed through the media system, family sphere, education system, government 
organs and politicians’ speeches.  What is the essential function of these discourses, that is, 
why does the government want to promote women’s image in a traditional way? For 
Foucault, a prison system modelled on the Panopticon represents more general ways in which 
power relations are maintained, in this case, as a strategy to exercise power over the human 
body. Through constant surveillance and punishments, individuals learn to behave in 
expected ways. In this sense, discourses indicate ideals for individuals, and punishments 
ensure that discourses work effectively. By examining the web of discourses circulated across 
different institutions, I want to find out which factors account for power relations that make it 
possible for traditional gender discourses to be reproduced across various media forms. 
Power and knowledge imply one another, as power cannot be exercised without a corpus of 
knowledge. This leads to the question of whether, in the case of contemporary China, 
traditional women’s roles may, in some cases, meet the needs of the ruling authorities, just as 
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in ancient China, the ruling class adopted Confucianism to meets its needs to rule the society 
without unrest. 
In Foucault’s theory, power is closely connected with context (Foucault, 1979, 1990, 
2007, 2008; Ahonen et al., 2014). Since power and context are intertwined, identifying 
context is necessary in order to identify the mechanisms and techniques employed in the 
operation of power. Ahonen et al. (2014) point out that, “Context is understood as a 
malleable entity (re)produced in taken-for-granted practices and discourses, ways of 
organizing social reality, that are subject to change over time” (p.265). Power exists in certain 
contexts, and context helps to maintain power-knowledge relations and to produce and 
reproduce discourses as a way to maintain power relations. Identifying power relations 
should first be about identifying the context. In my study, the main focus is to examine how 
biopower affects women via examining women’s and men’s media discourse. Specifically, I 
will focus on women’s roles as wives, as women, and as mistresses (in Chinese, the mistress 
can be referred to as ernai, xiaosan and qingfu). For men, I will need to examine their roles as 
men, as husbands, and as officials or leaders that are the ultimate goal for morally superior 
men; and I will examine metaphors used to describe corrupt cadres (metaphors with Chinese 
characteristics). To fully understand gender relations in news about corruption - all of which 
is released by the official media - I will also pay attention to the ways in which the 
government manages its image in two ways: the discussion of the causes of corruption and 
the government’s responsibilities in corruption, and quotations of politicians’ thoughts and 
speeches which indicate how they treat corruption. In this sense, knowledge about women’s 
bodies and images cannot be understood without identifying features of the Chinese social 
context that help to construct and reinforce these forms of representation. Thus, the following 
specific contextual features are related to three aspects: Confucianism and its gender 
ideology; media system’s functions to the CCP and how media represent women after the 
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media reform; and political system’s flaws, including corruption, and how the government 
controls the media system. 
3.3 The Influence of China’s Social Context on Gender Representation in News about 
Corruption 
One purpose of this thesis is to identify the reasons why gender images are presented 
as they appear in news reporting on corruption. The previous section introduced several 
theoretical elements to analyse how power-knowledge relations shape gender representations. 
To describe whether public knowledge about women’s roles in China has connections with 
broad power relations, three explanatory factors show in the literature. These explanatory 
factors are traditional culture, contemporary media system, and political system. 
3.3.1 Traditional Culture 
Traditional cultural practices dominated Chinese society for thousands of years, and 
Confucian norms and rules have deeply influenced gender relations in contemporary China. 
My analysis begins with Confucius (551 BCE-479 BCE), whose influence has extended 
across more than 2500 years of history in China. Confucianism had become predominant in 
Ancient China since the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220CE), as the Han Dynasty adopted it as 
state doctrine included in the education system (Yun, 2013). During the long history, 
Confucianism continued to develop through interactions with other famous schools, such as 
Legalism, Monism, Daoism, Buddhism, and so on, and has penetrated almost all aspects of 
society, including “social norms, political ideologies, cultural traditions, educational systems, 
and ethical standards” (Yun, 2013, p.584; Yao, 2000; Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989; Ho, 
1962; Yang, 1967). Because Confucianism has influenced people’s thoughts and behaviours, 
in order to understand traditional culture’s influence on women, it is necessary to examine 
Confucianism.  
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3.3.1.1 Confucius’s Ideas towards Women 
According to Gao (2003) and Clark and Wang (2004), Confucius wrote very little 
about women, but it appears from his work that he did not think women and men should be 
equal ---- “The Master said: Only women and small men seem difficult to look after. If you 
keep them close, they become insubordinate; but if you keep them at a distance, they become 
resentful (wei nvzi yu xiaoren nan yang ye, jin zhi ze shu, yuan zhi ze yuan; 唯女子与小人难
养也，近之则恕，远之则怨)” (Confucian Analects 17:23). Sometimes, people argue that 
“women” here refers to “female children” and “look after” means to “nourish,” but, at least, 
such a comment does not indicate that Confucius respected men and women equally (Jiang, 
2009). Jiang (2009, p. 231) observes that, “Although he does not say that men are easy to 
cultivate, by overtly saying that women are hard to cultivate without saying the same thing 
about men, he implies that women are harder to nourish than men and therefore inferior to 
men.”  
In another place, Confucius says:  
            (Wuwang yue: “yu you luanchen shiren.” Kongzi yue: “cai nan, bu qi ran hu? Tang 
yu zhi ji, yu si wei sheng, you furen yan, jiuren erji.”) 
            [The sage king] Shun had five ministers and society was well managed. King Wu said: 
“I had ten able people as ministers.” Confucius commented, “It is difficult to find 
talented ones, isn’t it? The times of Tang [Yao’s dynasty] and Yu [Shun’s dynasty] 
were very rich in talent. [Among KingWu’s ministers] there was a woman, so there 
were only nine people”. (Jiang, 2009, p.231). 
On this occasion, Confucius apparently looked down on women by not counting a 
woman as a human. Jiang (2009) contends that, although some scholars may argue that such 
a comment praised women’s ability to address public affairs and Confucius believes women 
are as talented as men, this makes no sense. According to Jiang (2009, p. 232), “If Confucius 
believed that men and women are equal, he would have said ‘there was one woman, so only 
nine men’ instead of saying that ‘there was one woman, so only nine people’.” Clearly, 
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although Confucius did not say a lot about women’s and men’s status, he did not put women 
on the same level as men. 
3.3.1.2 Ideas from Confucius’ Followers 
Confucianism has had an extensive influence on China’s society. Although he said 
little about women, most of the norms and principles were developed by his followers.  
Mencius, the most important follower and interpreter of Confucius, wrote: “When a 
daughter marries, her mother instructs her. Sending her off at the gate, she cautions her, 
saying, ‘When you go to your family, you must be respectful, and you must be cautious. Do 
not disobey your husband.’ To regard obedience as proper is the Way of a wife or concubine” 
(Clark & Wang, 2004, p.396). Mencius was more concerned about men than women. In the 
Book of Mencius, he wrote about the Five Relationships, that is, “love between father and 
son, duty between ruler and subjects, the distinction between husband and wife, the 
precedence of the old over the young, and trust between friends” (Jiang, 2009, P.232). 
Although Mencius mentioned the distinction between husband and wife, he did not mention 
details about it, and he did not mention females in other relationships. These Five 
Relationships became a key element of the value system, which is an essential patriarchal 
system and such value system developed over thousands of years” (Leung, 2003). According 
to Jiang (2009), Mencius’s ideal moral men should be guided by the principle that, 
            A man lives in the spacious dwelling, occupies the proper position, and goes along 
the highway of the Empire. When he achieves his ambition he shares these with the 
people; when he fails to do so he practices the Way alone. He cannot be led into 
excesses when wealthy and honored or deflected from his purpose when poor and 
obscure, nor can he be made to bow before superior force. This is what I would call a 
great man [da zhangfu 大丈夫 ]” (p. 233). 
Man is the main focus for Mencius, while women’s virtue is obedience. The 
Confucian Book of Rites also highlights women’s subservience to the man: “Woman is a 
follower (cong). When she is young, she obeys her father, when she gets married, she obeys 
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her husband, when her husband dies she obeys her son” (Chen, 1990, p. 531; Clark & Wang, 
2004, p. 396). Compared with Confucius’s own ideas regarding women, Mencius’ ideas 
appear to express more direct sexism. 
As previously described, Confucianism became the national doctrine and incorporated 
into the education system since its adoption by the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE). Thus, 
society was cultivated by Confucianism’s “central doctrine,” which “encompasses goodness, 
benevolence, consideration, humanity, and kind-heartedness. Related teachings emphasize 
such qualities as loyalty to government, respect for authority, reciprocity, self-cultivation, and 
neighborliness” (Yun, 2013, p. 585). Gender relations were combined with a binary concept 
of Daoism, yin-yang (阴 ---- 阳). “Yin, (阴) etymologically, means the shady side of the 
mountain and yang (阳) means the sunny side” (Yun, 2013, p. 585). The yin-yang binary was 
not a contradictory concept but meant harmonious relationships. Traditionally, “yang” means 
male and “yin” means female. The Five Classics (Wujing,五经), one of the most important 
Chinese classical writings, describes gender relationships in a hierarchical way by using this 
binary: 
            Things emerge and contract by following yang. All things end and begin by following 
yang. The rectitude of the Three Kings rose to its utmost in following yang. In this 
way it can be seen that they esteemed yang and demeaned yin...Men, however, mean, 
are in all cases yang; women, however hobble, are all yin [italics added]...Categories 
of evil all are yin, whereas categories of good all are yang; yang is a matter of virtue 
(de 德), yin is a matter of punishment (xing 刑 ). (Raphals, 1998, p. 163; Yun, 2013, 
p. 586). 
Such a statement indicates a foundation of distinct gender ideologies established 
through Confucianism. Although the religious ideals over time were combined with other 
concepts and ideologies, this basic notion of gender relations was not changed and became 
more discriminatory towards women.  
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3.3.1.3 Women’s Roles and Duties in Ancient China 
Ancient China was a patriarchal society, and, as Clark and Wang (2004, p. 395) 
emphasize, “THE MISERY OF CHINESE WOMEN throughout history is well known: the 
binding of feet, female infanticide, loveless marriages, second wives, the widow’s obedience 
to the eldest son, widow suicide, and concubinage”. In this part, I elaborate on women’s roles 
in ancient Chinese society. 
Chinese women had a long history of being subjugated by men. A woman played 
roles as a daughter, a wife and a mother, but none of these roles treated women as an 
individual human being (Gao, 2003; Clark & Wang, 2004; Jiang, 2009; Yun, 2013; Kung & 
Ma, 2014; Du, 2016). The most famous norms expressing that women were totally 
subservient were the three obediences (sancong;三从). The three obediences means women 
must obey their father before marriage, obey their husband after marriage, and obey the 
oldest son after the husband’s death (Gao, 2003). In traditional society, a married woman did 
not count as a member of her native family. An old Chinese saying indicates: “a married 
daughter is like the water that is thrown out of doors” (Gao, 2003, p.119). The three 
obediences ruined many people’s lives, since “the birth of a daughter in traditional China was 
a disappointment; the birth of a second daughter brought grief and perhaps death to the 
infant; the birth of a third daughter was a tragedy for which the mother was most assuredly 
blamed” (Wolf, 1985, p. 1).  
Specifically, in ancient society, a woman’s life would be determined by the tasks they 
performed for different family members, to do all the housework, bear children, and take care 
of the elderly; only by doing this could women be praised by society (Curtin, 1977). What is 
more, women did not have the right to claim a divorce. For instance, according to Lessons for 
Women (Nvjie;女诫), a classic literary work authored by Ban Zhao (班昭) in the Eastern Han 
Dynasty (25AD – 220 AD), the husband is the heaven for the wife, and the wife cannot leave 
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the husband, as the heaven is unavoidable (fuzhe tianye. Tian gubuketao, fu gubukeliye;夫者
天也。天固不可逃，夫固不可离也) (Ban, n.d.). They could claim divorce only in certain 
conditions which were named Seven Reasons for Expelling One’s Wife (qichizhitiao;七出之
条) - “disobedience to the husband’s parents, failing to bear a son, adultery, jealousy, 
contracting a harmful disease, malicious gossip, and theft” (Park & Cho, 1995, p.125). In 
ancient China, if a wife was considered to have failed to bear a son, she would be blamed by 
the husband’s family for not carrying on the family name. She could be sent back to her 
original family, or, in some rich families, her husband could have more than one wife (Gao, 
2003). In sum, women did not have equal rights as men in the family but could be blamed by 
the whole family due to giving birth to girls and marital problems. 
Another social norm is that widows committed suicide after their husbands’ death. “A 
notable Confucian exemplar was ‘chaste women’ (lienv;烈女), who were basically widows 
who had vowed not to remarry or, at the extreme, even committed suicide after their 
husbands' deaths, in order to demonstrate their unshaken determination to preserve fidelity 
and loyalty to their (deceased) husbands until death” (Kung & Ma, 2004, p. 135). Such 
behaviour was regarded as the worship of chastity, which was highly praised by traditional 
society.  
Although women were supposed to belong to the family, they did not have equal 
rights with males in many aspects. Women in China were expected to stay at home and do 
everything for the family and even sacrifice for the family and marriage, but they did not 
have the right to receive an education and to get government jobs or engage in social 
activities. Although women took care of the family, women were not the head of the family. 
Males were the heads of the family, and they had the right to control and inherit the family 
property, but women did not have such rights (Changli, 2010). 
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Another practice that was supposed to confirm women’s status was footbinding. 
Footbinding, starting from the Song dynasty (宋朝; 960-1279), originally was used to 
demarcate women from elite families with women from commoner family ---- women who 
came from elite families needed to practice footbinding (Barlow, 2004). Later, footbinding 
became a signifier to increase the chance in the marriage market (Yun, 2013). According to 
Ko (2005), footbinding was a practice done by women, and women desired to look beautiful 
by binding their feet as men admired feet of perfect size. Ko (1997) points out that 
footbinding was performed as a sign of civilization in the Ming dynasty. Such a practice 
existed in China until the end of the Qing dynasty (清朝; 1644-1912), and Han Chinese 
women resisted unbinding their feet as footbinding was a way to keep Han Chinese traditions 
(Ko, 1997). However, Johnson (1983) specifics that footbinding, stemming from Confucian 
tradition, was overt oppression of women, which was cruel and vicious and underscored 
women’s values as “goods for exchange” (p.16). Ancient Chinese society’s social norms and 
rituals were shaped by Confucianism, although some of those norms and rituals changed in 
different dynasties. Elite family and aristocracy created codes for social norms and rituals. In 
this sense, footbinding is a social norm and tradition from Confucian society.  
In sum, women in ancient society had a very low status without the right to education 
and work, and had to sacrifice for the family. Whether a woman was virtuous was assessed 
by her relations with her family and men. However, based on Seven Reasons for Expelling 
One’s Wife, women were almost responsible for all marital problems. 
3.3.1.4 Confucianism and May Fourth Movement 
Women’s inferior status was kept and reinforced by traditional Confucianism and 
feudalism for thousands of years (Leung, 2003). This began to change with the May Fourth 
Movement (1915-1921), which was a movement that supported the change to the Modern 
Chinese State, combined with a new culture movement (Sakamoto, 2004). As the new culture 
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movement in the early twentieth century, it had two significant features as compared with 
traditional culture. First, the new culture movement proposed a new social identity for 
individuals in modern society, which contained independent personalities, free thought and 
citizen status; second, the new culture movement sought to construct a new morality, new 
ideas, new language and new literature, and those constructions helped China to claim its 
place in the modern world (Lianfen, 2012).In this sense, the new culture movement re-
constructed the identity of individuals for modern China, but modern China also needed a 
new cultural identity.  
Since the May Fourth Movement was to seek a new culture in which emancipation of 
women was considered as an important feature of civilization and equality (Wang, 1999; 
Lianfen, 2012), the May Fourth Movement was also regarded as the first women’s movement 
in China (Leung, 2003). “Gender equality” and “equal rights” entered mainstream public 
discourse (Changli, 2010). Many new culturalists criticized traditional gender hierarchies and 
polygamy. The early feminist, He-Yin Zhen, claimed that gender inequality was deeply 
rooted in Confucianism (He-Yin, 1907). For instance, in ancient China, a man could have 
more than one wife, and widows were prohibited from remarrying, while He-Yin (1907) 
argued that by executing such norms, men could keep polygyny persistent. Prohibiting 
widows from remarrying was criticized by Hu Shi as well. In his article Chastity Issue 
(Zhencao Wenti; 贞操问题), he was against that prohibition and argued that being chaste 
should offer an equal chance for both man and woman to choose and people cannot compel 
women to be chaste (Hu, 1918). Lu Xun’s article About Women’s Emancipation (Guanyu 
Funv Jiefang; 关于妇女解放) criticized Confucianism and supported gender equality, 
although he said he seldom focused on women’s issues. He pointed out that after the May 
Fourth Movement, although many women left home to work in factories and restaurants, 
those women still suffered discrimination and exploitation (Lu, 1934). Such criticism implies 
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that women’s positions need to be improved in both the public sphere and in family and 
marriage roles. 
Wang (1999) identified several ways that revealed Confucianism’s inhumanness 
towards women, including “Footbinding, concubinage, arranged marriage, female chastity, 
sexual segregation.…” (p.12). The first step to emancipate women from the patriarchal 
family and subservient status was the equal right to enter school and universities. For 
instance, in the spring of 1920, Peking University decided to abandon the ban forbidding girls 
to enter school and accepted female students (Lianfen, 2012). At that time, sending daughters 
to schools was considered a patriotic gesture that symbolized a desirable social status (Wang, 
1999). Such a change challenged Confucianism’s principles in which “men should be in the 
outside world and women should be at home” (nanzhuwai nvzhunei; 男主外女主内).  
With the movement towards equal school entry, free love started to become the focus of the 
emancipation of women (Lianfen, 2012). A popular idea is that men and women should have 
free choice of mates and families should form with boundless love (J. Chen, 2012). In 
traditional society, marriage was arranged by the household, and women did not have the 
right to choose the people they married. What a woman did was to obey the decision of the 
family. When people got married, they did not know each other, not to mention developing 
ties of romance and love. During the May Fourth Movement, marriages or cohabitation based 
on love were considered as moral, while such relations were considered as immoral without 
love (Lianfen, 2012). At that time, The Ladies Journal (Funv zazhi; 妇女杂志), which 
focused on women’s emancipation and women’s issues, was the most influential women’s 
magazine (Wang, 1999). Zhang Xichen (1922), the chief editor for The Ladies Journal from 
1921-1925, identified free love as the essential solution for reforming old morality, old laws 
and old family systems. Along with these changes, the right to divorce became a topic of 
public attention as women did not have the right to claim divorce in ancient China. Although 
55 
 
the right to claim divorce was written in the Draft Civil Code, there were practical problems 
in exercising this right (Lianfen, 2012). For instance, some men decided to claim divorce 
from their wives, but most women did not have any education and did not have economic 
independence, so they could not lead a life without marriage. Some of them still lived with 
the husband’s family and took care of parents, such as Zhu An (Lu Xun’s rural wife). On the 
other hand, some women seemed to blur the boundaries of marriage by cohabiting with 
married men.  
The May Fourth Movement promoted the founding of many women’s associations 
with the aim to gain equal rights with men in dealing with family property. One of these 
associations, the League of Feminist Movement (Nvquan yundong tongmenghui;女权运动同
盟会), announced women should gain equal rights in the family, including control over 
family property (Huang, n.d.). Such a request was supported in the late 1920s, as the Civil 
Law acknowledged that the wife had shared possessions with the husband during the 
marriage (Changli, 2010).  
However, the May Fourth Movement mainly happened in urban areas, whereas such 
regulations were not implemented in rural areas while the gap between social classes limited 
the implementation of women’s rights (Changli, 2010). 
Through this movement, women gained rights of school entry and “free choice of 
marriage and divorce and an end to polygamy” (Leung, 2003, p. 363), and also gained rights 
to family property. Although women’s emancipation was a main target for the May Fourth 
Movement, this movement did not emancipate all women (Lei, 2011). What is more, the May 
Fourth Movement was launched by students and intellectuals, so most of its influence was in 
urban areas.  
In sum, women in ancient society had an inferior status in both indoor and outdoor 
activities; however, such traditional rules and norms were not removed thoroughly by the 
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May Fourth Movement which was supposed to bring shifts in culture with the result that 
many features of traditional culture had been maintained in the 20th century. Although 
women’s issues were not resolved completely, during this period, people enjoyed true 
freedom of speech for a brief few years in the early 1920s. There were many magazines 
devoted to gender equality, such as The Ladies’ Journal and the Eastern Journal (Dongfang 
zazhi;东方杂志). Meanwhile, besides feminism, the influence of anarchism, liberalism and 
socialism also grew during the early years of the Republic of China. Ironically, the media 
system in China had never experienced the freedom of speech since the foundation of PRC, 
and the CCP started to control the media system before the foundation of PRC.  
3.3.2 Media System 
As news about corruption is based on types of media fully controlled by the 
government, it is necessary to examine the nature of China’s media system. China has not 
had free media since 1949; as Chen and Zhong (1998, p.32) emphasize, “Free media is 
neither allowed by the government nor advocated by the political culture. According to 
Confucianism, still prevalent in China's sociopolitical life, the ‘wise and able’ government 
ought to ‘govern every aspect of social life’ including the media.”  
3.3.2.1 Media in Maoist and Cultural Revolution Periods 
China’s contemporary media system has been strongly influenced by political events. 
Based on Chairman Mao’s Talks At The Yenan Forum On Literature And Art (Zai Yan’an 
wenyi zuotanhui shang de jianghua;在延安问题座谈会上的讲话), there were two fronts 
during struggles for liberating people, one is the cultural front, and another is the military 
front (Mao, 1942). Although the military force is the most important thing during war-time, 
controlling literature and art has been given the same importance as controlling military 
force. Mao (1942) pointed out that literary and art workers should stand for the party and 
advocate the party’s spirit and party policy. In 1942, in order to launch the “Rectification 
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Movement (Zhengfeng yundong;整风运动)” in Yan’an, Mao reformed the CCP’s party 
organ, Liberation Daily  (Jiefang ribao;解放日报) (Dan, 2011). After the reform, Liberation 
Daily had become the “mouthpiece of the party” and the only publication in Yan’an, as other 
newspapers and magazines ceased publication. Through his reform, called the “Yan’an 
Model,” the press was party-owned and obligated to cater to the party’s interests in both the 
editorial policy and the content (Dan, 2008, 2011). Such a model was soon used for other 
media. Dan (2011, p. 108) observes that, “In this way, the media were made homogeneous 
through the institutional force of the party.” After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was 
founded in 1949, the CCP used the media system of Soviet Russia as a model. The media 
system was completely state-owned. Yang (2012) points out that a multi-level media system: 
nationally, the People’s Daily is the mouthpiece of the central government; provincially, 
there is a central party press (Dangbao;党报); in addition, there is a central party press in 
every city and counties in certain areas; and the party media provides guidelines which other 
publications should not be against them. 
Generally, the media system is monitored by the public. However, China’s media 
system did not follow that way. In fact, the party controlled the media system to keep it in 
line with the party’s interests, decisions and policies. In 1950, the Central Committee of CCP 
launched a campaign named “Resolution to Start Self-criticism and Criticism in the Press 
(Guanyu zai baozhi kanwu shang kaizhan piping he ziwo piping de jueding;关于在报纸刊物
上开展批评和自我批评的决定).” However, according to Dan (2011), this campaign only 
showed that the party has the right to use newspapers for criticism, and this campaign did not 
solve the freedom of the press. Here, the “criticism and self-criticism” was different from the 
“watchdog.” In any democratic society, watchdog means media is an independent force to 
check political power for the public, while the criticism and self-criticism “is a kind of 
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strategic empowerment under the monopoly leadership of the CCP” (Dan 2011, p. 108).  
From 1950 to 1976, there were a lot of political movements such as the anti-rightist campaign 
culminating in the Cultural Revolution, in order to clean up what Mao called capitalist 
elements in the society (Sun, Chang, & Yu, 2001). At that time, even though China had a 
great number of news outlets, such outlets had nothing to do with journalism. In sum, the 
biggest problem with China’s media system is that it was not independent, and such a media 
system provides conditions for propaganda to be circulated and media censorship to be 
executed. 
3.3.2.2 Media Reform 
With the implementation of the Opening and Reform policy, media systems started to 
reform in 1978 (Shao, Lu, & Hao, 2016). The reform, recognized “as ‘public causes in 
nature, but profit-making enterprises in management’ popularized the notion that media are 
both super-structure and part of the information industry” (Dan, 2011, p.108). Such a reform 
was oriented to financial reform - to address the financial burden for the government - and it 
did not touch the core part of the media system, including the political or corporate bias (Pan, 
2000; Zhao, 2008, Shao et al., 2016). Such a capitalist reform contributed to a situation in 
which all types of mass media came to focus on profits. Although this reform did not touch 
the core dynamics, it did reduce the political control to some degree. Compared with the 
Maoist and Cultural Revolution eras, there were several changes. First, many print media, 
such as afternoon and evening publications, news digests, and culture and lifestyle papers, 
were not required to carry ostensible political propaganda (Sun et al., 2001; C. C. Lee, 1994). 
Second, many news forms of mass media emerged, such as entertainment and leisure 
programs, which did not focus on political affairs (Sun et al., 2001; P. S. Lee, 1994). Within 
this period, although there were no private-owned mass media, many Chinese media started 
to make profits from advertisements and catering to audiences (Yang, 2012).   
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One of the achievements within the period of the market reform was the expansion of 
media systems. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1982), there were 180 
newspapers and fewer than 400 radio and television stations in China before the reform (Shao 
et al., 2016). Since the media reform, China had 1,918 newspapers, 9,876 magazines, and 
2,579 radio and television stations at the end of 2012 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
2012; as cited in Shao et al., 2016).  
Still, the biggest problem remains that the media system is not independent. 
According to Dan (2011), the associate Minister of China’s Publicity Ministry, Xu 
Guangchun (1997), claimed that newspapers should be political in nature. Notably, the media 
reform “ensures unchanged the media’s primary role as the mouthpiece of the party; the rule 
of the party over media and the politically correct orientation of public opinions’’ (Xu, 2002; 
as cited in Dan, 2011).   
Under the Opening and Reform policy, part of the media system had to be 
commercialized. This market transition enabled more women to participate in the job market, 
in the process challenging the traditional arrangements of care. According to Abrahamson 
(2016), under longstanding traditions, Chinese women who were married needed to take care 
of frail elderly, children, and the disabled. However, the reform contributed to circumstances 
which meant that women had to make a balance between work and domestic labour. Such a 
conflict was depicted in images of women in some public discourses. By selecting 202 
articles from three Chinese mainstream magazines between 1995 and 2012, Sun and Chen 
(2015) found that women’s images were complex in this period. On the one hand, the media 
were undergoing commercialization and started to care about individuals and the working 
environment of individuals. On the other hand, women’s images reflect traditional divisions 
of labour, as articles proposed women “returning home.” With respect to their findings, Sun 
and Chen conclude that they “provide empirical evidence of an increase in the media’s use of 
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individualistic framing to favour traditionalistic gender ideology” (2015, p.1104).  Although 
part of the media system had been reformed to be commercialized and to focus on 
individuals’ lives, media discourses on women are still based on traditional gender relations. 
In summary, the media system in China changed from completely state-owned and 
highly politicalized to both state-owned and private-owned and commercialization since 
1978. However, even though the reform changed many parts of the media, it is still controlled 
by the party and still needs to cater to the party’s interests. Party reforms did not really 
emancipate women after 1949, and women’s images in public discourses reflected and 
reinforced working and domestic roles.  
3.3.3 Political System 
After the foundation of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power 
and began to change Chinese society. In the Maoist era (1949-1976), there were a series of 
political campaigns, starvation caused by the Great Leap Forward (1958) and so-called “the 
three-year natural disaster” (1959-1961), “and a decade-long upheaval in the 1960s and 
1970s, with the cumulative number of casualties still defying calculation” (Lampton, 2015, 
p.3). The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was considered as a dark and disastrous time in 
contemporary China (Wei, 2011). In the early 1960s, some leaders, including Liu Shaoqi (刘
少奇), Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), Zhou Enlai (周恩来) and Chen Yun (陈云), came to play 
important roles in the central government. Their actions made Chairmen Mao frustrated and 
dissatisfied with them (Bachman, 2006). He began to emphasize “class struggle” in the 
political agenda. However, Mao did not realize his goals and eventually launched the cultural 
revolution in order to reinforce his power while eliminating political rivals in the party 
(Bachman, 2006). In 1978, China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, decided to transform a centralized 
socialist economy to a market-oriented economy. Deng decided the government should 
maintain political stability while reforming the economic system (Zhao, 2001). Deng 
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Xiaoping used the formula “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to deal with the conflict 
between socialism and market economy, in contrast to the prior period from 1958 to 1976 in 
which China had abandoned the market economy because it was supposed to be one of 
essential parts of capitalism (Boer & Li, 2015). By implementing an open door-policy, China 
has become the second-largest economy in the world (Boer & Li, 2015).  
Because of the rapid growth in the economy, more and more private companies 
emerged in the 1990s, many of which were founded by elites. While elites became rich, 
workers in some state-owned factories, especially in the northeastern rustbelt, which were left 
behind in this reform period, were laid off and had to find jobs in other places (Zhao, 2001). 
Some workers who could not find a job became very poor. Many social problems began to 
emerge to the extent that they may cause problems for the Chinese regime in the future. First, 
the banking system was chaotic, and many non-profit state-owned industries continued to 
lose money (Zhao, 2001). Second, many workers were laid off, and many youths were 
waiting to enter the labour market. Third, ideologically, the government still advocated for a 
communist ideology, which many Chinese did not believe in it (Zhao, 2001).  
Recently, many scholars have examined China’s problems, including over-investment 
in the housing market, capital outflows, increasing income disparities, and abuse of law; in all 
of these cases, there is potential for “official corruption and lack of checks and balances of 
government power through legal, public opinion and electoral channels” (Zhao, 2001, p.442). 
If these problems continue to mount, they could ultimately influence China’s regime, 
especially if reform does not include effective reform of the political system. Inside the 
political system, there are some problems. The first will be the issue of succession of the top 
leadership, as President Xi changed it to the president for life. If this problem is not addressed 
adequately, it may contribute to political instability. The second problem is the CCP’s 
capacity to maintain discipline. Corruption can undermine the political system by reducing 
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people’s loyalty (Lieberthal, 1991). Third, while at the early stage of the Opening and 
Reform period, the mainstream ideology blended Marxism with nationalism (Shlapentokh, 
2002), China currently lacks a legitimizing ideology or value system (Lieberthal, 1991).  
Although Chinese society has experienced a period of market Opening and Reform, 
such reforms did not touch the core part of its political system. To some degree, the media 
system has been commercialized and has accepted foreign media capital. However, the media 
system is still controlled by the government. “This fusion of Party state and market power has 
created a media system that serves the interests of the country’s political and economic elite, 
while suppressing and marginalizing opposing and alternative voices” (Zhao, 2004, p. 179). 
In the central government, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) represents the interest 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and oversees the media system to make sure nothing 
conflicts with official propaganda. The CPD controls nationwide media via setting rules 
about what kind of news can be covered and the manner of coverage, and CPD can put 
national issues over all other issues (Qinglian, 2004; Brady, 2006; Jingrong, 2010). For 
instance, during the Beijing Olympic Games, CPD prohibited negative news reports 
(Jingrong, 2010). 
In sum, China’s political system is totalitarian rather than democratic, as it is moral-
based, and the top leadership does not have time limits for the term. The government still 
controls the media system tightly. Despite the many social problems related to official 
corruption, neither official nor media responses to the issue are adequate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
In conjunction with Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge, which I use to understand 
women’s images in news and comments on corruption, I employ the related research tool of 
critical discourse analysis, which aims to explore power relations in macro social contexts 
behind languages. Specifically, I use Content Analysis (CA) and Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) to explore gender images. In this section, I will 1) state the research questions and 
how these methods are suitable to solve these questions; 2) explain each method in terms of 
definition; and 3) introduce the data sources and procedures of data collections. 
4.1 Research Questions 
  Previous research, though limited, suggests that images about females represented in 
corruption news are related to affairs in terms of depictions such as mistresses or causes of 
corruption. The thesis seeks to provide a more thorough understanding of these issues, 
focusing especially on the following questions: 
1) How are women, overall, described in news reports and news articles about 
corruption in China? 
2) Is there any difference between the ways in which women and men are depicted in 
news reports and articles about corruption? If so, what is the difference? 
3) What do any observed differences reveal about the nature of power and gender 
relations in contemporary China? 
In order to answer these research questions, I use content analysis and critical 
discourse analysis. In common with many other studies that focus on gender representation in 
news media, the content analysis provides statistical perspectives on gender representations 
by creating the bivariate analysis. This study follows this method to study gender 
representation with specific reference to corruption news. Also, I would like to move one step 
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further. To explore how gender images are formed in corruption news, and how these images 
are imparted through certain media platforms, I will also use critical discourse analysis. 
4.2 Content Analysis 
Content Analysis (CA) is an old research method, but it grew very fast in quantitative 
research. Generally, CA has been applied to many areas, including human interaction and 
conversations, character portrayals in TV commercials, films, and novels, word usage in 
news releases and political speeches, and so on (Neuendorf, 2002). However, CA has been 
defined in varying ways. According to Kolbe and Burnett (1991), CA is “an observational 
research method that is used to systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of 
recorded communications” (pp. 134). Similarly, CA can be defined simply as analyzing 
characteristics of the message in a systematic, objective, and quantitative way (Berelson, 
1952; Neuendorf, 2002). In the second case, unlike the first, CA is considered as a 
quantitative research method, with a focus on objectivity in which codes among texts should 
follow explicit rules. In this research, I use CA in this quantitative way.  
There are several steps for using CA, as Content Analysis (CA) can provide insights 
and understanding of gender images in news about corruption via counting word frequencies 
in order to create categories in an objective way. As qualitative methods are criticized as 
subjective understandings of the text, quantitative Content Analysis can increase the 
objectivity of research. Quantitative Content Analysis is a useful tool in defining gender 
representations in media forms, and Chi-square tests and regression models were used by 
previous studies to determine the significance of gender differences. However, as the number 
of corrupt female cadres is significantly lower (41:1173) than the number of corrupt male 
cadres, using Chi-square tests or regression models may produce biased results, so CA is 
used to summarize gender representations and provide bivariate analysis in corruption news. I 
conduct content analysis to analyze news reports from the website of The Central 
65 
 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which will be introduced in the following 
section. News reports are analyzed with respect to ten variables: year; cadre levels; gender; 
regions; occupation; economic problem; job-related crimes; political problem; personal life 
issues; and other problems. Then, I generalize the way women were represented in corruption 
news reports. There are two numerical representations here: the number of female cadres and 
the number of cases that women were involved in. This analysis also provides frequencies 
about corruption cases and about whether the number of female cadres related to cadre levels, 
certain years and crimes. 
4.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical Discourse Analysis, as both a theory and method, aims to examine discourse 
and social life (Rogers et al., 2016). Discourse analysis is not only the study of language, but 
a way of looking at the language that focuses on how people use it in real life to do things 
such as joke and argue and persuade, and to show that they are certain kinds of people or 
belong to certain groups (Jones, 2012). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been 
employed widely in recent years as a particular type of discourse analysis (Liu & Guo, 2016). 
Critical discourse analysis refers to an even wider sphere that includes all of the social 
practices, individuals, and institutions that make it possible or legitimate to understand 
phenomena in a particular way and to make certain statements about what is “true” (Holsti, 
1969). Critical discourse analysis is compatible with a Foucauldian analysis of discourse 
because it is particularly concerned with power and is rooted in “constructivism”. Liu, & Guo 
observe that, “Through the surface level of language form, CDA aims to reveal the influence 
of ideology on discourse, the counteractive influence of discourse on the ideology, and how 
the two elements derive from and serve social structure and power relations” (2016, p. 1076). 
According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and Jahedi, Abdullah, and Mukundan 
(2014), several principles apply for Critical Discourse Analysis. First, CDA deals with social 
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problems, and its aim is interpretative and explanatory. Second, it reveals how “power 
relations are discursive” (Jahedi et al., 2014, p. 29). Third, there is a dialectical relationship 
between discourse and society and culture. Fourth, discourse is related to ideology, which can 
be interpreted in relation to specific contexts. Fifth, discourse is “a form of social action” 
(Jahedi et al., 2014, p. 29). Sixth, text and society are mediated by order of discourse. For 
example, a university consists of a set of interrelated textual practices, such as papers and 
essays’ discourses and administrative text (Simpson & Mayr, 2010). 
              The application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is based on several 
considerations. First, in the book Media Discourse, Fairclough (1995) claims that media 
language should be analyzed as discourse and CDA should include linguistic analysis of 
media discourse. In this sense, attention needs to be given to the language and texture of texts 
while analyzing media discourse. Second, besides the linguistic analysis, CDA focuses on 
media’s relationships with institutional and wider social and cultural context, “including 
relations of power and ideologies” (Fairclough, 1995, p.33). It is necessary to analyse how 
media represents an ideology, as ideology representations are implicit in texts and always 
look like taken-for-granted or commonsense for reporters and audiences. In sum, Critical 
Discourse Analysis can focus on language, but also explores the social context in order to 
find out reasons that may influence certain discourses. Using CDA, one can explore gender 
representations in news articles and investigate the reasons behind them. 
 In this study, I explore how the structures/systems support particular kinds of news 
and gender images in written media coverage of women in relation to corruption, and how 
these news reports and gender images circulate in Chinese society. Specifically, the analysis 
of media discourse contains five steps. First, I focus on textual representation, that is, how 
words and phrases function to describe women and men in corruption news. In order to 
analyze the news articles through CDA, I develop themes and codes based on the language 
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that employed to describe the key characters spoken about in relation to the corruption in 
each news article, and then I calculate frequencies for each code. Second, I assess discourses 
which include those keywords and phrases.  
Generally, the process of analysing discourses requires the analysis of the genre, the 
type of discourse and the intertextuality. In terms of the genre, attention will be given to the 
narration associated with the representation of corruption and how the author organized the 
story or the description either by presenting a clear event-line or framing the story through 
particular orientations. The function of orientations is to focus the audience’s attention on 
selected aspects of the character’s experience in ways that may trigger emotional responses to 
the character (Fairclough, 1995). For instance, the audience may feel empathy for the 
character by reading this sentence, “not only has she tried to top herself and got herself taken 
to hospital but now as she’s recovering from that she’s had the biggest blow or one of the 
biggest blows you can have” (Fairclough, 1995, p.92). Next, I  categorize the discourse into 
different types, including gender discourse, political discourse, regulatory discourse, 
colloquial discourse, ancient discourse, confession discourse, and evaluation discourse, based 
on the nature of the content and how it is presented. Identifying the type of discourse is 
necessary in order to indicate the construction of “social practice from a particular 
perspective” (Fairclough, 1995, p.94). Gender discourse describes gender relations between 
characters, and political discourse contains information related to political slogans and the 
political party. While regulatory discourse refers to descriptions of violations, regulations or 
punishments that characters received, colloquial discourse employs metaphors, irony, and 
mockery which are common in daily life conversations. Ancient discourse refers to text that 
cites or refers to ancient proverbs, poems and sayings. Confession discourse reports the 
author’s confession. Evaluation discourse involves editorial comments or opinions stated by 
the authors of the news reports or those reported from investigators of corruption cases. Once 
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the particular forms of discourse have been identified, according to Fairclough (1995), 
intertextual analysis of media discourse is necessary in order to compare and evaluate 
representations, in terms of what is included, what is excluded, what kinds of messages may 
be conveyed through the use of ironic or metaphorical language in the discourse, and what is 
presupposed.  
Intertextuality is very important, as it provides insight into the way discourse may 
be connected to the broad social context, culture norms and ideologies, as illustrated in the 
following example. In one case of corruption that received news covered that is addressed in 
my analysis, that of Qian Zenghong, his wife was described as a “greedy wife,” while he was 
depicted as making wrong friends and “not having a good wife.” To strengthen the perception 
that the corruption was his wife’s fault and excuse the actual corrupt cadre, the author quoted 
ancient idiomatic expressions: “a good wife will help cadre to keep honest and upright and 
live in poverty (Jia you xianqi, ze shi neng anpinshouzheng ; 家有贤妻，则士能安贫守正)”. 
This idiomatic expression has several functions here: 1) it presupposes that readers are 
familiar with ancient idioms and wife should be good wife who helps their husbands; 2) it 
includes wife is the reason for a cadre’s honesty and uprightness but excludes other reasons 
that may cause a cadre to crash; 3) it is a congruent application.  
Third, I focus on the texture and the intertextuality of news articles. The specific 
analysis process will be the same as the analysis of discourse. Fourth, I explore identities and 
relationships between each category in the texts, such as women, men, the local government 
and the central government, as any language use should contain social identities and social 
relations (Fairclough, 1995); and I explore who is given predominance and who is 
marginalized. Last but not least, the study compares news articles related to this news 
coverage from different websites. 
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4.4 Data 
In this study, I collect data from several websites. These websites are the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Sina Net, Sohu Net, Fenghuang Net, and 
Wangyi Net, which are introduced below. 
From the website of CCDI, I collected news reports and news stories about officials 
accused or convicted of corruption. The Central Commission of Discipline Inspection of 
Chinese Party Communist is supposed to address issues related to party discipline and to 
monitor abuses, so party members who are “suspected of corruption, bad management or 
breaking with the party line are liable to be hauled before discipline inspection commissions” 
(“How China is ruled: Discipline Commission,” 2012). The website of CCDI publicizes 
policies of CPC, releases information of CCDI, collects complaints about cadres and reports 
cadres who are being inspected or disciplined. In addition, it reports the decisions about 
corrupt cadres as well as comments of dishonest cadres. I selected this website for data 
collection because this department represents the government and provides a standard draft 
(Tonggao;通稿) for other non-state-owned news media. I collected news articles about 
corrupt cadres from the channel of Repent and Warning (Chanhui yu jingshi;忏悔与警示). 
For news reports, I explored articles from the channel Examine and Investigate (Shencha 
diaocha;审查调查), which divides cadres into three categories: high-profile, middle level, 
and provincial management level cadres.  
In addition to data from the website of CCDI, representing state-owned media, I also 
collected data from commercial websites. One of these websites is Sina.com. As China’s 
leading online media company (Sina Corporation, n.d.), Sina was founded in 1998. 
According to Alexa (n.d.), Sina ranked No. 6 in Chinese websites and ranked No. 3 among 
media websites. As a company, Sina has Sina.com, Sina Mobile, and Weibo.com. But this 
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study will focus on news stories from Sina.com, because it “built a broad content network 
with thousands of professional media partners and accumulated a large mainstream user base, 
including well-educated, white-collar professionals” (Sina Corporation, n.d). Sina News is 
one part of Sina.com and includes reports from news providers including “CCTV, Beijing TV 
Station (“BTV”), China News, Agence France-Presse (“AFP”), Associated Press, Reuters, 
Getty Images, Nanfang Daily Group, Beijing News, Xinhua Net and Xinhua News Agency” 
(Sina Corporation, n.d). Selecting news stories from Sina.com is based on several reasons. 
First, although subject to media censorship, this so-called commercial website reports news 
comments on corrupt officials, so I am able to verify whether their news stories about corrupt 
officials tally with those by state-owned media. Second, Sina.com is popular in China, so 
choosing news stories from Sina.com makes it possible to understand news media’s potential 
influence on Chinese people. 
Similar to Sina.com, Sohu.com is another leading online media company in China. 
According to Alexa (n.d.), Sohu.com ranked No. 5 on Chinese websites. Also founded in 
1998, Sohu.com has provided services for more than 0.7 billion netizens in China (Sohu, Inc., 
n.d.). The main reason for selecting Sohu.com is for comparison, first, between Sohu.com 
and CCDI’s website in terms of news articles and, second, with other commercial websites in 
terms of news articles. 
Ifeng.com (Fenghuang Net) is a part of Phoenix Television, which was founded in 
1996 and “was the first privately-owned foreign satellite TV broadcaster granted landing 
rights in the People’s Republic of China” (Richet-Cooper, 2011). The objective of Phoenix 
TV is to “connect the world to China and reduce distances between Chinese communities 
scattered overseas” and to broadcast “via satellite in more than 150 countries on the five 
continents” (Richet-cooper, 2011). In this sense, Ifeng.com provides services for global 
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Chinese people. Selecting Ifeng.com is to know whether it reports corruption news in a more 
objective way or tally with state-owned media. 
163.com (Wangyi Net or NetEase), founded in 1997, is famous in China. It has 
provided services to more than 0.9 billion users (NetEase, Inc., n.d.). I selected this website 
because it is one of the most popular websites in China, and it is privately-owned, enabling 
me to explore whether, in terms of media comments related to corruption news, such a 
website should tally with state-owned media.  
4.5 Search Procedure 
My search for news reports began with one of the channels of CCDI, “Examine and 
Investigate” (Shencha diaocha). Several steps were used to collect news articles. First, I 
collected news articles from the CCDI’s channel, Repent and Warning (Chanhui yu jingshi). 
Although I would have liked to compare news articles on both channels (Examine and 
Investigate and Repent and Warning),  they often covered different corruption cases  so the 
number of cases on both channels is different. Second, I collected news articles from the four 
privately-owned online media. Because these did not have certain channels to report corrupt 
cadres, I had to search for news articles by using Google Search Engine. The list of cadres is 
based on the news items reported by CCDI. I searched the cadre’s name and entered the 
website that I want to search for, such as Sina. In the search results, I only focused on the first 
page, and only focused on news articles which were posted on main channels rather than 
local channels or mobile apps. Also, I did not focus on short news reports announcing the 
cadre was being investigated, being arrested or being sentenced. For each cadre identified in 
the reports, I created a WORD document in order to copy the comments and detailed news 
reports in preparation for data analysis. 
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4.6 Coding Procedure for Content Analysis (CA) 
I used Content Analysis (CA) to analyze the news reports downloaded from the 
website of CCDI. The website started to report in 2013. As this study focuses on the most 
recent five years, I downloaded news reports from 2013 to 2017. For cadres in the high-
profile level, there are 39 news reports, but these reports were reported from 2014, so reports 
from 2014 to 2017 were collected. In the middle level, 153 news reports were collected from 
2013 to 2017. For the low level, there are 733 news reports. In total, 926 items or news 
reports were coded.  
As some news contain references to more than one cadre, 1,214 cadres are 
represented in the dataset. Only two news reports were excluded from the dataset. One of 
them, in the 2015 low-level file, duplicated another piece of news while another, in the 2014 
low-level file, just stated that 409 cadres were penalized without any details.  
The first column of coding was used for case number, and ten other columns in my 
tabulations were used for variables. These variables are the year the news was released, cadre 
level, the gender of cadres, the occupation of the cadre, the region of the cadre, problems that 
are related to economy, problems that are related to authority abuse, crimes that are related to 
politics, personal life issues, and other problems. Two processes were included in the coding 
procedure. First, I used open coding to involve all possible codes in the news reports. For 
instance, for the variable of cadres’ occupations, I created codes based on the occupation, 
such as government, electricity department, bank, and company. Second, codes were 
developed to identify items combined based on their nature. For example, I combined the 
government and electricity department into government, and combined banks and companies 
into the company. The following table identifies the variable definitions and attributes. 
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Table 4.1 Variables, definitions, and attributes of news reports for content analysis 
No Variables Operational definitions of 
variables 
Attributes of Variables 
1 Year The year that the news was 
released 
1) 2013; 2) 2014; 3) 2015; 4) 2016; 5) 2017 
2 Level Levels of cadres 1) high profile cadres 
2) middle level cadres 
3) provincial management level cadres 
3 Sex Sex of each cadre 1) male 
2) female 
4 Occupation  The previous occupation of 
the cadre 
1) government, including central government, 
provincial government, and local government 
2) state-owned business, involving bank, state-
owned companies. 
3) others, entities that do not belong to the first 
two attributes 
5 Province The province that the cadre 
worked in 
Generally, China has 22 provinces, five 
autonomous regions, four direct-controlled 
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, 
and Shanghai), and special administrative 
regions of HongKong and Macau. According to 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011), 
mainland China was divided into 4 regions: 1) 
Eastern (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
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Guangdong and Hainan); 2) Middle part 
(Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and 
Hunan); 3) Western (Inter-Mongolio, Guangxi, 
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang); 4) Northeastern (Liaoning, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang). In addition, one cadre in Hong 
Kong was involved, so 5) HongKong.  
6 Economic 
Problem 
Problems that are related to 
the economy or money, 
including bribery, 
embezzlement of public 
funds, illegal reimbursement 
of personal expenses, 
acceptance of monetary gifts 
and illegal profit-making 
activities.  
0) no such problems 
1) have such problems 
7 Job-related 
crimes 
Problems that are not related 
to money, including abuse of 
authority, seeking benefits 
for relatives, illegal use of 
government vehicles and 
goods, and failing to fulfill 
their duties. 
0) no such problems 
1) have such problems 
8 Political Cadres’ political problems, 0) no such problems 
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problems involving obstructing 
investigation (including such 
behaviours as: fabricating 
lies, agreeing with others not 
to give each other away, 
colluding with others to 
devise a consistent story, 
transfering ill-gotten wealth, 
and so on), forming factions 
and cliques. 
1) have such problems 
9 Personal 
Life Issues 
Personal life issues, including 
having mistresses, 
committing adultery, trading 
one’s power for sex, 
improper sexual relationship 
with a number of women, 
living a corrupt lifestyle, and 
gambling. 
0) no such problems 
1) having mistresses, committing adultery, 
trading one’s power for sex, improper sexual 
relationship with a number of women, living in 
a corrupt lifestyle 
2) gambling 
3) have both 1) and 2) problems 
10 Other 
Problems 
Problems that are not related 
to money, employment, 
politics, and personal life. 
These include failure to 
report personal matters, such 
as true income, assets, 
children and marriages, 
0) no such problems 
1) not stated 
 
2) other problems 
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frequent visits to private 
clubs or expensive resorts, 
engaging in superstitious 
activities, and acceptance of 
gifts. 
If the news reports do not 
include the problems that the 
cadres have, this will be 
categorized as not stated. 
 
During the coding procedure, two things should be noted. First, for cadres who have 
more than one occupation, I coded the first occupation identified in the news report. For 
cadres who were accused of committing corruption in their previous occupations, I coded the 
previous occupation. Second, to ensure accuracy of coding, I used two methods. The first 
method consisted of checking the accuracy of codes by referring to other variables. For 
example, if the cadre’s problems were not stated in the news report, I would code this as 1- 
not stated - in the variable of other crimes. In this sense, other variables related to problems 
or crimes were entered as a code of 0 (no such problem). The second method was to 
randomly select cases and compare the attributes with specific news reports in order to ensure 
the accuracy of the coding.  
4.7 Analyzing Procedure for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
I used Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyze comments related to news on the 
above-mentioned websites. In this section, I describe the analysis procedure for these two 
stages. 
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For the news stories from CCDI for the years 2013 to 2017, the number of cases is 
297. The software that I used to explore news stories is NVivo. After all, articles were 
imported into NVivo, and the analysis involved several steps. First, I applied open coding to 
explore the text by marking certain words and discourses. These codes are related to gender 
representations, such as “mistress (qingfu;情妇)” and “wife (laopo, or qizi;老婆或妻子).” 
Then, based on these codes, I identified two themes ---- descriptions of women and 
descriptions of men. Next, based on two themes, I collapsed some codes. For instance, both 
codes of mistress and of wife can be categorized in the descriptions of women. Then, I 
computed the frequencies of codes and themes. Fifth, I analyzed the whole text to illustrate 
how women and men were described in the comments and patterns that the authors used. 
Sixth, I focused on the public comments from the four websites and explored whether 
discourses and comments were different based on whether a woman was identified as a 
mistress as opposed to a wife. Table 4.2 shows the themes and codes in the analysis. 
Table 4.2 Themes and codes of news articles for critical discourse analysis 
Theme Code 
Descriptions of Women Women 
Wife 
Mistress and Sexual Relationship 
Descriptions of Men Men 
Husband 
Official/ Leader 
Metaphors of Corrupt Cadres 
Reasons for Corruption Sayings signifying reasons of misconduct 
and illegal behaviours 
 
Table 4.2 identifies three themes and eight codes employed to classify the news 
articles for CCDI. The reason for including reasons for corruption is to identify relationships 
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between women, men, and the government, and results will be shown with the analysis of 
intertextuality. Each code is related to certain words and phrases. For instance, the code 
“wife” does not refer to the word “wife,” but refers to the phrases: “the wife helps the 
husband to commit corruption” (Fuzufutan;妇助夫贪) or the “greedy wife” (Tanneizhu;贪内
助). 
In the second stage of CDA, I utilized NVivo to analyze news articles from four 
websites - Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi Net. Such news articles were searched by 
Google.com based on the list of cases from the news reports released by CCDI. As readers 
will see in the findings, the total number of cadres was 1,214, and there were 185 cadres 
about whom comments were cited on these four websites. Some cadres, who had the same 
name as celebrities, such as Wang Gang, cannot be found in any news articles. Other cadres, 
whose names were too common in China, such as Li Li, cannot be found in any news articles. 
Generally, the lower the cadre’s level, the fewer news articles were found about him. Because 
codes were discovered in the first stage, the analyzing procedure for the second stage was 
simple. I used these codes to do query search in the text via NVivo, then categorized codes 
into four themes - Descriptions of women, descriptions of men, family, and cadres’ 
misconduct and illegal behaviours (not related to women) – before following the analytical 
steps mentioned above to explore the main elements of discourse presented in each of the 
articles that I anayzed.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONTENT ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
In accordance with the procedures identified in the previous chapter, this chapter 
shows results from Content Analysis (CA). There are several sections in this chapter: (a) 
frequencies distribution of each variable for decoding news reports from CCDI; (b) a general 
description of gender images in news reports; and (c) discussions.  
5.1 Frequency Distributions of Each Variable for News Reports  
This section discusses the results from the analysis of news reports from the channel 
of Examine and Investigate (Shencha diaocha;审查调查) on the website of CCDI. There are 
ten variables, summarized in the following tables. 
 
Figure 5.1 Numbers of news reports on corruption on the website of CCDI by year 
Figure 5.1 shows that the number of reported cases climbed steadily between 2013 
and 2015, after which they levelled off. The total number of valid cases is 1,214. The 
observed patterns are not a coincidence. At the beginning of 2015, while talking about the 
anti-corruption campaign at the 5th Full Assembly of the 18th CCDI, the President Xi Jinping 
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said that the fight against corruption remains grave and complicated, acknowledging that 
government had not obtained a sweeping victory in terms of ensuring cadres dare not, cannot 
and will not be corrupt (Xinhua News Agency, 2015). Xi’s speech encouraged CCDI to 
detect more corrupt cadres, which helps to explain why the number of corrupt cadres reached 
its peak in 2015. In 2016, President Xi Jinping observed at the 6th Full Assembly of the 18th 
CCDI that the fight against corruption was in the process of gathering unstoppable 
momentum (Xinhua News Agency, 2016).  
Table 5.1 Frequency distributions for each variable of content analysis 
 
Variables Attributes Frequency Percent 
Levels of Cadres high profile level cadres 48 4.0 
middle level cadres 153 12.6 
Provincial management 
level cadres 
1013 83.4 
Total 1214 100.0 
Sex Male 1173 96.6 
Female 41 3.4 
Total 1214 100.0 
Occupations Government 947 78.0 
institutions or state-owned 
companies 
267 22.0 
Total 1214 100.0 
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Regions Eastern Part 474 39.0 
Middle Part 260 21.4 
Western Part 367 30.2 
Northeastern Part 113 9.3 
Hong Kong 1 0.1 
Total 1214 100.0 
Problems that are related to 
economy or result in 
money 
related to economic  1081 89.0 
not related to economic  133 11.0 
Total 1214 100.0 
Problems that are related to 
occupational authorities 
and did not result in money 
are related to occupational 
authorities and did not 
result in money  
501 41.3 
No such problems  713 58.7 
Total 1214 100.0 
problems that are related to 
counter-investigation or 
forming factions and 
cliques 
Yes 312 25.7 
No 902 74.3 
Total 1214 100.0 
Problems related to 
personal life 
having mistresses, 
committing adultery, 
328 27.0 
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trading one’s power for sex. 
no  868 71.5 
Gambling 10 .8 
both 2 and 3 problems 8 .7 
Total 1214 100.0 
Other Problems No 723 59.6 
no stated 76 6.3 
other crimes 415 34.2 
Total 1214 100.0 
 
Table 5.1 describes frequencies in the distribution for each variable. Some of the 
cases are connected with traditions in Chinese officialdom and others with the current social 
context in Chinese society.  
For the variable of levels of cadres, only four percent of corrupt cadres were in high 
profile level positions, while provincial management level cadres were the group most 
frequently reported on the website of CCDI. This comparison has two implications. First, 
from a Maoist perspective, very few high-profile cadres are likely to be accused of corruption 
or other problems, reflecting an unspoken rule embedded Confucianist norms. According to 
the Book of Rites, nobles should not be subject to punishment (Xingbushangdafu;刑不上大
夫). Traditional nobles are equivalent in today’s society equal to ministers in the central 
government who are classified as high-profile level cadres in this study. Although this rule 
cannot be found in any laws or regulations, the speech of former Prime Minister Zhou Rongji 
verified the existence of this unspoken rule. In the book Zhu Rongji On the Record: The 
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Shanghai Years (Zhu, 2013), Zhu observed public dissatisfaction with the arrangement that, 
with the CCP as the ruling party, state laws and regulations fail to make party members as 
equal as the masses in terms of adherence to the laws, therefore, exempting party members 
from punishments. Second, the number of high-profile level cadres is fewer than provincial 
management level cadres. Nonetheless, President Xi said that the anti-corruption campaign 
would investigate both the tiger and the fly. Here, the word “tigers” refers to high-profile 
cadres and the word “fly” refers to provincial management level cadres. In China, being 
promoted to a high position, to some degree, means a cadre has fewer chances to be 
investigated by the CCDI.  
Of the 1,214 cases reported in the table, 41(3.4%) are females. This figure reflects  
gender inequality in government-related jobs rather than an indication that female cadres are 
more honest than male cadres. According to Sohu News (2012), the rate of female cadres 
who are high profile cadres is 11%, while the proportion of those in leading roles in cities or 
equivalent (provincial management level) is 13.7% and among those in leading roles in 
divisions or equivalent (provincial management level), it is 16.6%. Female cadres also tend to 
hold deputy positions rather than principal positions, and relatively few female cadres work 
in core departments, such as land, energy and petroleum, in which cadres have decision-
making power in which they may be more likely to get bribes or abuse power during 
decision-making processes. Most female cadres work in education, technology, culture, 
health and family planning departments (Sina News, 2012). The Organization Department of 
the CPC Central Committee released a document, Opinions on Further Training and 
Selecting Female Cadres and Developing Female Party Members, in 2001, which clearly 
stated that female cadres should be considered first in those non-core departments. Although 
the number of female cadres convicted of corruption has increased, it still far fewer than male 
cadres. 
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For the variable of occupations, 947 (78%) cadres work for the government and 267 
cadres cited for corruption work for institutions or state-owned companies. Such a small 
number of corrupt cases in corporate settings may be due to the enhanced public governance 
under President Xi Jingping’s anti-corruption campaign (Zhang, 2018a). 
In terms of regions of corrupt cadres, 474 (39 percent) are clustered in eastern 
provinces while in western provinces, 367 (30.2 percent) cadres were investigated. Regional 
differences in the distribution of corruption are likely related to policy issues and economic 
opportunities associated with particular industries. In 1978, China executed the Opening and 
Reforming policy to boost economic development, initially in eastern coastal areas such as 
Guangdong province and Fujian province. Specifically, the Chinese government established a 
number of coastal open cities, including Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shanghai, Zhanjiang, 
Ningbo, and others. To stimulate economic development, those local governments were 
given more authority in decision-making and policy favours in terms of taxation, licences, 
project approvals and budget allocations (Chen & Xie, 2009; Yi, Gao & Zhang, 2018). The 
policy favours, combined with lack of oversight in decision-making processes, have provided 
opportunities for cadres to abuse their power and get bribes. More recently, in 1999, the 
central government launched the Western Development Program which is similar to eastern 
coastal area development program with a major difference that the central government 
allocated about 500 billion Chinese yuan (about 80 billion dollars) for infrastructure 
construction in western areas (Chen & Xie, 2009). Although economic development in the 
eastern areas has been faster than in the western areas, cadres in western areas have more 
chances to be corrupt in terms of the allocation of budgets. In both cases, policy favours and 
lack of transparency in decision-making influence the number of corrupt cadres. 
Among problems and issues which are reported in the corruption news, the top three 
problems are: 1) economic problems; 2) non-money issues related to occupational authority; 
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and 3) sex-related problems such as having a mistress, committing adultery, or trading one’s 
power for sex. Personal life issues are more important and complicated than economic 
problems and problems related to power abuse. Except gambling, personal life issues in 
Chinese refer to lifestyle problems (shenghuo zuofeng wenti;生活作风问题). Descriptively, 
besides lifestyle problems, there are several phrases to express personal life issues, including 
“seriously morally corrupt” (yanzhong daode baihuai;严重道德败坏); “morally corrupt” 
(daode baihua;道德败坏); “leading a dissipated lifestyle” (shenghuo milan;生活糜烂) and 
“leading a corrupt lifestyle” (shenghuo fuhua;生活腐化). Although those phrases do not 
include any words related to sex, marital issues or women, all of them are related to 
extramarital issues. Leading a corrupt lifestyle means the cadre has fewer than three 
mistresses, while morally corrupt and leading a dissipated lifestyle means the cadre has more 
than three mistresses (Wangyi News, n.d.). Extramarital issues have become a characteristic 
of corrupt cadres - more than 95% of corrupt cadres have mistresses or “bao ernai” (Wangyi 
News, n.d.).  
China has a long history of identifying extramarital issues as immoral. In traditional 
Confucian society, being moral is the first priority for a man (junzi;君子), so a man should 
“first improve himself, then manage his family, then govern the state; this the only way to 
bring justice and virtue to the world” (xiushen qijia zhiguo ping tianxia;修身齐家治国平天
下) (Book of Rites; 2017). Being moral is the way to improve oneself. Even though men can 
have concubines in ancient China, cadres cannot have more than one wife, that is, one wife 
and some concubines; what is more, the number of concubines depended on the level of the 
cadre. For instance, during the Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE), the second-rank officials (similar 
to the vice president today) could have eight concubines, and they would be recognized as 
immoral if they had more than eight concubines or kept mistresses (Li, 2017). Nowadays, 
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being moral and not having extramarital issues are also requirements for cadres. In 2001, the 
sixth plenary session of the 15th CPC Central Committee included lifestyle issues as a 
problem of cadres. In 2007, the CCDI treated lifestyle issues like corruption. Cadres who 
have lifestyle issues were supposed to have violated social morality and regulations and 
would be punished accordingly. For instance, Yi Junqing, the former deputy director of 
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, was removed from the position because of 
improper sexual relationships with a woman. Lifestyle issues do not include women, but such 
issues stigmatized women by connecting women with improper relationships and immoral 
behaviour. In order to further assess the gender representation in news reports, the 
relationship between women and other variables will be shown via bivariate analysis.  
5.2 Bivariate Analysis for Gender Representations of News Reports 
In order to determine gender images in news reports from CCDI, this section shows 
relationships between gender and other factors, such as regions, levels of cadres, and crimes, 
via contingency tables.  
Table 5.2 Frequency distributions for news reports on corruption by male and female 
cadres by year 
 
 
Sex 
Year the news was released Male Female 
Year 2013 46 (3.9% of all males) 1 (2.4% of all females) 
Year 2014 245 (20.9%) 12 (29.3%) 
Year 2015 331 (28.2%) 11 (26.8%) 
Year 2016 268 (22.8%) 6 (14.6%) 
Year 2017 283 (24.1%) 11 (26.8%) 
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Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
 
Table 5.2 demonstrates the number of cases released each year by gender (reported in 
the media in binary terms of male and female). The number of male cadres reported on in 
corruption news was the highest in 2015, with 331 cases (28.2% of all male cadres), while for 
females, it was highest in 2014, with 12 cases (29.3% of total female cases). Similar to figure 
5.1, the number of male cases peaked in 2015. However, the number of female cases (which 
was very low in all years) peaked in 2014. 
Table 5.3 Frequency distributions by levels of cadres and sex 
 
 
Sex 
Levels of Cadres Male Female 
High profile level cadres 45 (3.8%) 3 (7.3%) 
Middle level cadres 152 (13.0%) 1 (2.4%) 
Provincial management level cadres 976 (83.2%) 37 (90.2%) 
Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
 
Figures in Table 5.3 show that most corruption news reports are related to provincial 
management level cadres, no matter whether the reports are about corruption by female or 
male cadres. The percentage of female provincial management level cadres is slightly higher 
than that of males, corresponding in part with gender differences in representation in various 
key positions. According to Sohu News (2012), female cadres are more likely to be in low-
level positions compared with male cadres. 
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Table 5.4 Frequency distributions for job-related crimes by sex 
 
 
Sex 
Job-related crimes Male Female 
Job-related crimes 691 (58.9%) 22 (57.3%) 
Crimes not related to the job 482 (41.1%) 19 (46.3%) 
Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
 
Table 5.4 shows that for both males and females, more than half of the reported 
crimes are associated with jobs (abuse of authority). The rate of job-related crimes of female 
cadres is lower than the rate of male cadres. However, the rate of job-related crimes of female 
cadres attracts more attention from news media, as many news reports and stories claim that 
the rate has increased year by year (Ai & Li, 2011; Hu, 2013; Sina News, 2004), and more 
than half of the female cadres who committed job-related crimes are mistresses of male 
cadres (Radio Free Asia, 2013).  
Table 5.5 Frequency distributions for corrupt cadres’ original occupations by sex 
 
 
Sex 
Occupations Male Female 
Government  916 (78.1%) 31 (75.6%) 
Institutions and state-owned 
companies 
257 (21.9%) 10 (24.4%) 
Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
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Table 5.5 shows the occupational distribution based on gender. About three-fourths of 
the people worked for the government before being investigated. Although the target of the 
anti-corruption campaign is cadres from all levels and all departments (BBC News, 2017b), 
most of the reported corrupt cadres are from the government. 
Table 5.6 Frequency distributions for news reports focused on economic crimes of 
corrupt cadres by sex 
 
 
Sex 
Problems related to 
economic crimes 
Male Female 
Related to economic crimes 1046 (89.2%) 35 (85.4%) 
Not related to economic 
crimes 
127 (10.8%) 6 (14.6%) 
Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
 
Table 5.6 reveals that the kinds of corruption reported on for most cadres are related 
to economic crimes, no matter whether male or female. 
Table 5.7 Frequency distributions for news reports focused on political crimes by sex 
 
Sex 
Problems related to 
political crimes 
Male Female 
Related to political crimes 305 (26.0%) 7 (17.1%) 
Not related to political 868 (74%) 34 (14.6%) 
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crimes 
Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
 
Table 5.7 shows the frequency distribution of reported problems related to political 
crimes by male and female cadres, representing 26% of male cadres and 17.1% of female 
cadres appearing in reports on corruption. 
Table 5.8 Frequency distributions for nes reports focused on personal life problems of 
male and female cadres 
 
 
Sex 
Problems related to 
personal life 
Male Female 
Related to personal life 326 (27.8%) 2 (4.9%) 
Not related to personal life 829 (70.7%) 39 (95.1%) 
Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
 
As Table 5.8 shows, 326 male cadres have problems related to personal life, while 
only two female cadres have this problem. However, many of the male cadres’ problems are 
attributed to women. As reported in Table 4.1, personal life issues are associated with having 
mistresses, committing adultery, trading one’s power for sex, improper sexual relationship 
with a number of women, living a corrupt lifestyle, or gambling. The news reports do not 
describe personal life in detail. For instance, a news report about Yang Xiaobo, the former 
mayor of Gaoping, Shanxi Province, indicated simply that she “took advantage of her 
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position to obtain a huge amount of illegal money and gifts, and committed adultery” 
(Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), 2014, November 26).  
Table 5.9 Frequency distributions by regions and sex of cadres 
 
 
Sex 
Regions Male Female 
Eastern Part 460 (39.2%) 14 (34.5%) 
Middle Part 250 (21.3%) 10 (24.6%) 
Western Part 354 (30.2%) 13 (30.9%) 
Northeastern Part 109 (9.2%) 4 (10%) 
Hong Kong 1 (0.1%) 0 (0%) 
Total 1173 (100%) 41 (100%) 
 
Table 5.9 reveals that more than one-third of cadres reported on, both male and 
female, are in the eastern part. These patterns confirm that cadres (male and female) in the 
eastern part have more chances to commit corruption due to the interaction of policy favours 
and lack of supervision.  
In summary, the fact that women are underrepresented in news reports about 
corruption reveals both gender inequality in government and state-owned companies and 
gender-based differences in the representation of lifestyle issues. Relatively few CCDI news 
reports focus on women’s lifestyle issues or their presence as the main subject of corruption 
news. However, they are represented more frequently as sexed subjects of male corruption 
cases.  
 
92 
 
5.3 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions 
In an attempt to answer the research question on what gender differences can be 
found in corruption news, this chapter has provided an overview of general gender images in 
news reports on corruption from CCDI. The data reveals that while women are under-
represented in corruption news reports, this is more likely accounted for by differences in 
their positions. In fact, female cadres tend to be stuck in low-level positions in China (Sohu 
News, 2012). Gender differences are also found in reporting on problems related to personal 
life issues, as only two corrupt female cadres have this problem, compared with 326 males. 
Women are more likely to be depicted in accounts focusing on male corruption. Without 
clearly mentioning women, lifestyle issues successfully connect women with improper sexual 
relationships with male cadres. Women appear in many of the reports as accessories or just 
part of the corrupt cadre cases and part of men’s values. These results lead me to consider the 
definition of gender equality. Based on the Constitution, women and men have equal rights in 
various aspects, including political, economic, cultural, social and family spheres, and so on 
(Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). Although the Chinese government continues to express its 
commitment to gender equality in regulatory discourses, women’s voices have been 
relatively limited in recent years. For instance, on March 6, 2015, five feminists - Li Maize, 
Wu Rongrong, Wei Tingting, Zheng Churan and Wang Man – seeking to hand out stickers 
about sexual harassment were arrested by Chines police for organizing subversive activities 
(Fincher, 2018). That was also the year in which the biggest number of corrupt cadres 
appeared in official media reports (shown in figure 1) and the year that President Xi Jinping 
co-hosted a summit at the UN to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Beijing World 
Conference on Women. That is to say, while the Chinese government proclaims its 
commitment to promote gender equality, the CCP has actually muted women’s voices and 
treated women as sexed subjects in corruption news. Gender equality remains an empty 
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discourse. However, in order to fully understand gender inequality in corruption news, it is 
necessary to know how women were depicted in an unequal way. Considering that news 
reports are relatively short and content analysis cannot provide details about how women are 
depicted, news articles and critical discourses analysis are needed.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FINDINGS ONE: THE OFFICIAL 
MEDIA 
This chapter addresses the research question about gender differences between 
women’s images and men’s images by examining discourses represented in the news articles 
of CCDI, focusing on the main themes of text representations, discourses, and intertextuality. 
This chapter and the one that follows, which analyzes parallel discourses on commercial 
news sites, begins with an overview of the main codes and categories employed in the news 
articles, followed by more detailed examination of several cases selected from the reports to 
illustrate how these discourses are framed in the reporting on different types of corruption. 
6.1 Text Representations of CCDI Corruption News Articles 
In this part, I present how women and men are represented in the CCDI news articles. 
This section identifies definitions and related words and phrases to illustrate the themes and 
codes introduced in chapter 4. After summarizing frequencies for those codes, I will explain 
how certain words and phrases can be connected with traditional gender discourses and the 
contemporary social context.  
Table 6.1 Codes, definitions and frequencies of themes related to descriptions of women  
 
Themes Codes Definitions Frequencies 
Descriptions 
of Women 
Women This code refers to “women” (nüxing;女性). 14 
Wife 
This code refers to words and sentences that 
include the word wife and three phrases: 
“wife helps husband to commit corruption” 
310 
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(fuzhufutan;妇助夫贪); “greedy wife” 
(tanneizhu;贪内助); “good wife” (xianneizhu;
贤内助). 
Mistress and 
sexual 
relationship 
This code refers to words and sentences that 
include the following words and phrases: 
“mistress (qingfu;情妇);” “improper sexual 
relations (buzhengdang xingguanxi;不正当性
关系);” “improper relationships between men 
and women (buzhengdang nannü guanxi;不
正当男女关系);” “trading one’s power for 
sex (quansejiaoyi;权色交易);” “living a 
corrupt lifestyle (shenghuo fuhua;生活腐
化);” “adultery (tongjian;通奸);” “love 
(aiqing;爱情);” “moral corruption (daode 
baihuai;道德败坏).” 
106 
Total  128 
Note: the total number of news articles is 276. 
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Table 6.1 shows the definitions and frequencies of each code. Although women 
generally were not the main subject of the corruption cases, they were still mentioned in the 
news articles. The table reports that the code “wife” was mentioned 310 times in relation to 
several meaningful phrases. One such phrase, “fuzhufutan (the wife helps the husband to 
commit corruption),” is ironic, based on a proverb “fuchangfusui (夫唱妇随)” which 
originally means that the wife should obey her husband (fuchangfusui, 2019). It represents a 
metaphor for harmony between the husband and the wife. The phrase “fuzhufutan (the wife 
helps the husband to commit corruption)” presupposes readers are familiar with the proverb 
“fuchangfusui (the wife should obey her husband)” by using similar words. “Fuzhufutan (the 
wife helps the husband to commit corruption)” recalls traditional gender discourses in which 
the wife must obey her husband through elements of “husband,” “wife,” “help,” and 
“corruption,” which confirms women’s position in corruption case as a helper. What is 
excluded is other factors that influence corruption. The phrase “tanneizhu (greedy wife)” is 
an antonym of “xianneizhu (good wife).” “Good wife (xianneizhu)” is an ancient phrase 
which came from the Warring States (475-221BC) periods. Yan Zi (晏子), who was the 
Prime Minister (zaixiang;宰相) of Qi state (齐国), was talented (xianliang;贤良) but not very 
tall, while his groomer was tall. One day, the groomer’s wife saw Yan Zi and the groomer 
passing the house (Cai, 2018). The groomer’s wife told her husband that although Yan Zi was 
the Prime Minister, and everyone knew that he was talented, he was still modest; although 
she said her husband was tall, he was not modest and had no desire to make progress; she told 
him she felt ashamed of him and wanted to leave. Finally, the groomer reflected on his wife’s 
words and turned modest (Cai, 2018). The groomer’s wife later was called the “good wife 
(xianneizhu)”, as she knew what was wrong with her husband and how to make her husband 
progress (Cai, 2018). Later, the phrase “good wife (xianneizhu)” was used to praise women 
who were virtuous and promoted their husband’s study, career and social status. “Xian 
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(virtuous)” is a very important quality for women. According to the Lessons for Women 
(Nüie;女诫), if a wife is not virtuous, she cannot respect and serve her husband (fu bu xian, 
ze wuyi shi fu;妇不贤，则无以事夫). Besides the three obediences (sancong;三从), virtuous 
also refers to the four virtues (side;四德) of fidelity, physical charm, propriety in speech, and 
efficiency in needlework. In this sense, to be the “good wife (xianneizhu)”, women should 
put the husband and the family at the center of their lives and sacrifice themselves. A wife’s 
duties have also become a heated topic in the Republican period. Some people advocated the 
liberation of women from the role of dutiful wives and loving mothers, while many people 
proposed domestic duties for wives, such as financial independence and child-raising, 
however, while saying little about women’s public roles, (J. Chen, 2012). The debate did not 
radically change women’s roles in the family, which partially explains why traditional gender 
discourses are still used today. Here, “tanneizhu” is an ironic phrase that wives do not follow 
their responsibility to help their husbands. Using the “good wife (xianneizhu)” and the 
“greedy wife (tanneizhu)” reminds readers that women should be good wives to help their 
husbands in their careers and to improve or maintain their social status.  
Terms related to mistresses and sexual relationships appear 106 times in relation to 
eight phrases. The meaning of mistress and love is straightforward, and the meaning of 
“shenghuo fuhua (leading a corrupt lifestyle)” and “daode baihuai (morally corrupt)” had 
been mentioned in chapter 5, so the focus here is on the other four phrases. “Quansejiaoyi” 
means sexual bribes to cadres, while “bu zhengdang xingxingwei” and “bu zhengdang nannv 
guanxi” means sexual relationships outside marriage. Probably the harshest phrase is 
“tongjian”, which refers to adultery. “Tongjian (adultery)” was a serious crime in ancient 
China for which both women and men would receive punishment, even being sentenced to 
death. For “Tongjian (adultery)”, women who got involved with other men were recognized 
as not fulfilling women’s responsibilities (i.e., three obediences), and men who were involved 
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with other people’s wives were identified as immoral men (opposite to moral men ---- junzi). 
Ancient China was a hierarchical society with strict gender norms and rituals, so “tongjian 
(adultery)” was supposed to violate those norms. Women who committed “tongjian” were 
called “adulteress (yinfu;淫妇)” and men who committed “tongjian” were call “adulterer 
(jianfu;奸夫).” Both “yinfu” and “jianfu” in the Chinese context are insults. In sum, these 
eight phrases stigmatize women as sexed subjects and remind readers that women should be 
moral. To be moral, women should remember traditional gender discourse - to be a good wife 
and accompany their husbands. 
Table 6.2 Codes, definitions and frequencies of themes related to descriptions of men  
Themes Codes Definitions Frequencies 
Descriptions 
of Men 
Men 
this code refers to words and sentences which 
include “men” (nanren;男人). 
4 
Husband  
This code contains the words and sentences 
which contain “husband” (zhangfu,丈夫; fu;
夫) 
165 
Officials/Leade
rs 
This code contains the words and sentences 
which include “officials” (guanyuan;官员) 
and “leaders” (lingdao;领导) 
1,338 
Metaphors of 
corrupt cadres 
The code refers to metaphors to describe 
corrupt cadres, including the related words 
and phases: “grassroot officials embezzled 
169 
99 
 
huge government funds (xiaoguan ju tan,小官
巨贪, or xiaoguan ju fu, 小官巨腐),” “big rat 
( it means corrupt officials, shuoshu,硕鼠),” 
“a lot of flies ( it means a lot of corrupt 
grassroot officials, qun ying,群蝇),” “fly (it 
means corrupt grassroot officials, cangying,苍
蝇),” “ant (it means grassroot officials, mayi,
蚂蚁),” “tiger ( it means high profile officials,  
laohu,老虎).” 
Total  1,735 
Note: the total number of news articles is 276. 
 
Table 6.2 reveals that men in news articles about corruption are most frequently 
depicted as “officials and leaders,” followed by terms referring to “the husband,” 
“metaphors,” and “men”. Compared to descriptions of women, men are not depicted as 
greedy husbands or good husbands, but their roles are conveyed through many metaphors. 
From past to present, being an official or cadre is a very good career plan for Chinese, as the 
Analects of Confucius (lunyu;论语) says a scholar should be an official (xue er you ze shi;学
而优则仕). In ancient society, Confucianism was the foundation of Chinese learning; the 
purpose for entering school and learning was to attend the imperial examinations (kejukaoshi;
科举考试); and the purpose for the imperial examinations was to select officials for the 
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government from all levels. Nowadays, many Chinese who have bachelor’s degrees or above 
are keen to attend the Civil Service Exam, as more than 1.33 million people registered in the 
2018 National Civil Service Exam to compete for only 14,500 positions (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2018, November 1). However, the reason why being officials is so attractive to 
Chinese is not because of the high salary, but because of the authority held by cadres and the 
off-the-books income they can amass (huiseshouru;灰色收入). In China,  a member of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China earned 11 thousand yuan (about 2000 
dollars now) a month in 2011 (Shu, 2014). In the analysis, men were connected with officials 
and leaders, which continue to reinforce the worship of being officials and leaders and 
traditional gender stereotypes (women cannot enter school in ancient society).  
There are seven metaphors reported in Table 6.2, divided into three categories. First, 
xiaoguan ju tan and xiaoguan ju fu are used to refer to low-level cadres who have embezzled 
a huge amount of money. For instance, Hao Pengjun, the former Party Branch Secretary of 
the Coal Bureau, Pu county, Shanxi Province, had embezzled about .3 billion yuan and spent 
more than .1 billion yuan on buying 38 houses in many places, including Beijing and Hainan 
Province (Tencent, 2011). However, he was only section chief rank official (keji;科级). 
Those phrases were meant to attract the readers’ attention, as “xiao (small or low-level)” and 
“ju (huge)” are opposite in Chinese. Second, “shuoshu (big rats)” were used to describe 
corrupt cadres more than 2000 years ago. Based on the Book of Songs (shijing;诗经) which 
collected songs from Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE), a song described corrupt cadres: “big 
rat big rat, do not steal my food” (shuoshu shuoshu, wu shi wo shu;硕鼠硕鼠，无食我黍) 
(haoshici.com, n.d.). A Mouse or a rat was supposed to be greedy and ugly and likely to steal 
food, so a mouse or a rat are metaphors for corrupt cadres. What is more, there is a saying 
which expresses people’s hate towards a mouse or a rat, that is, when a mouse or a rat runs 
across the street, everybody cries, “kill it!” (laoshu guo jie, renren han da;老鼠过街,人人喊
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打). This phrase presupposed people are familiar with the metaphor and the saying. The 
metaphor may remind people’s hate towards corrupt cadres, similar to the hate towards 
mouse or rat. What is excluded are institutional reasons for corruption. Third, “laohu (tiger)” 
and “cangying (flies)” are related to the President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption slogan: 
“cracking down on both tigers and flies (laohu cangming yiqi da;老虎、苍蝇一起打).” 
Mention of these two phrases can show the party’s determination to eliminate corruption and 
make readers feel confident towards the ruling party.  
6.2 Discourses of CCDI Corruption News Articles 
6.2.1 Descriptions of Women: Women’s Fault 
This section focuses on discourses about  women, analyzing how they function to 
make connections between women and corruption. Although, in the previous analysis, very 
few corrupt female cadres are reported, and most women are mentioned in relation to male 
cadre’s corruption issues, women are found to be responsible for corruption in the discourses 
below. 
The first type of female representation in discourses concerning cases of corruption is 
simple mention of “women,” as in the three examples below. 
                        Case 1 
(Yici ourang de jihui, Yi Mou zhongyu ‘ruyuanyichang’: ta 
zhangwo le quezao de zhengju, zhengming Cheng Haibo yu 
mou nianqing nvxing you guo buzhengdang xingwei.) 
Yi Mou made his “dream” come true all by chance; that is, he 
had specific evidence that proved that Cheng Haibo had 
improper sexual relationships with a young woman. (Central 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), 2013, 
August 20) 
Case 1 is a narrative discourse in which the reporter explains a corruption case to 
readers, and the case involves two men (Yi Mou, Cheng Haibo) and an anonymous woman. 
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The “woman,” described as being engaged in “improper sexual relationships,” is treated as a 
sexed subject who is an accessory in the corruption of the male cadre. The reporter 
emphasizes it is not easy to collect evidence by using the phrase “‘dream’ come true 
(ruyuanyichang)” with quotation marks. The phrase “all by chance (Yici ourang de jihui)” is 
consistent with the phrase“‘dream’ come true (ruyuanyichang).” The discourse indicates 
both men are engaged in a conflict, and women and improper sexual relationships are tools to 
beat the enemy.  
                          Case 2 
             (Duan Peixiang bujin zai qian wu shang ai zhan pianyi, hai 
daode baihuai, yanzhong weifan shenghuo jilv. Shencha faxian, 
ta zai danren Dehongzhou guangbo dianshiju dangzu shuji, 
juzhang he zhouzhengfu fumishuzhang, bangongshi zhuren 
qijian, yu duoming nvxing fasheng he baochi buzhengdang 
guanxi) 
             Duan Peixiang did not only take advantage of money and 
wealth but displayed moral corruption as well. An 
investigation revealed that he had improper sexual relations 
with a lot of women when he was Party Secretary of 
Dehongzhou television station. (CCDI, November 16, 2017)  
Similar to case 1, case 2 is a narration. In this case, the word “women” is associated 
with illegal behaviour and misconduct (moral corruption, improper sexual relations). The 
discourse only contains the voice of the reporter, who is employing narration to describe the 
corruption scandal reinforces women as sexed subjects who, like the corrupt cadre, are 
willing to engage in “improper” sexual relations. The word “investigation (shencha)” 
indicates the reporter’s effort to establish the authority of the government. The report 
mentions the corrupt cadre and the results of the investigation, while the reasons for improper 
sexual relations are excluded.  
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  Case 3 
 (Zai ‘mixin xintai’ de yinling xia, Luan Qingwei dizhi gezhong 
youhuo de nengli jijuxiajiang. Ta chen qizi, erzi zai guowai 
qijian, zai guonei yu liangming nvxing changqi baochi 
buzhengdang guanxi, bing yu you yi nv. Weile manzu zhe 
liangming nvxing dui jinqian de xuyao, ta liyong shouzhong 
quanli fengkuang liancai, gei tamen maifang maiche, gong qi 
dasi huihuo.) 
Under the “superstitious mentality,” Luan Qingwei’s ability to 
resist various temptations reduced quickly. While his wife and 
son were abroad, he had improper sexual relationships with 
two women, and one of them gave birth to a girl. In order to 
fulfill these two women’s needs on money, he utilized his 
authorities to get money crazily, bought houses and cars for 
them and provided them with a lot of money. (CCDI, February 
4, 2017) 
Case 3 describes a corruption case with reference to a “superstitious mentality” 
(described with quotation marks), emphasizing that corruption is the individual’s fault. The 
word “women” appears in the discourse twice. First, women are represented in relation to 
improper sexual relationships,” and second, the word “women” is associated with their need 
for  “money” and a set of desires (houses and cars). “Improper sexual relationships” remind 
readers that those women may trade sex for money, while “money” and a set of desires 
(houses and cars) indicate what the corrupt cadre did is to meet women’s needs, and such a 
discourse reinforces an impression that women who are greedy put pressures on men. The 
discourse appears as narrative, but actually belittles women and labels women as materialist 
girls which, in Chinese, is a negative phrase which means young women value everything by 
their monetary value and do everything for their financial interests. This phrase has been 
known by Chinese people since the showing of a blind dating television program in 2008. Ma 
Nuo, one of the participants, said that she preferred to cry in a BMW car rather than smile on 
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a bike (ningyuan zuozai baoma li ku, ye buyuan zuozai zixingche shang xiao;宁愿坐在宝马
里哭，也不愿坐在自行车上笑), that is, she preferred to lead a luxurious lifestyle even if 
she may not necessarily be happy. The public criticized Ma as a materialist girl. By 
examining the entire discourse, there is a paradox: the first sentence claims that Luan’s 
failure to resist temptations was the cause of his corrupt behaviour, but the last sentence 
stigmatizes women as the cause of corruption. The discourse tries to send a warning: 
individuals should be responsible for corruption scandals. Ironically, corruption news is 
released by the official media, which means that the government has the power to define the 
cause of corruption.  
Intertextuality can be established in the above three examples around the theme of 
“improper sexual relationships,” which means unmarried sexual relationships (Wang & 
Zhang, 2015). According to Fairclough (1995), narrative discourses that prevail among news 
reports are sometimes organized to show stories without a clear event-line. It is important, 
then, to examine the main elements that appear in the stories and the ideological function of 
the discourse. The ideological focus of the above discourses is corruption, to draw attention 
to the kinds of activities that state media describe as corruption and who causes corruption. 
This gives news reports a Corruption + Cause structure, where Corruption involves the 
process of committing corruption and the Cause involves how corruption can happen. In 
these narrative discourses, the conjunctions are mainly temporal (when, while), the processes 
are actional (i.e., take, fulfill, bought, get) or mental (superstitious mentality), and the 
characters in the discourse are subjects (specific individual, woman). These narrative 
discourses are trying to establish a connection between corrupt cadres and women; that is, 
corrupt cadres’ relationships with women could be based on improper sexual relationships, 
which are illegal, while fulfilling those women’s desires could cause corruption. 
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On the other hand, those three examples further reflect traditional gender norms 
according to which sexual purity is the only measure of women’s values (Barlow, 2004). 
Although in modern society, no regulations and laws clearly state that women should 
conserve their sexual purity, an emphasis on improper sexual relationships in media 
discourses is an indirect attempt by which state media may seek to regulate women’s 
sexuality.  
The next kind of “woman” present in these media discourses is the “wife”. Because 
the wife is an essential concept in traditional culture, examining this word makes it possible 
to explore the influence of patriarchal power and whether conventional gender relations still 
persist in contemporary society. 
              Case 4 
 (“Qinqing huibao,” fuzhufutan) 
“Repaying one for his or her kindness,” the wife helped the 
husband to commit corruption (CCDI, August 16, 2013). 
In case 4, “repaying one for his or her kindness (qinqing huibao)”, is a metaphorical 
phrase - the wife’s aid in abetting her husband’s corruption in the same way that a wife 
repays the husband’s kindness. This phrase stems from an old saying. In China’s moral 
system, it was virtuous to repay people’s kindness, reflected in the expression that a drop of 
water given in need shall be returned with a burst of spring (dishui zhi en, dang yongquan 
xiang bao;滴水之恩，当涌泉相报), which means even if others just provide a little help, 
one should return the favour with all one can when others are in need (360doc.com, n.d.).  
The phrase “the wife helped the husband to commit corruption (fuzhufutan)” is also a 
metaphorical phrase, which came from the proverb “the wife should obey the husband 
(fuchangfusui).” 
The use of phrases “repaying one for his or her kindness (qinqing huibao)” and “the 
wife helped the husband to commit corruption (fuzhufutan)” in the news report presupposes 
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that readers are familiar with the traditional moral system, including this old saying, and 
understand the use of irony to express the opposite meaning. The author warns that a wife 
should not be the helper for their husband in terms of corruption.   
             Case 5 
(Qizi Jinmou, zai Zhu Weiping tanfu duoluo de guocheng 
zhong, fahui le ‘tanneizhu’de zuoyong. Shen wei dangdi mou 
yinhang zhihang hangzhang de ta, yu Zhu Weiping ‘zhi 
xianghe,gong yu mou’, gongtong tanzou qi ‘laoqian’de 
xiezouqu. Jinmou bu manzu yu yijing yongyou de youyu 
shenghuo, zhengtian xiang de jiushi zenyang qian sheng qian, li 
gun li, wei Zhujia caichan gunxueqiu shi de zengzhang, zuochu 
le henda ‘gongxian’.) 
Coverage of Zhu Weiping’s corruption highlighted the role that 
his wife, Ms. Jin, played the role of a “greedy wife.” As the 
president of a sub-branch of a bank, she accepted bribery with 
her husband. She was not satisfied with gracious living but 
thought about how to make more money by misconduct or 
illegal activities. She “made contributions” to the family 
wealth. (CCDI, November 4, 2014) 
In Case 5, the corruption discourse “greedy wife (tanneizhu)” is used to highlight the 
contrast with its opposite phrase of the “good wife (xianneizhu).” Quotation marks indicate 
“greedy wife (tanneizhu)” is an ironic application of the discourse of corruption in 
representations of the wife’s behaviour in corruption scandals. In the last sentence, the phrase 
“made contributions (gongxian),” introduced with quotation marks, is another ironic 
application, emphasizing Ms. Jin’s important role in corruption. Ironic applications reinforce 
the image of the wife as rapacious. These two applications, together with the statement that 
she was not satisfied with gracious living, attribute the cause of the male cadre’s corrupt 
behaviour to the so-called behaviour of the greedy wife. 
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In these cases, the wife’s role in corruption is configured by the juxtaposition of a 
gender discourse (Coverage of Zhu Weiping’s corruption highlighted the role that his wife, 
Ms. Jin, played the role of a “greedy wife.”) with narrative discourses (i.e., As the president 
of a sub-branch of a bank, she accepted bribery with her husband.). The reference to the 
corruption process is also a legal discourse, as Ms. Jin’s behaviours are referred to here as 
“illegal”. The focus on the greediness of both spouses obscures other pertinent reasons, such 
as lack of supervision, that make corruption possible, which are entirely excluded from these 
narratives of corruption. 
             Case 6 
 (Li Mou bujin ziji’shanchang’quanqianjiaoyi, hai bu wang 
zuo hao Yu Shaodong de ‘xianneizhu’. Yiwei mengkuang 
laoban wei biaoshi ganxie, youyi songgei Yu Shaodong yitao 
Chongqing zhu cheng de fangzi. Li Mou dezhi hou, quancheng 
yitong kanfang, xuanfang bing wancheng banli goufang 
shouxu. Zhihou, ta you ‘qinzi’ shouqu duifang 12 wanyuan de 
fangwu zhuangxiufei, jiashang goufang feiyong zongji 68 wan 
yu yuan.) 
Ms. Li not only traded power for money but also played the 
role of the“good wife.” A boss who owned a manganese ore 
company wanted to give Yu Shaodong a house in Chongqing as 
a gift. Ms. Li heard this news and selected the house. She 
accepted 120,000 Chinese yuan for house decoration. This 
money plus the house purchase fund equalled more than 
680,000 Chinese yuan as total. (CCDI, May 20, 2016) 
            In this case, the wife is initially described as a “good wife (xianneizhu).” However, 
quotation marks indicate that this is an ironic use of the phrase good wife to suggest that the 
wife is actually a “greedy wife (tanneizhu).” The cadre Yu had committed misconduct, and 
the boss wanted to bribe Yu to thank for his help. But in employing three verbs “heard” 
“selected” and “accepted” to describe Ms. Li’s involvement in obtaining the bribe, the 
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narrative discourse makes it look like Ms. Li is the only active participant in corruption, 
while the passivity with which Yu, the male cadre, is portrayed here suggests that he is an 
innocent bystander, devoid of agency 
The discourses surrounding the role of the wife show that she is judged in relation to 
whether she helps the husband in getting bribes. If those wives help their husbands in 
corruption, they are recognized as greedy wives. As has been discussed previously, both 
discourses of the good wife and the greedy wife are connected with wifely duties in 
traditional society. Those discourses not only reinforce expectations about women’s 
traditional roles but, more importantly, represent the exercise of power. According to 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality, biopower represses sex by limiting the topic on certain 
occasions while certain groups of people, such as children, cannot talk about it. Similarly, the 
patriarchal power represses women by posing a set of restrictive norms and rituals and 
stigmatizing women for sexual wrongdoings. In modern society, power is exercised in 
various forms to suppress women. By infusing traditional meanings to the conception of wife, 
the discourses reinforce patriarchal norms and behaviours for women. 
These expectations are also represented in the last kind of discourse about women 
which involves mistresses who are infamous subjects in corruption news. 
                         Case 7 
 (Ju ban’an renyuan toulu, Wang Guoyan chagnqi yu duoming 
nvxing baochi buzhengdang guanxi, qi tanfu suode zhong, 
henda yibufen huihuo zai qingfu shenshang. Ru 2008 nian 10 
yue, Wan Moumou song 100 wanyuan renminbi gei Wang 
Guoyan zao jujue, cihou, zhebiqian yizhi baoguanyu 
‘zhongjianren’ chu, zhidao 2011 nian 8 yue zuoyou, Wang 
Guoyan kaolv qi qingfu Zhu Moumou yao kai jiudian shi cai 
jieshou; 2005 nian xiabannian, Chen Moumou zai zhengde 
Wang Guoyan tongyi hou jiang qi weiyu Nanchangshi 
Erqilnanlu Diou kaifei tianyudian jiazhi 38 wanyuan renminbi 
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de gefen wuchang zhuanrang gei Wang Guoyan de qingfu Yang 
Mou). 
According to investigators, Wang Guoyan had improper sexual 
relations with many women, and most of the money earned 
from corruption was spent on his mistresses. For instance, in 
October 2008, Wang Guoyan rejected 1 million Chinese yuan, 
which Mr. Wan wanted to pay him as a bribe. Then, this money 
was kept by intermediator until August 2011, when Wang 
Guoyan accepted the money because he thought his mistress ---
- Ms. Zhu ---- needed to use the money to open a hotel. In the 
second half of 2005, Wang Guoyan agreed that Mr. Chen 
transferred his shares of a coffee shop to his mistress ---- Ms. 
Yang and the shares worth 0.38 million Chinese yuan. (CCDI, 
September 23, 2013) 
The discourse stigmatizes women as the focus of “improper sexual relations,” then 
emphasizes how women who are mistresses cause corruption in three ways. First, the 
discourse states that most of the bribes the male cadre got were spent on mistresses. Second, 
the male cadre first rejected the bribe but accepted it when his mistress needed money. Third, 
by mentioning “hotel” and “coffee shop,” the author implies the commodification of sexual 
relations by connecting mistresses with monetary values. The investigators’ storytelling while 
introducing details of the corrupt behaviours, makes the discourse intelligible and credible. 
             Case 8 
 (2000 nian, danren yunxi gufen gongsi fuzong de Lei Yi dao 
Beijing chuchai, zai jiuba renshi le Hou Moumou bing yu qi 
fasheng liangxing guanxi, bujiuhou baoyang le Hou Moumou 
bing rang qi dao Kunming juzhu. Danren yunxi jituan dangwei 
shuji, dongshizhang zhihou, Lei Yi gengshi bianbenjiali, 
xianhou baoyang le Li Moumou, Wang Moumou deng duoming 
nvxing, bing jingchang yizhiqianjin, chuzi wei tamen zai 
Kunming, Chengdu, Shenzhen deng di goumai che, fang, qi 
tanwu suode de ju’e huilukuan you 1000 yu wan yun renminbi 
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yong zai le qingfu shenshang. Chucizhiwai, Lei Yi haizai yixie 
laoban de anpaixia, yu yixie nvmingxing, nvmote fasheng he 
baochi buzhengdang liangxing guangxi. Weile weichi ziji he 
qingfu de fuhuo shenghuo, Lei Yi buxi weifan dangjiguofa, 
yiqianmousi, dasiliancai.) 
            In 2000, Lei Yi, who was the vice manager of Yunxi Company 
at that time, was on a business trip to Bejing. He met Ms. Hou 
in a pub, and they had sexual relations. Later, he kept Ms. Hou 
(as his mistress) and let her stay in Kunming. After becoming 
CEO and Party Secretary of Yunxi Company, Lei Yi had many 
mistresses, such as Ms. Li and Ms. Wang, and so on. Lei Yi 
used the money made from corruption to buy houses and cars 
for his mistresses in Shenzhen, Kunming, and Chengdu, and so 
on. He had spent about 10 million Chinese yuan on his 
mistresses. Besides, with the help of some bosses, Lei Yi had 
sexual relations with some celebrities and models. In order to 
maintain this corrupt lifestyle, Lei Yi made huge money from 
misconduct and illegal activities. (CCDI, August 15, 2014) 
 Similar to the previous discourse, this discourse continues to remind readers that 
mistresses are often causes of corruption. One of the differences between the two discourses 
is that Lei Yi did not reject the bribe at first, so he did not look as innocent as Wang Guoyan. 
Another difference is that Lei has sexual relationships with more than one woman, and he has 
a higher social status than those women do, which reflects traditional gender relations. 
McMahon (2010) claimed that in ancient China, an elite man could have many women via 
polygyny and via paying for sex in the brothel. At the end of the discourse, the author 
summarized the case by attributing Lei’s corruption to his desire to maintain his promiscuous 
lifestyle, which reinforces the statement that corruption is the fault of the cadre and the 
mistresses. Although no cadres’ words or mistress’ words were quoted in the discourse, the 
narrative makes it look realistic. What is excluded here are institutional reasons for 
corruption. These discourses emphasize that many corrupt cadres bought houses, cars, and 
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luxury goods for their mistresses, making it appear that the relationships between mistresses 
and cadres are about the commodification of intimacy rather than about more formal aspects 
of the cadre’s institutional position and role.  
In China, purchases of luxury goods increase every year, with the Chinese spending 
about $43 billion on luxury brands in 2011 (Rabkin, 2012). Generally, luxury items can be 
connected to corruption in three ways. First, buying luxury items is a popular way to bribe 
cadres, as those items can be expensive “gifts”. For instance, before the “two sessions” (the 
National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), 
many local cadres would buy luxury items (Hong, 2012) which would be sent to other cadres 
as “gifts” during the “two sessions” period. Second, luxury-item stores are places for getting 
bribes. For instance, business people can go to certain stores owned by the cadre’s relatives 
and buy things without picking them up, so the bribe turns into revenue. Third, mistresses 
like to purchase luxury items. Mistresses’ purchases are described as the driving force of 
some luxury brands (Rabkin, 2012). On the one hand, some mistresses accompany cadres or 
business people to attend important occasions, so luxury goods could make them look 
beautiful and showcase their financial status; on the other hand, buying luxury goods is a 
form of conspicuous consumption to make people think they have refined taste (Rabkin, 
2012). This often causes resentment among the masses who have modest incomes. However, 
if the general public hates luxury items because of its connection with corruption (Hong, 
2012), people may resent mistresses, who are not only tainted by corruption but also have a 
negative effect on marriages. In China, the mistress is often seen as the responsible party for 
destroying her lover’s family, as expressed in an old saying about the importance of family or 
marriage - one would damage ten temples rather than destroy a marriage (ning chai shizuo 
miao, bu hui yizhuanghun;宁拆十座庙，不毁一桩婚). Mistresses are described with 
adjectives such as greedy or materialistic, and portrayed as destroyers of families. As more 
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and more cadres and business people have mistresses, a new kind of company has emerged – 
the mistress dispelling company, which serves to help the wife to dispel mistresses by hiring 
lawyers and psychologists who first befriend the mistress and then convince her to give up on 
her affair. The discourses that associate mistresses with houses, cars, and goods cater to the 
readers’ interest in this heated topic but they are also a way to arouse hatred against 
mistresses. Caught into the lascivious details of such salacious discourses, readers may focus 
on the mistresses as the problem rather than other factors, including the political system 
itself. 
Both case 7 and case 8 are narrative discourses. As both cases do not have a clear 
event-line, one of the elements of discourse, orientation, was utilized. According to Faiclough 
(1995), orientation guides the audience’s perception of the characters. In case 7 and case 8, 
orientations (i.e., accepted, agreed, buy, spent … on, open a hotel, a coffee shop, houses and 
cars) help to generate emotion (negative perception) towards the character (mistresses). 
             Case 9 
 (‘li lian qianxian guo yu jia, cheng you qinjian bai you she.’ 
Shehui fazhan de lishi Jincheng gaosu women: shemi langfei, 
huihuo wudu biran daoshi guojia miewang, zhengquandianfu; 
yige lingdaozhe jiaoshe yinyi, shenghuo fuhua biran zangsong 
qiantu, shenbaiminglie. Bo Liangen, Wu Zhizhong, Jin Zhao 
jiushi cong rezhong yu chihewanle, chenni yu dinghongjiulv, 
zhubu tuihua bianzhi de.) 
“To visit the worthiest country and home, into a thrifty defeat 
by extravagance.” The historical progress of social 
development tells us: extravagance and waste must lead to the 
perdition of the state; a leader who is extravagant and leads a 
corrupt lifestyle must ruin his future and lose all standing and 
reputation. Examples are Bo Liangen, Wu Zhizhong and Jin 
Zhao. (CCDI, July 15, 2014) 
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The discourse employed in case 9 tries to connect a leader’s corrupt behaviour to a 
country’s survival by using the ancient proverb“to visit the worthiest country and home, into 
a thrifty defeat by extravagance.” This old saying, written by Li Shangyin, a famous poet in 
the Tang dynasty (618-907) (Li, n.d.), has three implications. First, the saying attributes the 
causes of the downfall of the dynasty to the extravagance of the royal family and aristocracy.   
To maintain their indulgence, the emperor imposed exploitative levels of taxation on 
peasants, in response to which peasant uprisings contributed to the weakening of the dynasty. 
For instance, the Empress Dowager Cixi used 30 million taels of silver to celebrate her 60th 
birthday and commanded the Beiyang Fleet to end the First Sino-Japanese War without any 
further military support (Hu, 2011). Without support, the Beiyang Fleet was beaten by the 
Japanese Fleet, and the Qing government had to sign unequal treaties. Because such 
behaviours accelerated the end of the Qing dynasty, the proverb reminds people of many 
similar stories about extravagance and the end of a dynasty. Second, the proverb contains 
hidden propaganda by making a direct connection between individual interests and national 
interests. The CCP regularly employs such propaganda which advocates for individuals to 
sacrifice themselves for national interests. For instance, the story of Lai Ning, a student who 
sacrificed himself at the age of 15 in putting out a forest fire, was widely distributed in the 
1990s, when I was in elementary school. In this sense, the proverb tallies with propaganda 
that people perceive from their own everyday life experiences, serving to reinforce the 
exercise of political power. Third, ancient Chinese literature is highly generalized, has 
rhythm, and is straightforward for people to learn and to repeat in the form of proverbs, 
idioms, and poetry. In the case of the ancient saying employed in this discourse, the 
relationship between extravagance and the country is clearly conveyed in only fourteen 
words. In depicting a corrupt lifestyle that includes mistresses and improper sexual relations, 
the discourse stigmatizes women for their roles in ruining a cadre’s life. Mistresses’ 
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subjectivity is repressed by political and patriarchal power because of the unidimensional 
way they are presented to the readers. 
In the discourse, the mention of “corrupt lifestyles (the cadre keeps several 
mistresses)” can arouse people’s hatred for mistresses, reinforced by reference to some 
historical literary quotations which attribute the end of a dynasty to women. For instance, the 
story of “Setting Beacon Fire to make fun of Dukes” (fenghuo xi zhuhou;烽火戏诸侯) 
describes a king who set a beacon fire to please the queen. However, the purpose of setting a 
beacon fire is to inform dukes to save the king from trouble, so after the beacon fire had been 
lit for fun so many times, no dukes came to save the king when the king was really in trouble.  
Case 9 is a regulatory discourse that is congruently applied (i.e., extravagance and 
waste must lead to the perdition of the state). The configuration of a traditional discourse 
with regulatory discourses conveys tensions between “individual corrupt lifestyles” (i.e., 
keeping mistresses) and a state’s prosperity. The author establishes the truth of the cause of 
corruption scandals, “a leader who is extravagant and leads a corrupt lifestyle must ruin his 
future and lose all standing and reputation.” However, while the male is the focus of 
corruption, the mistress is portrayed as the cause of his troubles. 
Some cadres bought houses for their mistresses, which many discourses presuppose is 
a form of bribery. In China, the house is very important and has many implications. First, the 
house is related to important forms of social welfare and resources. Since the 1960s, the 
Chinese government used the household registration system Hukou to restrict migration. That 
is, people who were born in rural places cannot live in cities because they have agricultural 
Hukou, while people who were born in cities have urban Hukou (Fincher, 2016). However, 
many public services, such as medical resources and educational resources, are distributed 
unevenly between cities and suburban areas and between capital cities and other cities. In this 
sense, cities have more hospitals, experts, and high-quality schools, and capital cities, like 
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Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, have even better hospitals and schools. In 1998, China started 
the housing system reform, which enables people to buy and sell houses. Before 1998, 
people’s houses in cities were assigned by the working unit. To stimulate people to purchase 
a house, many city governments started to give people the chance to change their Hukou if 
they bought a house in the city. People began to buy houses not only to get a new Hukou but 
to have access to better public services. However, many rural residents come to the cities 
illegally without obtaining an urban Hukou to work as migrant labourers. Most of them are 
working in heavy labour industries or service industries in jobs that do not require employees 
to have a higher education background or high skills. It is very hard to get Hukou for rural 
residents who work in those jobs, while buying a house is too expensive. Second, 
traditionally, the house is family property which is associated with important social values. 
For instance, Mencius proposed that people who have property would benefit social stability 
(you hengchang zhe you hengxin;有恒产者有恒心). Third, currently, the house is a signifier 
of wealth, which is ever more important in China’s consumerist culture. From 2000 to 2010,  
housing prices increased, on average, 10% every year (Wangyi News, 2018). In Beijing, for 
example, in 2001, the average house price was 4,716 yuan per square metre, while by 2019, it 
had risen to 42,941 yuan per square metre (Wangyi News, 2018; Xinhua News Agency, 
2019). Owning a house in a city signifies that people have property and are wealthier than 
people who do not own a house. Fourth, accepting a house as a bribe can be convenient for 
corrupt cadres, as the house can be registered under the name of the cadre’s family members, 
siblings, parents, or friends. In relation to four aspects noted here, there is a proverb to 
express the association between a house and mistress which says “settle one’s lover in a 
golden house (jinwu cang jiao;金屋藏娇),” which people sometimes cite in conversations 
about those who buy houses for mistresses. 
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In summary, women are commonly depicted in news articles on corruption with 
reference to a series of negative words, including “illegal sexual relations,” “greedy wife,” 
and “mistresses.” Married women are expected to perform their roles as a traditional good 
wife who is responsible for their husband’s upright behaviour; as mistresses or women 
involved in sexual relationships outside of marriage, by contrast, women are sexualized in 
adverse ways and held accountable for male cadre’s corruption. These results confirm that 
women do not receive the same treatment as men in the media. Women’s media images are, 
in part, a reflection of government policies rather than independent and indiscriminate 
descriptions of women. In contemporary society, patriarchal power is exercised on women in 
indirect ways by arousing people’s memory of traditional values and connecting gender 
norms with everyday life. News media contribute to reproducing traditional gender 
discourses in various forms, including metaphors, use of irony, traditional proverbs, 
discourses representing officials’ crimes, and traditional storytelling. The next section 
discusses men’s images in CCDI news articles on corruption. 
6.2.2 Descriptions of Men: Men’s Fault 
As observed in Table 6.2, four keywords related to men’s descriptions are present in 
corruption news. Unlike descriptions of women, discourses about men emphasize men’s 
power at home and in the workplace. 
In discourses associated with the representation of “men (nanren;男人),” several 
traditional expectations towards men can be found, such as being morally superior (junzi). 
              Case 10 
  (Zuo yige shenmeyang de zhangfu, zuo yige shenmeyang de 
fuqin, zuo yige shenmeyang de erzi, zenme zuohao, shi bixu yao 
kaolv de. Wo pingshi bu zhuzhong peiyang zhengque de 
shenghuo qingqu, tantu xiangshou, tanfu anyi, keguang shang 
jiada le ziji dui jinqian de tanlan he zhuiqiu. Zai yewu 
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jiaowang zhong, zai jinqianyouhuo mianqian, bachi buzhu ziji, 
bei tuoru nitan. Wo duibuqi wo de qizi, yihou ta hui yao 
yigeren chengqi yigejia; ye duibuqi wode erqi, yige chengji 
youyi de zhongxuesheng, huoxu gaozhong biye shi, daxue biye 
shi, huoxu ta zhangda chengren de shihou, wo caineng jiandao 
ta, ye bu zhu zenme miandui ta; ye duibuqi wo nianmai de 
fumu, tamen chijinkutou, ba wo peiyangdao daxue biye, 
zoushangle gongzuo gangwei dangshang lingdao, zai tamen 
xuyao zhaogu shi, wo que likai le tamen, huoxu wo zai ye 
jianbudao tamen. Rensheng change shuo chang ye chang, shuo 
duan ye duan, lainghao de shenghuo qingqu, jiankang de 
jiating meide shi yige nanren de lishenzhiben) 
 I should have considered how to be a good husband, a good 
father, and a good son. I did not have a healthy interest in life, 
and I am kind of a hedonist ---- objectively, this made me 
greedy and made me want to get more money. I failed to resist 
the temptation of money during business associations. I am 
sorry for my wife, as she will have to take care of the family all 
by herself in the future. I am sorry for my son, as he is a good 
middle school student, and I may see him again when he is a 
high school student or when he graduates from university, and 
I do not know how to face him. I am sorry for my parents, as 
they raised me until I graduated from university, but I left them 
while they needed me to take care of them, and maybe I will not 
have a chance to see them after being released from prison. 
Life is like a river, not too long not too short, but having 
healthy interests in life, and a healthy family should be 
essential tasks for a man. (CCDI, July 2, 2014) 
The above discourse stems from a cadre’s confession. What is impressive is that the 
cadre repented for his actions because of his relationships with his family members, and he 
felt sorry for all of them. The discourse arouses readers’ empathy that men should be correct 
persons and take care of their families as fathers, sons and husbands while keeping away 
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from criminal activity. However, the discourse has three implications. First, the cadre owed 
his corruption to unhealthy interests in life; his mention of responsibilities for a man and the 
cultivation of healthy interests and responsibilities reflect Confucianist morality. As observed 
previously, Confucianism put an individual’s morality together with the survival of a country, 
emphasizing the importance of a leader’s morality in governing a country. Also, 
Confucianism advocates that filial piety comes first among hundreds of behaviours (bai xing 
xiao wei xian;百行孝为先), so it is moral and normal for a man to take care of parents and 
the family. Here very striking is the lost opportunity to show filial piety which this cadre 
failed to abide by because he got himself imprisoned for corruption and thus endangered his 
responsibilities to take care of his elderly parents.  
Second, in quoting the statement of confession, the article validates the perception 
that corruption is the fault of the individual cadre and not of the political system. While 
analysing the scaffold in the 18th century, Foucualt (1979) claimed that written forms of 
criminal procedures, including confessions, served to establish the truth and the exclusive 
power of the sovereign. The best way to exert the power of truth is to let criminals accept and 
sign for it (Foucualt, 1979). Similarly, in quoting confessions here, the authorities are trying 
to create the truth by demonstrating that the CCP is empowered to establish and enforce the 
truth. Third, the culture of confession (jiantao wenhua;检讨文化), marked by self-criticism, 
ensures that party cadres show submission and admit their errors for not supporting the 
mandates of the party leadership (Liu, 2018).  
Since the 1950s, just after the PRC was founded, the CCP launched an ideological 
reform campaign (sixiang gaizao yundong;思想改造运动) to force intellectuals (zhishi fenzi;
知识分子) to shift their thoughts and ideas to CCP’s socialist ideologies. Intellectuals had to 
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write confessions to reflect on their “faults” and to show they had changed their thoughts and 
ideas. Writing confessions reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution, but the practice 
has been kept until now. Although writing a confession appears to be an individual behaviour 
it is actually a forced behaviour under duress, as people have to write confessions to get less 
punishment, often having to revise confessions many times until the authorities are satisfied 
(Shang, 2013; Liang, 2013; Sha, 2005). Political power is exerted in the confessional 
discourse through three operations: 1) certain elements should be included in the confession, 
such as admitting one’s errors to Chairman Mao during the Maoist period; 2) the purpose of 
writing a confession is to avoid further punishment; and 3) the strategy behind the confession 
is to incorporate propaganda into individuals’ lives.  
During President Xi Jinping’s first five-year term, there have been many confessions 
by both party leaders and commoners, suggesting a possible resurgence of Maoism and tight 
ideological controls (Liu, 2018). By analyzing the televised confession made by Gui Minhai, 
a Hong Kong bookseller, who was arrested on mainland China, Liu (2018) proposed two key 
elements in his confession: criminality and the lack of filial piety. Although the official 
mainstream media indicates that he was arrested after fleeing the scene of a traffic accident 
he caused, it was widely speculated that he was arrested due to published books which 
describe negative images of CCP’s leaders. Compared with confessions in the Maoist era, the 
necessary element of confession in the contemporary age has shifted to focus on traditional 
family values. The discourse in case 10 combines traditional norms with the culture of 
confession to hide the institutional factors associated with corruption. 
              Case 11 
 (an fa hou, Xu Weilin shexiang guo henduo ruguo: ruguo bu 
dangshang yibashou, ruguo shouzhong meiyou laobanmen 
kewang de xiangmu, ruguo dangshi zai jianding yidian …… Xu 
Weilin jingchang huishou zai jiceng tashi gan shi shi de 
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qingjing, bu fuyu danshi tashi, huidao jia man shi huanxiao. 
Nashi, tashi gujia de haonanren, shi ge zhengzhi de haofuqin. 
Nashi, ta henshao churu yule xiuxian changsuo, chule biyao de 
yingchou, ta zong hui diyishijian huijia, xiangshou jia de 
wenxi. Ran’er, zhe yiqie dou bei ta de tanlan he xiangshou 
huidiao le.) 
After being investigated, Xu Weilin thought of many ifs: if he 
did not get the position, if bosses did not want programs that he 
managed, if he can say no …… Xu Weilin always recalled 
when he was a local cadre, he was happy although he was not 
rich. At that time, he was a good man who always took care of 
the family, and he was an upright father. At that time, he 
seldom went to entertainment and leisure venues, unless he 
must attend those activities. He always went back home early. 
However, all of these were destroyed by greed. (CCDI, August 
12, 2014) 
      Case 11 is also a confessional discourse, as signified through reference to a series 
of  “ifs” that Xu Weilin considered. Similar to case 10, the discourse further confirms 
Confucianism’s gender norms through statements about “a good man who takes care of the 
family” and “an upright father.” Also, the discourse confirms political norms by combining 
an individual’s personality with the ability to be a leader (i.e., “all of these were destroyed by 
greed”). The discourse presupposed that readers understand the importance of family and the 
importance of morality. Although the CCP claimed that China had entered a new era after the 
foundation of the PRC, discourses of this nature reveal that traditional gender norms and 
culture did not change totally and still prevail in China.  
            Case 12 
 (zai jiating fangmian, Cui Lianhai hai suan de shang shi yige 
gujia de nanren. Zuowei zhangfu, ta dui airen henhao, airen 
youbing zhuyuan shi doushi ta zai yiyuan peiban zhaogu, ye 
cong mei tingshuo ta zai waimian nianhuarecao; zuowei fuqin, 
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ta hen zhongshi erzi de jiaoyu, erzi daxue biye hou kaoshang le 
gongwuyuan, zai waidi mou jiguan gongzuo, Cui Lianhai 
xianhou fen wuci gei erzi huiqu 275 wan yuan, rang erzi zai 
dangdi maifangzi; zuowei erzi, ta dui fumu henxiaoshun, che 
geiqian geiwu wai, zai ziji kanbing de shihou, ye buwang gei 
fumu dai yixie hao de yaopinbupin; zuowei gege, ta dui ziji de 
didi meimie ye hen zhaogu, jingchang zai jingji shang geiyu 
banzhu……) 
In terms of family, Cui Lianhai is a good man. As a husband, 
he treated his wife very good and took care of his wife when 
she was sick and in the hospital; people did not hear that he 
had extramarital affairs with other women. As a father, he paid 
attention to the son’s education, and his son became a civil 
servant after graduated from university; Cui had sent 2.75 
million yuan to his son for five times, in order to support his 
son to buy a house in another place. As a son, he was pious; he 
not only gave money and materials to his parents but gave them 
health care products at his convenience. As a brother, he took 
care of his siblings in terms of money…… (CCDI, December 9, 
2013) 
Case 12, like the previous two cases, mention men’s responsibility to the family, but 
this example further details the role of man as an economic supporter of a family. In the 
discourse, the phrase “took care of” has two levels of meanings. First, it means responsibility 
for a man to take care of the family physically while his wife was in the hospital. Second, it 
means to take care of the family by providing financial support.  
In China, men are always associated with financial status. Historically, women did not 
have the right to accept education and work outside the household, so men were the only 
economic supporters for the family. In contemporary society, although women have the right 
to enter school and find a job, they have limited chances for career development. Women’s 
ability to give birth to children is believed to increase the cost to employers, so many 
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occupations favour men. Gender discrimination in the hiring process and the working place 
reinforce the idea that men are supporters of the family. One outcome of this phenomenon is 
that a man’s financial status plays a significant role in the marriage market. In urban areas, if 
a man wants to marry, he needs to buy a house to show his financial ability (Budden, 2017); 
in rural areas, if a man wants to marry, he needs to provide a betrothal gift (caili) to the 
bride’s family (Chen, 2016). Generally, buying a house in China’s cities takes, at least, 
100,000 dollars, while betrothal gifts require at least, 20,000 dollars. However, the marriage 
market is highly competitive for men, as the One-Child Policy caused imbalanced gender 
ratios, leading to a surplus of 40 million men. On the other hand, if a family loses the 
husband, this family is recognized as having “lost the economic supporter” and may live in 
poverty. All these facts suggest China is a male-dominated society. Gender inequality is 
inscribed in this discourse which continues to remind readers that the man is still the 
breadwinner, embedded in related discourses that emphasize men’s power in the family and 
downgrade women’s power. Such discourses are applied to the representation of corruption 
but reveal more generally the hidden exercise of power to configure women’s roles. There is 
also a gendered double standard here in the representation of corrupt men who are portrayed 
as having engaged in corruption for altruistic reasons such as supporting their families, while 
women are vilified for leading men to perdition through their sexuality.  
Case 10 and case 11 are confession discourses (I am sorry …, If …) presented with a 
subjunctive mood (i.e., I should have …). The ideological focus of the confession is on the 
cause of corruption: a confession typically includes statements about how individuals’ 
behaviour causes corruption and how individuals should behave. The discourse about men 
(i.e., At that time, he was a good man.) illustrates what a man should do by specifying a set of 
filial duties (take care of parents), family duties (take care of the family) and personality traits 
(upright, greedy). Case 12 is an evaluative discourse (i.e., As a husband, he treated his wife 
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very good and took care of his wife when she was sick and in the hospital.), but it is 
consistent with the confession discourse in terms of content. 
Traditionally, masculinity in China was related to taking care of the family rather than 
being an independent man. Discourses conveyed through news about corruption confirm the 
traditional expectations for men. These include expectations about the role of the “husband” 
in serving the family well, illustrated in the three examples that follow. 
                           Case 13 
 (Yi yao jiaqiang dui quanli de zhidu yueshu. Fanfubai shi 
yixiang xitong gongcheng, xuyao laizi gefang Liliang suo 
xingcheng de heli. Jiaoyu, zhidu, jiandu, gaige, jiufeng, 
chengchu deng gezhong yaosu, jun zai fanfubai zhong fahuizhe 
zhongyao zuoyong. Bizhe renwei, lizu yu changyuan, shangshu 
yaosu zai fanfubai zhong de zuoyong bing bu xiangtong, zhidu 
jianshe shi ezhi quanli fubai de genben. Cong Tang Shaobo 
jieshou huilu guocheng keyi kanchu, Tang Shaobo bingfei 
meiyou renshi dao fubai de fengxian, ta dui jieshou huilu 
feichange xiaoxin he jinshen; zai Tang Shaobo fubaian zhong, 
ye wei chuxian ‘futanqisui’ de qingxing, xianhui de qizi bujin 
jingchang dingzhu zhangfu zuoren yao qianxu jinshen, erqie 
yizai gaojie ta buyao shou renjia de qian. Raner, suoyou zhexie 
dou weineng rang Tang Shaobo baituo dui jinqian de yuwang, 
ta zuizhong reng zouxiang le fubai. Yinci, jiaqiang zhidu 
jianshe, rang guanyuan bugan fubai, buneng fubai, caineng 
cong genbenshang fagnzhi fubai.) 
First, strengthen the institutional constraints on power. The 
anti-corruption campaign is a systematic project, and it needs 
a composition of forces from many aspects, such as the 
education system, the political system, monitoring, reform, 
punishment, and so on. In my opinion, those aspects have 
different functions during anti-corruption campaigns, and the 
essential factor in stopping corruption is to improve the 
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political system. From Tang Shaobo’s case, he knew the risks 
of committing corruption, so he was very careful in getting 
bribes; from Tang Shaobo’s case, we did not find the situation 
that the wife helps the husband to get bribes. Tang’s wife is a 
good wife and always warned her husband not to get bribes. 
However, all of these cannot stop Tang’s desire for money. 
Hence, improving the political system can essentially stop 
corruption. (CCDI, August 10, 2013) 
 Case 13 articulates a regulatory discourse outlining how to eliminate corruption. The 
discourse contains various factors (education system, the political system), corruption 
scandals (i.e., he knew the risks of committing corruption, so he was very careful in getting 
bribes) and characters implicated in the story (Tang Shaobo, Tang’s wife). Specifically, this 
case can be understood from several perspectives. First, the discourse recognizes the wife as a 
good wife, which highlights the family’s role in preventing corruption. The wife did not help 
the husband to commit corruption but kept warning him of the dangers of corruption. Second, 
after mentioning the wife-husband relation in terms of corruption, the discourse blamed the 
person who disengages with family values to engage in corrupt behaviour. Third, although 
the author proposed the way to prevent corruption was to strengthen the authority structure 
and the political system, no details were provided about strategies to achieve these goals. 
Thus, any political dimensions within this discourse remain vague.  
According to Foucault’s perspectives on the Panopticon, criminals in prison know 
that they are being watched, but they do not know who watches them. To avoid punishment, 
criminals need to engage in certain behaviours to cater to expectations (Foucault, 1979). In 
China, the main surveillance system for cadres’ behaviour is the Commission for Discipline 
Inspection. Given that the anti-corruption campaign is the most severe one since the 
foundation of PRC, why do cadres still commit corruption even if they know they are being 
watched and that many colleagues have been investigated? Three factors may account for this 
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situation. First, the Commission for Discipline Inspection is an institution that is led by the 
CCP, and most of the cadres are CCP members, so the regulatory power is weak. Second, the 
official media in China is the mouthpiece of the CCP, which seriously limits its power to 
monitor cadres and the government. Third, as numerous cadres were apprehended and part of 
the anti-corruption campaign was supposed to clean up Xi Jinping’s rivals, it is reasonable to 
suggest that many cadres engaged in misconduct did not receive punishment, so there were 
few fears among them about the consequences of corruption. Many cadres assumed that the 
risk of committing corruption would be less than the benefits they could get from corruption. 
Even in the discourse, it was observed that the prevention of corruption would not make 
cadres fearful of being corrupt; rather, the function of the discourse appears to be to show on 
a superficial basis the official determinations to eliminate corruption as a way to mitigate the 
pressure of the ruling party for not effectively restricting officials’ corruption.  
                         Case 14 
 (Zhangfu rezhongyu quanqian jiaoyi, qizi ze poyou jingji 
tounao.) 
The husband liked to trade power for money, while the wife 
was “economic-minded.” (CCDI, August 23, 2013) 
   The two clauses in case 14 are linked, with the word “husband” paralleled with the 
word “wife,” and the words “trade power for money” paralleled with the words “economic 
minded.” The word “like” in Chinese, “rezhongyu”) signifies something that is good, but to 
trade power for money is not a good thing and the phrase economic-minded in Chinese, 
“jingji tounao (economic minded)” refers to people who are smart in using money, which has 
a positive meaning whereas their application here is ironic. This discourse is meant to mock 
the phenomenon that the husband and wife jointly commit corruption. The purpose of the 
discourse is to remind readers that a family is an important unit in committing or preventing 
corruption. 
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Case 15 
 (2010 nian di, fangdichan laoban Huang Moumou weile 
ganxie Zhu Fulin zai qi banli fangchan xiangmu tudizheng 
fangmian de bangmang, xiang tongguo chaofang huoqu chajia 
de xingshi songqian gei Zhu Fulin. Yushi, Zhu Fulin jiao qizi yi 
yuemu de mingyi zhifule dingjin, yi diyu shichangjie 100 yu 
wan yuan dinggou le yitao fangwu. Lianggeyue hou, Huang 
Moumou shou keyi jiang fangzi zhuanshou huoqu chajia, Zhu 
Fulin you jiao qizi zhifule quan’e fangkuan. Fangzi zhuanshou 
hou, huoli 100 yu wan yuan. Youyu shijian jiange taiduan, Zhu 
Fulin you ying zhangfu yaoqiu, zhidao bannian hou cai lingqu 
le zhe 100 wan yu yuan.) 
At the end of 2010, the boss of a real estate company, Mr. 
Huang, wanted to thank Zhu Fulin’s help in getting Land Use 
Certificate, so he wanted to give money to Zhu via price 
difference in the real estate market. So, Zhu asked his wife to 
order a house and use the name of the mother-in-law to 
register the house. The price of the house was 1 million yuan 
lower than the market price. After two months, Mr. Huang said 
it was time to sell the house to get the price difference, so Zhu 
asked his wife to pay the full price. So, Zhu got 1 million yuan 
after selling the house. However, the 1 million yuan was still in 
Mr. Huang’s company, as Zhu thought it was not right to get 
the money back too soon. After six months, Zhu’s wife got the 
money back by following her husband’s request. (CCDI, June 
15, 2015) 
Case 15 contains narrative discourses which combine corruption discourses and 
husband-wife discourses. Husband-wife discourses contain action verbs (asked, order, use), 
nouns (house) and characters (Mr. Huang, Zhu Fulin, Zhu’s wife), indicating traditional 
gender ideologies. The word “wife” is mentioned three times, and each time the wife is 
portrayed as just following what her husband said. The discourse does not attribute 
corruption to the wife but emphasizes the husband as the head of the family. This case 
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indicates a paradox in the news about corruption in which women are identified as the cause 
of corruption, while male cadres have the power to commit corruption. Such a paradox 
echoes traditional gender norms in which the three obediences required women to follow men 
while political storytelling owed a dynasty’s downfall to women. Those paradoxes further 
confirm women’s marginalization in contrast to men, who have the right to define women’s 
behaviours. 
These three examples highlight the essential role of family members in relation to 
corruption, which they can either prevent or aid and abet. The relation between the family 
and corruption is also a feature of CCP propaganda. President Xi Jinping has emphasized 
family values (jiafeng;家风) since he took power in 2012. At the end of 2012, the Xinhua 
News Agency released a special article introducing Xi’s family life, conveying his warning to 
his family members, relatives, and friends, not to do any business activities in the places he 
had worked before and not to use his name to do anything (CCTV.com, 2018). Xi has 
connected family values with anti-corruption by proposing to “be honest and keep a family in 
order” (lianjie qijia;廉洁齐家) which requires party members to be honest and have good 
family values as part of their obligation to the paternalistic nation. However, such a slogan 
transfers the responsibility for anti-corruption to women, who Xi said have “special 
functions” in building and keeping good family values (Zhang, 2018b), echoing notions of 
women as “mothers of the nation” within Republican China. Such special functions refer to 
women’s personality, as well as maternal qualities such as the ability to give birth and the 
ability to breast-feed (funv teyou de shenxin tedian, shengyu he buru gongneng;妇女特有的
身心特点，生育和哺乳功能) (Zhang, 2018b). The slogan has been exerted by many 
institutions across many activities. Every year since 2014, the All-China Women’s Federation 
(ACWF) has promoted its initiative to “Build the honest atmosphere; Family helps to be 
honest and upright (shu qinglian jiafeng, jiating zhulian;树清廉家风，家庭助廉)” (Xinhua 
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Net, 2016). This initiative requires women to educate their family to be honest and to 
maintain an honest family atmosphere, and cadres are required to build up the family as the 
bottom line of anti-corruption (Xinhua Net, 2016). While this campaign employs the concept 
of the “good woman” as a strategy to stop corruption, it also reinforces the traditional idea 
that a woman’s primary goal should be a good mother and a good wife, serving to reproduce 
this dominant discourse in daily life. As political discourses had incorporated traditional 
gender discourses, women have to suffer the exercise of both political and patriarchal power. 
Family’s importance in keeping away corruption has been widespread, with the word 
“family” included even in discourses related to descriptions of the “leader /official.” 
Case 16 
 (‘buzuo kuiben maimai.’ Shi meige shagnren de jiben xintiao, 
renhe yige shangren zai gei guanyuan songli shi, kanzhong de 
doushi guanyuan shouzhong de quanli. Zhexie daoli, Du Min 
bushi buzhidao, dan yiran lecibupi, he laoban hunzaiyiqi, 
shenzhi quanjia shangzhen ---- qizi jingshang, xiongdi 
bangchen, lian erzi ye canyu qizhong) 
 “Businessmen do not do business without making a profit,” 
this is the principle of businessmen. When sending gifts to 
officials, every businessman targets an official’s power. Du 
Min knew this principle and the businessman’s purpose, but he 
did not stop committing corruption. He liked to make friends 
with bosses, and even family members wanted to take 
advantage of his power ---- his wife did business, his brothers 
did business, and even his son did business. (CCDI, May 4, 
2017) 
            Case 16 combines a corruption discourse that highlights economic norms related to 
sayings (Businessmen do not do business without making a profit), narrative discourse (He 
liked to make friends with bosses, and even family members wanted to take advantage of his 
power …) and evaluation discourse (Du Min knew this principle and the businessman’s 
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purpose). In this case, three keywords – “official,” “businessmen,” and “family members” – 
are employed in relation to corrupt behaviour. By observing that the cadre knew corruption 
was illegal but could not stop, the discourse seems to emphasize the fault of the cadre. In 
Chinese, there is a phrase that refers to collusion between officials and business people – 
“guan shang goujie (官商勾结), which describes a common way to commit corruption. Since 
China has moved towards a market economy, government officials have the power to decide 
which company can undertake infrastructure construction and other programs, creating 
possibilities for business people to bribe government officials in order to obtain government 
contracts.  
In this case, the discourse mentions the participation of the cadre’s family members in 
corruption, which implies the importance of keeping the family in order. It presupposes the 
family could constrain the cadre’s career. Family, from past to present, is recognized as a 
basic social unit. After the foundation of the PRC, marriage has become a public issue or 
even a political issue. During the Maoist era, if a young man did not marry, the working unit 
would find a woman to marry him. Before 2003, to marry, people needed to get approval 
from the working unit, which would check the political backgrounds of the person people 
wanted to marry. To divorce, people needed to get approval from the working unit as well, 
but generally, the leader in the working unit would persuade them not to divorce, as “divorce 
won’t be a good influence”, especially for middle and low-level leaders and officials. 
Sometimes, however, divorce could be a way to show loyalty to the CCP. In 1953, a 
document named the Central Government’s Decisions on Dividing Class Components 
(Zhongyang zhengfu guanyu huafen jieji chengfen de jueding;中央政府关于划分阶级成分
的决定) advocated people to get divorced from partners who did not have good political 
backgrounds (landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionists, bad people, right political 
spectrum) (Wangyi News, 2019). With this exercise of political power on marriage 
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discourses, the idea that family members could constrain the cadres’ career is not alien to 
Chinese people.  
Case 17 
 (san shi jiating shishou. Jiaotongting xilie fubaian, zaici 
shagnyan le ‘fuqi, fuzi, funv, xiongmei’ tongtang shoushen de 
huamian. Zhexie tanfu anjian, xuduo douyou jiating chengyuan 
gongton gfubai de qingjie, zhexie guanyuan mei neng shouzhu 
jiating de lianjie fangxian, youde shi bei jiating guoxia, youde 
shi bei qinqing suo lei, zuizhong bujin huile ziji, ye duansongle 
jiating he qinren de xingfu) 
Third, the family falls. From a series of corruption cases 
related to the Department of Communications, many of them 
had husband and wife, father and son, father and daughter, 
brother and sister stand trial together. Among corruption 
cases, many officials’ family members committed corruption 
together with officials, and such officials cannot keep the 
bottom line of not being corrupt. Some of these officials were 
coerced by family or relatives to commit corruption. 
Corruption ruined their life, their family and their relatives. 
(CCDI, November 18, 2014) 
              Case 17 employs a regulatory discourse which consists of reference to family-related 
corruption (i.e., From a series of corruption cases related to the Department of 
Communications,…) and an evaluation discourse of the cause of corruption (i.e., such 
officials cannot keep the bottom line of not being corrupt). The family appears as a catalyst 
for corruption, and the official finds himself “coerced” by different family members to 
engage in corrupt behaviour. The word “coerced” reminds readers that men should have 
family members listen to him and not the other way around. Traditionally, men were 
supposed to manage the family. Success in managing the family was seen as the first step to 
govern the country (dazhangfu yiwu bu sao, he yi sao tianxia;大丈夫一屋不扫，何以扫天
下). Although men are the head of the family, family members are blamed for corruption, and 
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wives who participate in corruption are labelled as greedy wives. In this case, a desire for 
material goods by other family members is suggested as a reason for cadres to commit 
corruption. Such a relationship looks circumspect in the modern world, but it looks 
reasonable from a traditional perspective. Traditional Chinese culture is well known for 
discouraging personal desires, especially material desires. For instance, during the Song 
dynasty, a Confucian scholar, Zhu Xi (朱熹), proposed that people should have feudal ethics 
and extinguish desires (cun tianli, mie ren yu;存天理,灭人欲) (ifeng.com, 2010). Family 
members’ desires, as described in this report, can violate traditional morality and contribute 
to corruption. On the other hand, the discourse also faults cadres for failing to keep the 
bottom line of not being corrupt, suggested that their moral training was not sufficient. 
Morality, an important ideal of Confucianism, continues to be significant through views that 
cadres should be morally advanced and able to guide people with morals (dao zhi yi de;道之
以德) (Xinhua News, 2017). In sum, the news discourse, in focusing on families as an 
impetus for corruption, upholds the party’s approach to addressing corruption in part by 
focusing on collective ideals and moral values. 
Case 18 
 (chuxian keyan jingfei fubai, shouxian shi keyan zhidu guoyu 
xingzhenghua zaocheng de. Woguo de keyan zhidu wangwang 
shi yi keti xiangmuzhide xingshi zai yunxing, keti xiangmu de 
shenbao wangwang shi you danwei lingdao, zishen jiaoshou, 
xueke daitouren danren zuizhang, keti zuzhang dui keti de ren, 
cai, wu juyou gaodu de zhipeiquan, erzhe guoyu jizhong de 
quanli shi zisheng fubai de wenchuang) 
The first reason for research funding corruption is the over 
administration of the research system. In China, the operation 
of the research system relies on research projects, and 
research projects should be approved by leaders, experienced 
professors, and academic leaders. These people are always the 
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group leader of research projects and have the right to allocate 
human resources, research materials and the research funding. 
The concentration of power produces corruption. (CCDI, 
November 27, 2013) 
              Case 18 draws attention to officials’ power as a reason for corruption. This case 
illustrates a regulatory discourse of corruption that employs explanatory discourse (i.e., These 
people are always the group leader of research projects and have the right to allocate human 
resources, research materials and the research funding). 
In China’s universities, the power of political-administrative officials is stronger than 
academic power (Xinhua News, 2016). In terms of applying for research funding, if the 
applicant is the department head as well as a professor, the application has a high likelihood 
of success (Xinhua News, 2016). Interestingly, people who examine the research funding 
applications are leaders, not professors, as a result of a process of university 
administrationalization -administration interferes with academic independence (Xinhua 
News, 2016). Many research projects are led by people who are not themselves researchers. 
Moreover, because universities do not have independent supervisory oversight, people who 
get research funding can allocate it by themselves. Thus, corruption related to research 
funding has become an issue in Chinese society; Sohu News (2014) estimated that more than 
500 billion yuan had been lost due to corruption. While the case reported here draws attention 
to problems associated with the concentration of power, this is an empty discourse because it 
does not mention how to prevent this phenomenon. What is more, to make a clean break with 
corrupt cadres and avoid being blamed for corruption scandals, the CCP uses metaphors to 
describe corrupt cadres. The following are three examples of metaphors. 
Case 19 
 (Xian jiwei cong zheqi anjian rushou shenwaxicha, yiju 
chachule 28 qi gongcheng jianshe lingyu de weibiao chuanbiao 
anjian, bujin jiekaile gongcheng jianshe zhaobiao shichang 
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zhong chuxian de zhongzhong quanqian jiaoyi neimu, hai 
qianchu yiwo kaozhe zhe jixing de hangye ‘qianguize’ 
weisheng de ‘shuoshu’.) 
Starting from this case, The County Commission for Discipline 
Inspection investigated 28 cases related to illegal bidding in 
the construction area. Such cases did not only reveal the inside 
story of trading power for the money in the construction area 
but found a lot of “big rats” who survived by utilizing unspoken 
rules in this industry. (CCDI, September 13, 2013) 
In this article, corrupt cadres who were investigated by the Commission for Discipline 
Inspection are portrayed as “big rats.” The report articulates corruption in official terms (i.e., 
The County Commission for Discipline Inspection investigated 28 cases) in conjunction with 
the metaphorical imagery of “big rats.”  Through this application, the last sentence of the 
discourse seeks to arouse the public’s hatred of corrupt actions while impressing the audience 
with the effectiveness of efforts to stop corruption. Currently, illegal bidding related to 
construction has attracted much attention; it is estimated that at least 800 billion yuan are 
advanced for bribery or corruption every year (Yan, 2014). The essential problem behind 
corruption in bidding is lack of supervision. For instance, Zheng Daofang, who was the 
Deputy Director of the Department of Communications in Sichuan Province, was responsible 
for supervising bidding activities; he was also a bidder in his role as the CEO of a 
construction company. In addition, he was the Director of the Bid Evaluation Committee, 
who was responsible for evaluating the criteria for bidding (People’s Daily, 2005). So, the 
bidding process in which one individual had exclusive power in supervising, bidding, and 
evaluation is problematic and provides chances for the cadre to commit corruption. Recently, 
President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has contributed to some reduction in the number of 
corruption scandals (Xinhua News, 2015). However, the anti-corruption campaign does not 
mean that a highly effective supervision system is completed, and it does not remove the 
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exclusive power from cadres, meaning that corruption related to bidding has not been solved 
completely.  
Case 20 
 (Jinnian yilai, Jiangxisheng Lepingshi jiwei, jianchaju jianchi 
‘laohu’, ‘cangying’ yiqida, yansu chachu qianhai quanzhong 
liyi de weijiweifa anjian. Tongguo yanchan pianqu guojia 
zaolin xiangmu zijin weiji weifa anjian, yiju chachu le gaishi 
linye xitong fubai wo an, qude le lianghao de zhengzhi, shehui 
he faji xiaoguo.) 
Since this year, the Leping Commission for Discipline 
Inspection and the Leping Supervisory Bureau keep fighting for 
“tiger” and “flies,” that is, they investigated illegal and cases 
that violate public interest and regulation. By investigating 
illegal cases related to defrauding national reforestation 
project funding, the corruption of municipal forestry was shut 
down. Such anti-corruption activities got good political, social 
and law results. (CCDI, November 11, 2013)  
Case 20 inolves forestry corruption. In China, the department of forestry is meant to 
protect the environment, to plant and manage forests and trees, which used to receiving less 
allocation from the central government; therefore, foresty is supposed to be less corrupt 
(Landscape.cn, 2014). In recent years, the central government has allocated more and more 
money to the forestry. From 1949 to 1999, the forestry department received 24.3 billion yuan 
from the central government, while in 2002, the central government provided a total of 33.9 
billion yuan to the forestry department (Landscape.cn, 2014). The accumulating allocation 
from the government exceeds 1 trillion yuan. In the absence of an independent force to 
supervise allocations, the forestry department has many corruption cases. For instance, Guo 
Qinghe, the former Party Secretary of Guangzhou Forestry and Landscape Bureau, was 
accused of illegally getting more than 2 million yuan as bribes (Landscape.cn, 2014). In case 
20, the discourse is a regulatory discourse (i.e., Since this year, the Leping Commission for 
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Discipline Inspection and the Leping Supervisory Bureau keep fighting for “tiger” and 
“flies”), with  “tiger” and “flies” serving as metaphorical representations of corrupt cadres, 
which are consistent with President Xi Jinping’s slogan for the anti-corruption campaign. The 
report employs the phrase “public interest” in relation to a focus on investigation and good 
results to remind readers that the party and the government are upright, standing for the 
public against corruption, which is not their fault. 
Case 21 
 (“Jianchi shengwei tichu de ‘lianjie xing sheng’ zhanlue, chu 
zhongquan, zhi miwang, jianchi ‘laohu’, ‘cangyi’ yiqida, ji 
jianjue chachu lingdao ganwu weiji weifa anjian, you qieshi 
jiejue fasheng zai qunzhong shenbian de buzhengzhifeng he 
wubai wenti.” Henan shengwei changwei, sheng jiwei shuji Yin 
Jinhua shuo, yiding yao yi fanfubai de shiji chengxiao 
quxinyumin, wei zhongyuan jueqi tigong jianqiang de jilv 
baozheng). 
“We need to keep the strategy proposed by the Provincial 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, that is, punch the ‘tiger,’ 
‘flies’ together. We not only investigate illegal behaviours and 
behaviours that violate regulations related to officials and 
leaders but investigate corruptions that happen around the 
public.” This statement was made by Yin Jinhua, the Standing 
Committee of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and the 
Secretary of Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission. He 
said we need to use the results of the anti-corruption campaign 
to make people trust us, and such a campaign can promote the 
rise of central plains. (CCDI, October 9, 2013) 
Case 21 quotes the leader’s words to strengthen the determination to eliminate 
corruption, employing metaphorical applications (tigers, flies), to remind readers of the 
central government’s anti-corruption campaign and reassure the public that action is being 
taken to address the problem. However, by presenting the focus of the discourse in a vague 
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manner, the report ignores institutional issues while implying support for consolidating the 
leader’s power.  
In sum, in descriptions of men that appear in news reports on corruption, the family is 
an important element, depicted in a manner which reinforces men’s roles as householders 
while emphasizing joint family and wife responsibility even for corruption perpetrated by 
men. On the other hand, the CCP also uses metaphors and empty discourses to address 
corruption cases. There is a chain of relations between participants in the discourses: corrupt 
cadres take responsibility for being greedy and for not keeping the family away from 
corruption; women take responsibility for not building good family values; and the CCP 
attributes responsibility for corruption to any sources other than itself. From the perspective 
of power/knowledge, women are oppressed by both patriarchal and political power. 
6.3 Intertextuality Analysis of CCDI Corruption News Articles 
This section displays an analysis of intertextuality by taking into consideration four 
articles. The first two articles are related to male cadres who had personal issues (no cases 
related to female cadre’s personal issues were found). The third article refers to male cadres 
who do not have personal issues, and the fourth article concerns a female cadre who does not 
have personal issues. 
6.3.1 Examples of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was Related to Personal Issues 
The first article introduces the corruption case of Liu Jiakun, the former deputy 
director of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the Fuyang and former 
secretary of CPC County Committee in Taihe County. A characteristic of this article is that 
women are directly depicted as the source of trouble. The title is The Way to Bribe Me is to 
Bribe My Mistress, which clearly states that the mistress plays an important role in 
corruption. The title employs a sexualized discourse to attract readers.  
The article begins with an extract from Liu’s confessions: 
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 (“wo shouhui shi, qingfu shi gongju zaiti, shi caopanshou, shi cangku. Wo shouhui 
de suoyou qianwu jihu quanbu shi tongguo qingfu shixian de, conger xingcheng le qingfu 
shou qianwu, wo liyong quanli wei xinghuiren banshi mouqu liyi de jumian ……”) 
(“danren xianwei shuji shijian yi chang, wo zhujian fangsong le dui ziji de yaoqiu, 
kaishi xiangwang denghongjiulv de shenghuo, dingbuzhu shehua shenghuo de 
youhuo …… ”) 
  “When I got bribes, the mistress is the tool of getting money, she is the person who 
controlled this, and she is responsible for storing the money. Nearly all of the bribes I got 
were accepted by her first. So, she got money and gifts, and I was responsible for doing 
things for bribes by taking advantage of power…” (CCDI, October 16, 2013) 
 “I had been the secretary of CCP County Committee of Taihe for a long time, so I 
reduced restrictions to myself. I began to desire a luxurious life…” (CCDI, October 16, 
2013) 
Liu’s confession used the words “tool,” “controlled,” and “storing” to indicate the 
role of his mistress, who appears as an enabler and complicit in the corruption. Then, he 
admitted his fault by mentioning “reduced restrictions.” Gender discourses and confessional 
discourses make it look reasonable to owe the corruption to the mistress and the cadre, 
although the confession could be a forced confession.  
Following the extract, the news article turns to use regulatory discourse to introduce 
the sentences given to Liu and his mistress Zhao Xiaoli by the Intermediate Court of Suzhou 
Municipality, noting briefly the amount of bribery money they got (29 million Chinese yuan) 
from project contracting, land expropriation, payment for project, re-organized enterprise, 
and so on. Then, the article summarizes Liu’s career, in which he was reported to have 
worked hard until age 47, at which point his career was ruined by a woman: 
  (47 sui shi de ta zenme ye buhui xiangdao, ziji houlai hui yinewei yige nvren, weile 
suowei de “aiqing” er zoushang tanfu zhi lu, shangyan le yichang ziji nong quan, qingfu 
shouqian de tanfu ju). 
However, he would never think that he would commit corruption for a woman and for 
so-called “love.” This scandal can be generalized as Liu’s abuse of power and his mistress 
accepted money. (CCDI, October 16, 2013) 
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            The above discourse reinforces the statement that the mistress is the cause of 
corruption. The discourse is informal, using the third person - “zenme ye buhui xiangdao 
(never think),” and “suowei de aiqing (so-called “love”).” Using colloquial discourse is to 
make the statement closer to the general public daily life. The quotation marks applied to the 
word “love” are meant to satirize the relationship between the cadre and the mistress and 
imply that it is not true love. The article shows their relationship is based on material goods 
and money, which cater to stereotypes about mistresses. Such stereotypes are associated with 
traditional society gender hierarchy and the relationship between luxury items and the 
mistress. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many girls in ancient society were sold to 
rich families as concubines, which made it possible for some of them to have access to 
material goods and money. These associations continue today in the view that mistresses are 
one driving force for the purchase of luxury goods through relationships perceived as the 
intimacy of commodification. 
The article proceeds with a sub-section to introduce how Liu became a leader by 
working hard. For instance, when he was the secretary of Fuyang Environmental Protection 
Agency, he and his colleague solved environmental problems which the public paid close 
attention to, and made the discharge of wastewater, dust, and waste meet the standard. Such 
activities were praised by the municipal government and the State Environmental Protection 
Administration. Liu accepted many awards and gave presentations in many organizations and 
places. The article described Liu’s characteristics at that time by quoting an official from 
Anhui Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection. The official used “plain clothes and 
cloth shoes (yi zhuo pusu, chuan zhe buxie;衣着朴素，穿着布鞋)” to describe Liu’s 
appearance. He also used “enthusiasm (reqing;热情)” to describe Liu’s performance while 
introducing the Land Policy, and used “honest and upright (yishenzhengqi;一身正气)” to 
describe the impression Liu gave him. 
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Those words, mentioned by the official, cater to expectations for cadres in both 
traditional and contemporary society. A proverb, be contented in poverty and devoted to 
things spiritual (anpinledao;安贫乐道;), means even in poverty, people should insist on 
moral principles. Although ancient cadres’ salaries were low, and cadres were expected to be 
morally advanced. During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), however, it was very hard for an 
official to support the family by only relying on his salary, so almost every official 
committed corruption. The easiest and the most common way for officials to increase their 
income is called “linjiantihu (淋尖踢斛),” that is, when farmers used the container to 
measure the grain they handed in, the official just kicked the container, and the grain that fell 
off the container would belong to the official (Dangnian mingyue, 2011). By contrast, 
regulatory discourses were reinforced by stories such as that of Hai Rui (海瑞), who did not 
have linjiantihu during his lifetime, was very poor, and his wife and his concubine did not 
even have new clothes. When he was dead, his family did not have enough money to bury 
him (Dangnian mingyue, 2011). In contemporary society, a cadre has a relatively lower 
salary but has more power, so if a cadre has luxury goods, the public may suspect this cadre 
is involved in corruption. For instance, Yang Dacai, the former head of the Shaanxi Province 
work safety administration (Shaanxi sheng anquan shengchan jiandu 
guanliju;陕西省安全生产监督管理局), was wearing an expensive watch while inspecting a 
car accident. He was soon reported by people, and later, was investigated by the Commission 
for Discipline Inspection (Sohu Media, 2013). In Liu’s case, the official’s words were 
incorporated into colloquial discourse, which is acceptable for the audience, the general 
public. 
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Then, this official mentioned that the second time he met with Liu he felt like Liu was 
not as upright as the first time they had met. The article attributed this change to his mistress: 
(er daozhi zhezhong zhuanbian de zuizhongyao yinsu jiushi ta tong Zhao Xiaoli 
chansheng le hunwaiqing, bing weile zhe suowei de “aiqing” yinfa duominuo gupai shi de 
tanfu xingwei.) 
The main factor that led to these changes was the affair with Zhao Xiaoli, and the so-
called “love” had triggered corruption behaviours just like Dominoes. (CCDI, October 16, 
2013) 
The article described how Liu and his mistress got bribes in a section with the sub-
title “Errors in seeking love: mistress had become Liu’s weakness” (cuo tan huan: qingfu 
chengwei ta de “ruanlei”;错贪欢：情妇成为他的“软肋”). Again, the title reminds readers 
that Liu’s fault was to seek love with a mistress who would become the person that caused 
his corrupt behaviour. The article indicated that Liu’s corruption was exacerbated by the birth 
of his son: 
(ruguo shuo, Liu Jiakun fangzong ziji, chenmian yu he Zhao Xiaoli de ganqing rang 
qi chengwei ziji “ruanlei” de hua, name Zhao Xiaoli shengxia de nage nanhai zai houlai jiu 
chengwei jikui ta lianjie congzheng fangxian de “zhongbang zhadan”) 
Zhao became the weakness of Liu; then, the baby boy would be the “bomb,” which 
made him turn away from being honest and upright. (CCDI, October 16, 2013) 
Again and again, the mistress and the baby boy are blamed for Liu’s corruption. Here, 
the word “bomb” is a common metaphor in Chinese news articles. It symbolizes events 
which may be of great importance. In this discourse, the “bomb” means the baby boy had a 
significant influence on Liu’s career, highlighting a progressive relationship between the 
influence of Zhao and the influence of the baby boy. However, the baby boy was borne by 
the mistress, so the discourse actually confirms that Zhao caused corruption.  
The article described the pattern of Liu’s corruption, revealed by the subtitle as greed: 
the mistress accepted money, and he did the work (tanyu qi: qingfu shouqian ta banshi;贪欲
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起：情妇收钱他办事). This part began with the importance of Liu’s power in obtaining 
projects in Taihe County. Liu banned his wife and his son from contacting real estate 
developers, from getting money or gifts, and from arranging an appointment for relatives for 
the sake of his job. However, such restrictions did not work for his mistress, Zhao Xiaoli. 
Then, the article revealed how Zhao accepted Kang’s money and gifts. The reason that Zhao 
used to persuade Liu to accept money and gifts was: 
 (Zhao Xiaoli yi gai zhiqian de wenshun xingxiang, kunao qilai: “he ni hao de 
zhexienian wo mei yao guo ni yifenqian, haizi chusheng hou, wo meishijian dali shengyi, 
nandao yao zuochishankong ma? Haizi manman zhangda, zai fuyang shenghuo chizao yao 
baolu, women dao waidi maifang , shenghuo, haizi shangxue, bu dou xuyao qian ma?”) 
She cried and screamed: “I have not asked you for money since I had been together 
with you. I had no time to do my business after giving birth to the baby. How can I earn 
money? The baby is growing, and people here will sooner or later know my son and me so we 
have to move to other places. In order to live in other places, we will have living expenses, 
we need to buy a house, and the kid needs to go to school, all of these need money, right?” 
(CCDI, October 16, 2013) 
              The above discourse quoted Zhao’s words in a colloquial discourse close to people’s 
conversation in daily life. Indeed, the words “cried” and “screamed” are associated with a 
popular saying in Chinese society ---- first try crying, then try screaming, last try to kill 
oneself (yi ku er nao san shangdiao). This saying means women generally have three 
methods to be shrewish: crying, screaming, and suicide. It is a cynical saying which 
stigmatizes women as unreasonable and insane people. The saying initially stemmed from 
ancient society but is prevalent in modern society due to its frequent transmission through TV 
programs. The discourse highlights both the mistress and her behaviour, which is not upright 
and reasonable, as causes of the cadre’s problems. 
             The discourse implies the financial pressure to keep a mistress, which helps to 
generate empathy for the cadre. However, the discourse confirmed the previous discourse 
that the relationship was not for love; the mistress had ulterior motives rather than felt 
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genuine love for the cadre, which pressured Liu to get bribes. The article then cited another 
example of Mr. Han to illustrate the corruption pattern of Liu and Zhao; that is, Zhao 
accepted money and gifts, while Liu helped secure bribes to get projects. The article detailed 
how the corruption pattern worked in various ways before concluding with comments by the 
investigator, who briefly summarized the reasons for Liu’s corruption: 
(Liu Jiakun yin tanfu luoma, shi yinxiang de shiluo, liyi de youhuo, renxing de 
ruodian zai qiefa jiandu de quanli mianqian de quan baolu). 
Liu Jiakun was brought down by corruption, and this is because of his loss of faith, 
the temptation of money, the weakness of humanity, and lack of supervision. (CCDI, October 
16, 2013) 
             The above discourse focused on three aspects of the problem: cadre, mistress, and 
supervision. The cadre’s problem is the “loss of faith,” which confirmed the expectation that 
the cadre should be moral; the mistress was recognized as “temptation,” and the authorities 
are criticized through the phrase “lack of supervision.” However, among those reasons for 
corruption, three are related to personality, which is emphasized as the cause of corruption, 
while there is only limited mention of the role of government in contributing to lapse 
supervision. 
The article warned readers, in particular, to avoid improper sexual relations: 
             (Liu Jiakun de shenbaiminglie guigendaodi shi ta zishen xiuyang chule wenti, raner 
qi qingfu Zhao Xiaoli zai qizhong suoqi de “cuihua” zuoyong yeshi xianeryijian. Weile rang 
Zhao Xiaoli muzi guoshang anyi naizhi shehua de shenghuo shi Liu Jiakun shoushou ju’e 
huilu de zhuyao qudongli. Zai Zhao Xiaoli de tianyanmiyu he kunao xia, Liu Jiakun de lianjie 
congzheng fangxian dongyao, bengta, zuizhong buzeshouduan, yishenshifa, nanyiziba di 
zhuiru tanfu shenyuan.) 
The main reason for Liu’s corruption was his personal reason, but his mistress, who 
served as a catalyst, also caused Liu’s corrupt behaviour. Keeping the mistress and her son 
living in a luxury life motivated Liu to accept bribery. Mistress’ love words and crying 
changed Liu’s mind to be an honest and upright cadre, and he could not stop committing 
corruption. (CCDI, October 16, 2013) 
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              Thus, in an article describing Liu’s corrupt behaviour, primary attention is given to 
the mistress Zhao Xiaoli, who knew how to persuade Liu by “love words and crying.” This is 
reinforced in the report, which used an ancient saying to caution against the problem of 
improper sexual relations: 
            (guren yue:”shengse zhe, baide zhi ju”.) 
The ancients said that if a man indulges in sexual relations, this man will not be 
moral. (CCDI, October 16, 2013)  
Finally, another ancient saying is quoted: “close the case and thought, troubles came 
from sex and luxurious life” (yanjuan shensi, huo shengyu yinyi, huan shiyu shengse;掩卷深
思，祸生于淫逸，患始于声色) (CCDI, October 16, 2013).  In case readers missed the 
message that mistresses were dangerous, the article also quoted comments from an unknown 
resource, observing about Liu’s case that:“to be honest, Liu’s corruption was from his 
relations with mistress Zhao” (Liu Jiakun de tuibian, shishiqiushi di shuo, shi cong yu Zhao 
Xiaoli fazhan chengwei hun wai lianqing guanxi kaishi de;刘家坤的蜕变，实事求是地说，
是从与赵晓莉发展成为婚外恋情关系开始的) (CCDI, October 16, 2013).  The article 
described the corruption in narrative terms, indicating that the mistress did participate in 
corruption; she was identified in nine different places as being the main reason for corruption. 
In short, the article, from its title through to its closing quotations, makes clear that women, 
by inducing men to engage in illicit sexual activity, are a major cause of corruption. 
The article illustrates how the CCDI reports mix gender discourse, regulatory 
discourse, confessional discourse, and colloquial discourse to form a structure or a 
relationship between participants: the mistress is the cause and motivation of corruption, the 
cadre is misled by the mistress, and the CCP’s role is minimized in two sentences that refer to 
“lack of supervision.”  Ironically, the article does not quote confessions from the mistress 
even though she is confirmed as the cause of corruption! This article reveals a means by 
144 
 
which, according to Foucault (1990), society or culture can perpetuate its ideology via 
dominant discourse, shaping what people perceive as “truth” as an instrument of power. In 
this sense, the article guides people to a conclusion that the corruption scandal is caused by 
individuals rather than a phenomenon that the CCP should not be responsible for. These 
discourses reflect an exercise in biopower, in this case seeking to regulate behaviours of 
women and cadres.  
Another article analyses the corruption case of Li Zehua, who was quoted as saying 
he wanted to make money by abuse of power but made a cage (prison) for himself. The 
article drew on regulatory discourses to summarize penalties imposed on him by the 
government. The first sub-section describes how Li Zehua was committing corruption with 
his secretary, Li Zewei, acquiring money by selling land illegally without giving the buyer a 
receipt. In China, without a receipt, the seller will not pay tax. The second sub-section 
describes how Li used illegal money for his mistress, Ms. Li. Entitled “Spend a lot of money 
for his mistress” (wei qingfu yizhiqianjin;为情妇一掷千金), this section cites an example to 
illustrate how Li Zehua committed corruption and how his mistress Ms. Li was involved in 
corruption. While Wang Mou brought money to buy the land, the mistress Ms. Li was 
described as greedy: 
(Li Mou kanjian Wang Mou dailai de yiluo chaopiao, qingbuzijin fachu 
gankai:”zheme duo qian a, ruguo shi wode jiu hao le.”) 
Ms. Li saw the money that was brought by Mr. Wang, and she said: “what a lot of 
money. If I had this money, that would be great.” (CCDI, September 7, 2016) 
             Quoting Ms. Li’s words in the colloquial discourse, the author depicts the mistress as 
actively and willingly seeking to participate in corrupt behaviour. When the cadre understood 
what his mistress meant, he gave her 100,000 yuan, for the purposes, as described in the 
article, “to make the mistress happy”( wei boqu qingfu huanxin;为博取情妇欢心). To 
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illustrate the sub-title’s emphasis on the money that the cadre spent on the mistress, the 
article continues to introduce the involvement of the mistress: 
 (2014 nian chu, Li Zehua dezhi mou dichanshang zhunbei goumai yikuai tudi, bian 
shixian jiang zhekuaidi dijia chushou gei qi qingfu Li Mou ji haoyou Liu Mou. Zhihou, ta zai 
tongzhi dai dichanshang cong qi qingfu Li Mou shouzhong goumai gai di kuai. Li Mou he Liu 
Mou jiang di maichu hou qingsong zhuanqu tudi daomai chajia, huoli 12 wan yuan. Li Zehua 
cong zhezhuang jiaoyi zhong huode haochufei 2 wan yuan.) 
At the beginning of 2014, Li Zehua knew that a famous real estate developer wanted 
to buy land, so he sold the land to his mistress and one of his friends, Mr. Liu. Later, Li 
Zehua asked the real estate developer to buy the land from his mistress. Ms. Li and Mr. Liu 
got 0.12 million Chinese yuan for selling the land. Li Zehua got another 20,000 Chinese yuan 
as benefits. (CCDI, September 7, 2016) 
This description reveals that the cadre was the person who had the power to obtain the 
information that someone would buy the land and asked his mistress to buy the land, but the 
discourse fails to support the statement that committing corruption was to sustain the 
luxurious life of the mistress. The next section of the article, titled “get everything from 
nothing” (“jiejishengdan” wan “kongshoudao”; “借鸡生蛋”玩“空手道”), describes how 
Li Zehua got illegal money from giving nothing away. Similar to the former example, Li 
Zehua got illegal money by selling land to the buyer at a higher price (higher than the original 
price) in order to make a profit. The article concluded with reference to regulatory discourse 
to introduce how the government dealt with Li Zehua and other leaders’ problems, with eight 
people, including Li Zehua, sent to judicial organs, and more than 30 officials investigated. 
The article ended with a warning to people not to commit corruption. 
By referring to “judicial organs,” this discourse reinforces the official message that 
corrupt cadres would receive punishment and be sent to prison as a result of government 
oversight to monitor corrupt cadres and prevent corrupt behaviour that violates laws and 
regulations. Li Zehua experienced a diminishment of his own power as a result of his corrupt 
activities, losing the capacity he had, before being investigated, Li to speculate and obtain ill-
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gotten gains. This power, based on his job and position, belongs to sovereign power and was 
relinquished by Li when he was sent to prison.  
It should be noticed that the pattern of corruption revealed in the case of Li Zehua 
(i.e., selling land to real estate developers) has become common in China. The behaviour of 
Li and his mistress, called speculation, emerged prior to the transformation to the market 
economy in China. At that time, because of the planned economy, the government would 
allocate all material goods in relation to its population. Because of the egalitarian nature of 
the planned economy, some people could not get more goods even if they wanted. However, 
corruption ensued because some state-owned companies had extra goods after allocation 
which could be sold at a very high price, making it possible for people who sold them to get a 
lot of money. However, speculation was also practiced by many cadres and business people 
after China transformed from a planned economy to a market economy. The cases described 
so far illustrate two ways to engage in speculation, by reselling the house or reselling land for 
profit. Both of these are covert means to get bribes.  
The articles discussed in this section show how women may be involved in the 
process of corruption, even if they are not identified as the person who motivated the male 
cadre to commit corruption. The mistress is portrayed as a person whom the male cadre 
spends a lot of money on as someone who seeks money from the male cadre. Although the 
cadre does the power-rent seeking, it is the mistresses were are labelled as greedy. Using 
criminal discourse, colloquial discourse and gender discourse, the authors introduce readers 
to a number of well-known, well-defined, and stable codes, in the process simplifying 
corruption scandals to a criminal and personal issue. In both cases, the mistress is represented 
as someone who would mask corruption and accept money for the cadre. Overall, women, in 
this genre of news reporting, are represented as tools to get bribes - as greedy women lusting 
for ill-gotten money.  
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6.3.2 The Example of Male Cadres Whose Corrutpion was not Related to Personal 
Issues 
An article entitled “Cut the Hand which Embezzles State-owned Assets” (CCDI, 
February 25, 2015) describes the case of a male cadre involved in corruption related to a 
state-owned company. The colloquial nature of the title is meant to show to members of the 
public the state’s determination to solve corruption related to embezzling state-owned assets. 
For cadres, the title is meant as a warning not to engage in corruption. In China, politicians’ 
talk and speeches suggest changes in the future or attitudes towards specific issues. For 
instance, in the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection, Wang Qishan, the head of the CCDI, said that even under “high-handed posture” 
(gaoya tai shi;高压态势), some party members and cadres did not stop corruption. Here, the 
phrase “high-handed posture” (gaoya tai shi;高压态势) signals that the anti-corruption 
campaign is still in progress, and no corrupt behaviour will be tolerated. In other words, 
Wang Qishan suggested that any party members and cadres (his talk did not specify who) 
who commit corruption will be investigated (Wang, 2014). As Table 5.2 has revealed, this 
message was reinforced through the high number of cases reported to be investigated in 2015. 
The article on corruption in state-owned enterprises started with an editor’s note 
which suggested that issues such as “weak consciousness in understanding party discipline 
and not implementing subject responsibilities” (dang de guannian danbo, zhuti zeren bu 
luoshi, shi chansheng wenti de zong binggen;党的观念淡薄，主体责任不落实，是产生问
题的总病根) (CCDI, February 25, 2015) could sometimes contribute to corruption. The 
word “consciousness” reduces the corruption scandal to an individual’s personal flaw while 
the phrase “subject responsibilities” refers to the Commission for Discipline Inspection which 
is responsible for investigating and reporting corrupt cadres. By reporting that these were not 
148 
 
implemented in some cases, the article implies that the supervision organizations may have 
failed to detect corruption.  
The article highlights official perspectives by describing a mobilization meeting of 
central inspections before the Spring Festival, where Wang Qishan talked about the problems 
of state-owned enterprises and the main reasons behind these problems. It also mentioned 
some of these problems reported by the third round of central special inspection before 
introducing four cases to illustrate problems state-own companies were facing.  
The first case, which is related to how family members can treat state-owned 
companies like an ATM to profit by taking advantage of cadres’ positions, is analyzed here. 
The cadre, in this case, was Chen Ruizhai, former chief manager and secretary of the Party 
Committee for the Shangdong Stationery and Sporting Goods Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. He got 
bribes by borrowing public funds intended for other organizations illegally and embezzled 
1,424,100 yuan of state-owned assets. Like many other corrupt officials, Chen used his son’s 
name to have some shares in those organizations and companies.  
            Similar to other news articles, the article uses regulatory discourse to depict the way 
Chen was penalized by the government and sent to judicial organs. This case also included an 
analysis to convey the apparent reasons for Chen’s corruption. The first reason given was that 
Chen was avaricious: 
 (bujin size chuli guoyou zichan, nuoyong gongkuan, jiu lian Shandongsheng 
caizhengting xiang sheng wenti gongsi fafang bufen kunnan zhigong jiuzhujin zhezhong 
“jiumingqian”, jingran yeyou 20 duo wan yuan bei Chen fangru xiaojinku hou sifen. Kejian, 
Chen de tanlan he xiaozhang yijing daole hezhong chengdu.) 
He was too greedy ---- he not only embezzled state-owned assets but also embezzled 
funds (also called “life-saving money”), which Shandong Department of Finance allocated 
to workers who lived in poverty in Shangdong Stationery And Sporting Goods Imp. & Exp. 
Co., Ltd. (CCDI, February 25, 2015) 
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            To illustrate Chen’s greediness, the author of the article recounts how Chen 
embezzled poor workers’ “life-saving money (jiumingqian).” In China, there is a superstition 
that if a person embezzles life-saving money to do other things, it would be inauspicious. The 
use of the phrase “life-saving money” in this case arouses readers’empathy for poor people 
and causes them to disdain the cadre. Such a colloquial discourse makes readers think that 
corruption occurs because of avarice rather than pointing to other factors like flaws in the 
political system.  
The second reason, described below, conveys a discourse which suggests that Chen 
engaged in corruption because of his distorted thoughts and ideas:  
            (jiuqi genben yuanyin, shi Chen de sixiang chu le wenti. Chen jinguan xueshi shuiping 
bijiao gao, waimao yewu nengli bijiao qiang, dan jinnianlai mingxian fangsong le dui ziji de 
sixiang gaizao, jingchang jiekou yewu fanmang, henshao canjia zhengzhi xuexi he jieshou 
lianjie congye jiaoyu, henshao zhudong jiaqiang dangxing xiuyang he dangxing duanlian, 
shijieguan, renshengguan, jiazhiguan zhege “zongkaiguan”chu le wenti, quanliguan, 
liyiguan zhuxian fasheng le niuqu cuowei, wangji le zuzhi de zhongtuo he qunzhong de 
qidai.) 
The essential reason for his behaviour was his thoughts and ideas. Although he was 
better educated and had a strong working ability, he did not promote himself via accepting 
anti-corruption education, so his ideas and thoughts became tortured, and he totally forgot 
the party and the public. (CCDI, February 25, 2015) 
             By presupposing that if Chen had accepted anti-corruption education, he would not 
have had corruption issues, the discourse successfully shifts the content of corruption from its 
usual emphasis on criminality and its impact as a political scandal to an individual moral 
issue. Currently, China has more than 300 laws and regulations to limit corrupt behaviours. 
The Criminal Law clearly states that an individual who embezzled not less than 50,000 yuan 
but less than 100,000 yuan should be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than five years 
(Zhu, 2013). Given its legal punishment, corruption is clearly a criminal issue. Moreover, 
corruption should be a severe political issue (Ouyang, 2013), as it is related to the ill-
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management of the ruling party. However, in the state media discourses, corruption is 
euphemistically represented as just a moral issue or an individual failing that can be fixed by 
education. The CCP represents itself as very honourable because the party continues to offer 
various chances for its cadres to learn how to be upright and honest. The discourse mentions 
responsibilities to “the public” in order to remind readers that the CCP protects and 
represents the interests of the public. In this summary, corruption downgraded to an 
individual problem. Although the last paragraph mentioned that lack of supervision also 
influenced corruption patterns, this statement is too general to have much of an impact in 
compensating for personal or individual issues. What is interesting here is that for much of its 
ideology, CCP is not at all interested in the human rights of the individual and favors the 
rights of the collectivity and Chinese society as a whole. But when it comes to assuming 
blame or responsibility, regulatory discourse approved by the CCP tends to blame corruption 
on individual failings rather than systemic problems in the party.  
This article continued to introduce another three cases and ended up with quotations 
of several articles from the Regulation of the Communist Party of China on Disciplinary 
Actions (Zhongguo Gongchandang jilv chufen tiaoli;《中国共产党纪律处分条例》) and 
The Regulation on the Punishment of Civil Servants of Administrative Organs (Xingzheng 
jiguan gongwuyuan chufen tiaoli; 《行政机关公务员处分条例》) (CCDI, February 25, 
2015). Such party discourse shows readers that the CCP takes the moral high ground and 
does not tolerate corruption. In sum, a mixture of regulatory discourse, colloquial discourse, 
and party discourse has simplified the reasons behind this corruption scandal, while allowing 
the party to exercise its power on corrupt cadres and come out with a clean image from a 
potentially controversial situation. 
The corruption issues of state-owned companies are different in some ways from 
corruption issues that arise for government officials. In China, in order to control important 
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areas, such as banking, telecom, resources, the government controls many state-owned 
companies. Compared to private companies, state-owned companies have better working-
benefits and preferential policies and have easier access to bank loans. The government has 
set up party branches and assigns managers or leaders in those companies. All managers and 
leaders have the same administrative level as government officials. Without a clear line 
between the functions of the government and those of state-owned enterprises (zheng qi bu 
fen;政企不分) and effective supervision from the government, corruption can proliferate in 
state-owned enterprises (Ifeng.com, 2014). So, the CCP’s goal in reforming state-owned 
enterprises is to separate government functions from enterprise management (zheng qi fen 
kai;政企分开). However, such a goal has not yet been achieved. President Xi Jinping has 
strengthened the government’s control of state-owned enterprises by requiring all of them to 
follow the party’s leadership (Feng, 2016), because other interests are at play, and the state 
wants to retain its influence. However, corruption cannot be eliminated even if government 
functions are separated from enterprise management. Should the government sever its ties to 
those enterprises, then they, in turn, can bribe government officials, just like other private 
companies. The essential problem is the one-party political system, and the government’s 
authority cannot be supervised adequately by civil society or democratic elections. So, the 
separation between the government and enterprises may reduce corruption but cannot solve 
the problem totally. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, where the transition from the socialist 
market economy was made in the early 1990s, corruption also arose in the process of 
privatizing state-owned enterprises when officials got bribes to sell them under market value. 
This problem could arise in China as well. China has, in fact, been watching the transition to 
capitalism in Eastern Europe because it feared its own imminent political collapse after the 
fall of the Eastern socialist block in 89-early 1990s. Consequently, China drew its own 
lessons about how to transition to the market economy on its own terms.  
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In sum, discourse about corruption in state-owned companies, like other corruption-
related discourse, tends to emphasize the flaws or greediness of individual characters. In the 
case which follows, another common feature, loss of morality, is the focus of an article 
describing corruption related to a female cadre. 
6.3.3 The Example of Female Cadres Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal 
Issues 
Among 297 articles, only 11 articles depict corrupt female cadres. Such a low number 
does not mean that females are more honest and more trustable, but rather reflects the reality 
that there were very few female cadres in positions of power. Many of these 11 articles do 
not depict female cadres as the main characters. Considering it is necessary to focus on how 
female cadres are depicted in corruption-related news articles, an article that depicts a female 
cadre as the main character is shown here. 
The article’s title contains a pair of Chinese antonyms - “mei (beautiful)” and “chou 
(ugly)”- to satirize and expose as shameful the cadre use of bribes to become beautiful by 
using luxury items. The article first summarized Zhu Fangyun’s case - the total amount of 
illegal money she got was 0.32 million Chinese yuan, and she was in possession of a lot of 
luxury items, including Chanel furs, and a lot of expensive cosmetics – and described how 
she became corrupt by abuse of power. The Environmental Protection Agency decided to buy 
the Automatic Air Monitoring System and ICP emission spectrometer via bidding invitation. 
Zhu, who was the judge for this bidding, accepted 40,000 yuan and let Changsha Chunlei 
Equipment Co., Ltd. win the bid. After being investigated, she said she was afraid of getting 
illegal money the first time, but after she found nobody recognized this, her concerns 
decreased. 
The second part of the article focused on the process of getting bribes. Zhu thought it 
was easy to profit from her position, even when she was a low-level cadre (vice section 
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chief), which she used to buy more luxury items. After helping the Chunlei company to win 
the bid in 2012, Zhu got 50,000 Chinese yuan as bribes. However, 90,000 yuan was not 
enough for Zhu, and she still wanted more money. In 2014, Zhu helped Chunlei company to 
win the bid again. In order to thank Zhu, the boss, Mr. Wang, gave her 230,000 yuan as 
bribes. 
The last part commented on Zhu’s corruption under the title of “She eats her own 
bitter fruit and regrets committing corruption” (zishi ku guo, ta aohuibuyi;自食苦果，她懊
悔不已) (CCDI, October 20, 2016). The title blames the cadre for the corruption, while the 
article observes that Zhu was sentenced to three years and got a fine of 200,000 yuan. Then, 
Zhu’s reflection of her behaviour was quoted. 
             (“xianzai xiagnxiang, ji gandao houhui,you hen houpa. Ziji zai rizi bijiao jianku de 
shihou shangqie neng dizhi gezhong youhuo, zuodao jie shen zi ai, rujin rizi bianhao le, que 
bu dongde yueshu, zizunziai, cai niangcheng le wufa wanhui de houguo.”Zhu Fangyun aohui 
bu die.) 
“Now, I feel regret and am in fear of doing this. During times of hardship, I resisted 
various temptations, but I lost myself when my life became better. This is why I got these 
results.” (CCDI, October 20, 2016) 
           Zhu’s confession uses a phrase, jie shen zi ai (which came from a proverb jie shen zi 
hao, which means exercise self-control so as to protect oneself from immorality), to 
summarize her problems. Jie shen zi ai reminds readers to be morally upright, indicating that 
the problem of the cadre was her lack of morality. As morality is one of the essential qualities 
for being an official in ancient society, the phrase jie shen zi ai helps to formulate corruption 
as individual issues. The author also attributes Zhu’s behaviour to distorted values about 
consumption. By employing colloquial discourse, regulatory discourse, and confessional 
discourse, the article shapes corruption as the result of the individual fault. 
Zhu Fangyun’s case is different from other cases, as it suggests a change to 
consumerism and the prosperity of the luxury market in China might have implications 
154 
 
related to motivations personal corruption. As Hanser and Li (2015, p.111) observe, “The 
expansion of a market economy has thrust consumers… into a highly competitive consumer 
marketplace which seeks to satisfy every consumer desire.” Consumption has become a way 
to satisfy one’s needs for prestige (zunrong), face (mianzi), and as members of a certain class 
(middle class) (Hanser & Li, 2015; Zhang, 2012). Here face, a concept that is very prevalent 
in Chinese society, refers to maintaining appearances and status, whereas to lose face is to 
lose status and feel ashamed. To some degree, luxury goods are a good fit for these needs, 
and women are more likely to buy luxury items. Based on the Wealth Report Asia (The Julius 
Baer Group, 2018), Asian women have become the highest consumers of luxury goods 
globally. The report has coined the word “womenomics” to describe such a situation. 
According to Bar (2018), Chinese women’s purchases of luxury goods have accounted for 
about one-third of luxury-good purchases worldwide. The report owes this growth to the 
increasing social status of Chinese women, as more women are found in management 
positions and are financially savvy. On the other hand, the prosperity of the luxury market 
could result from the weakened momentum of the anti-corruption campaign (Kottasova, 
2018). Also, many young Chinese buyers are financially secure, as they were born after most 
families were limited to have one child (Kottasova, 2018). Besides the influence of social 
status, political influence and financial influence, three other factors also influence the 
growth of luxury market: Chinese women see luxury products as an identity; Chinese women 
worship foreign brands as it makes them appear cosmopolitan; and Chinese women are 
influenced by social media, as many people pose photos of luxury products on their Chinese 
social media accounts (Zheng, 2018). Many labels describe the relationship between women 
and luxury items in terms like the “materialist girl.” Reference to “luxury items” makes for 
popular headlines in Chinese society and the Chinese press. Stories about corrupt female 
cadres and luxury goods attract readers, who can be distracted with such consumerist 
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preoccupations rather than focus on other issues such as problems with the political system. 
In this case, the author appeals to readers by employing a colloquial narrative to describe 
Zhu’s story, highlighting how the female cadre had lost all sense of self-restriction and 
displayed distorted values of consumption.   
 
By utilizing the intertextual analysis to analyse news reports on corruption, I have two 
main findings. First, these articles employ a mix of different discourses to shape corruption 
scandals as individual criminal behaviour, although in some paragraphs, corruption is 
described as a moral issue. Twenty-two different numbers of words and phrases are used to 
describe misconduct and illegal behaviours, and these words and phrases appear 4,968 times 
in a total of 297 articles; therefore, on average, corrupt cadres’ misconduct and illegal 
behaviour are referred to 15 times per article. This repetition in news articles keeps 
reinforcing to readers the ways in which corrupt behaviour violates laws and regulations. 
The first kind of description is related to abuse of power for money, as described in 
phrases like “trading power for money(quan qian jiaoyi,权钱交易 or yi quan mou li,以权谋
利 or yi quan mou qian,以权谋钱);” “abuse of power for personal interests(yiquanmousi;以
权谋私);” “act in the public service for one's own ends (jiagongjisi;假公济私);” “power rent-
seeking (quanli xun zu;权力寻租);” “bribery( shouhui or huilu受贿 or 贿赂);” and 
“collusion between and government officials and business owners (guanshang goujie;官商勾
结).” Among these words and phrases, “jiagongjisi (act in the public service for one'sown 
ends),” “shouhui (bribery)” and “huilu (bribery)” are ancient proverbs or ancient words. 
“Quanli xun zu” is the translation of the economic term referring to power rent-seeking, 
which has been employed in popular discourse for about a decade. Others are similar phrases 
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to express the relationship between money and power. All of these words and phrases are 
well-defined and well-known in Chinese society. 
The second kind of descriptions is related to the abuse of authorities and may not be 
related to money: “know the law but break it (zhifafanfa;知法犯法);” “play into the hands of 
something (yan guo ba mao;雁过拔毛);” “grasp at authority by oneself (dulan daquan,独揽
大权);” “fraud (nongxu zuojia,弄虚作假);” and “misuse of authority (lanyong zhiquan;滥用
职权).” For instance, Wu Rijing, the former CEO, general manager and Party Secretary of 
the Guangdong XinGuang International Group, was accused of grasping at authority by 
himself, as he occupied the three most important positions in a state-owned company 
(Ifeng.com, 2011).  
The third kind is general words and phrases to describe corruption:“accumulate 
wealth by unfair means (liancai;敛财);” “corruption ( fu;腐)” and“greedy ( tan;贪).” Those 
words and phrases can refer to embezzlement, bribery, selling positions, and so on.  
The fourth kind of description is even more general: “not make a clear distinction 
between public and private interests (gongsi bu fen;公私不分).” It should be noted that this 
phrase can be used in various contexts. For instance, this phrase can refer to how the boss 
treats one worker better in the work place, because the boss and the worker are friends 
outside the work place. In news articles about corruption, “gongsi bu fen” is not necessarilty 
related to money. 
Next is “selling or buying government positions (maiguanyujue;卖官鬻爵),” which is 
an ancient proverb which implies unfair competition for government positions.In addition, 
other phrases are sometimes used, including “gambling (dubo;赌博),” which violates both 
the law and the CCP’s regulations) and “offensive and defensive alliance (gongshou 
tongmeng;攻守同盟)” which is a strategy used to mask criminal behaviours.  
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The second main finding is that the causes of corruption scandals are simplified in the 
state news reports to individuals’ personality and family issues. Eleven words and phrases, 
other than those that refer to problems associated with women, are related to the cause of 
corruption. Only two phrases are associated with supervision, that is, “supervise (jiandu,监督 
or jianguan,监管).” One phrase blames corruption on cadre’s friends, that is, “making wrong 
friends (jiaoyou bu shen;交友不慎).” Other phrases are associated with individual desires: 
“be blinded by the lust for money (lilingzhihun;利令智昏),” “put profit above conscience 
(liyuxunxin; 利欲熏心),” “lose control (shikong;失控),”  “psychologically unbalanced (xintai 
shiheng, 心态失衡  or xinli shiheng, 心理失衡,),” “greed is like a valley that can never be 
filled (yuhenantian; 欲壑难填),” “full with selfish desire (siyu zuosui,私欲作祟  or siyu 
pengzhang, 私欲膨胀).” Both “lilingzhihun (be blinded by the lust for money)” and 
“liyuxunxin (put profit above conscience)” are ancient proverbs, and their meanings are 
similar - greed makes people crazy or lose intelligence. According to the Records of the 
Grand Historian (Shiji, 史记), the expression “lilingzhihun (be blinded by lust for money)” 
was used to describe Zhao Sheng, who was the chancellor of Zhao country in the Warring 
States Period (Sima, n.d.). Upon defeat, the Han country had to concede territory, Shangdang, 
to Qin country. However, the garrison general of Shangdang did not agree with it (Sima, 
n.d.). The garrison general wanted to use Zhao country’s army to confront Qin’s army, so he 
promised that Shangdang would affiliate with Zhao if Zhao won (Sima, n.d.). Zhao Sheng 
wanted Shangdang and agreed to confront Qin’s army. However, Zhao’s army was defeated 
by Qin’s army, and 400,000 of Zhao’s soldiers lost their lives. So, the Records of the Grand 
Historian commented on Zhao Sheng as “lilingzhihun (be blinded by lust for money),” 
because Qin country was the strongest country, and Zhao Sheng should not have agreed to 
confront Qin in order to get Shangdang (Sima, n.d.). “Xinli shiheng” and “xintai shiheng” 
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(psychologically unbalanced) refer to mentality, which caters to the party’s propaganda. The 
CCP requires members to strengthen the party spirit through training (jiaqiang dang xing 
xiuyang;加强党性修养), and good mentality is an important part of it. Those eleven words 
and phrases, which appear a total of 1,257 times in the news articles, stress the importance of 
personality in corruption cases. A common characteristic for all the above words and phrases 
is that they are well-defined and stable codes. Such a characteristic ensures readers’ 
understanding and reinforces the party’s power to shape discourse and ideologies about 
proper behaviour in daily life. 
6.4 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions 
By using critical discourse analysis to explore divergent discourses about men and 
women’s involvement in corruption, I have shown the impact of gender differences in news 
coverage of corruption. In the official media, the most frequently mentioned code for women 
is the “wife,” which is the core role of women in traditional Chinese culture. Ironically, 
during the Maoist period, women’s roles in private spheres were considered as obstacles for 
women to achieve emancipation, and women were mobilized to play roles in the public 
sphere (Ji, 2015; Sun & Chen, 2015), such as doing heavy industry labour (Yihong et al., 
2006). The emphasis on the “wife” may reflect the resurgence of Confucianism in 
contemporary society. However, being a traditional good wife contrasts with greater choice 
associated with neoliberalism that has accompanied the market economy. On the one hand, 
women have more choices in finding a job and choosing a lifestyle; on the other hand, 
traditional wifehood encourages women to be caretakers; thus, women have to suffer a 
double burden through their labour in the workplace and the family (Leung, 2003; 
Summerfield, 1994). In this sense, most women have not truly attained gender equality, even 
if it is possible to improve their economic status. 
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In news about corruption, men are more likely to appear as “leaders” or “officials,” 
which shows that China’s officialdom is still male-dominated. Mass labour participation has 
not opened the door to higher job positions for most women, who are largely engaged in low-
paying jobs (Ji & Yeung, 2014). In fact, during the state-owned companies’ transitions in the 
1990s, many female workers were laid-off and later got part-time jobs (Cook & Dong, 2011). 
While women are gaining higher levels of education, gender stereotypes and discrimination 
in the workplace limits their opportunities to get promotions (Rai, 1994). Indeed, by 2009, 
only 11% of cadres at the national level were female cadres (Sina News, 2012).  
Gender differences are also prominent in the ways in which men and women are 
represented in the new reports about corruption. In general, three kinds of women are 
mentioned in the news articles: the wife, the mistress and women who have improper sexual 
relations with cadres. Both mistresses and women who have extramarital affairs with cadres 
are blamed as the cause of corruption, while the wife is blamed if she fails to monitor the 
husband’s behaviour. Women’s images suggest that wifehood, and being a good wife, are the 
only criteria for judging women. The media reports feature ancient precepts, stories, words 
and phrases to confirm women's leading roles in corruption scandals even when women are 
not the corrupt cadres. By analyzing Confucian thoughts, Mencius's thoughts and yin-yang 
harmony, Clark and Wang (2004) claim that Confucianism originally supported gender 
equality and harmonious relationships between men and women. Jiang (2009) points out that 
Confucian values for a harmonious society may not harm women, but they do urge women to 
fulfill their duties. In addition, Confucianism does not provide any specific rules or norms 
that protect women's rights and prevent abuse towards women (Yun, 2013). In the present 
study, however, the media reports quote Confucian rules and norms as a way to blame 
women rather than protect women.  
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Mistress-blaming reconfirms the traditional social hierarchy and social 
inequalities. Modern mistresses have a similar status as concubines (Mann, 1997). In ancient 
society, abuse of concubines reflected the concubines’ lower social status as well as their 
lower status in a polygamous marriage. In the news articles, mistresses do not receive respect 
from authors, but rather, are condemned by authors as sources of trouble. In China, there is 
also a storytelling style which criticizes beautiful women for causing the collision of 
dynasties. However, Chen (2017) points out that this storytelling style now serves as a 
template for corruption news framing. Mistresses in corruption news suffer verbal 
discrimination and abuse. What is more, many news articles neglect female mistresses’ voice, 
emphasizing mistresses’ greediness in committing corruption and obtaining money. In sum, 
corruption news articles depict a hierarchy between women centred on concerns of sexual 
ethics. 
In news articles on corruption, men are depicted as family supporters, immoral cadres 
and animals who are identified by the traditional culture as avaricious. Nevertheless, in their 
confessions, some corrupt cadres evaluate their roles as men in accordance with traditional 
conceptions of manhood, while some of them define masculinity as a reflection of wealth and 
power. The male cadres’ goal appears to be to present themselves as a moral man, as 
increasing morality can minimize men’s greediness and reduce corruption. This reflects 
Confucian moral norms in which corruption is caused by individual immoral men. 
Significantly, the reason that Confucianism remained the dominant ideology over the past 
2000 years was that it met the needs of, rather than criticized, the ruling class. In the same 
way, using Confucianism meets the needs of the ruling CCP; that is, corruption is an 
individual issue, not the ruling party’s issue.  
From my examination of men’s and women’s images in news about corruption, it 
becomes apparent that the Chinese government is still using Confucian rules and norms to 
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govern society. However, Confucian leadership style is based on virtues, as kings and leaders 
were supposed to have a high level of virtuousness maintained by self-discipline (Clark & 
Wang, 2004). With the development of the market economy, Chinese cadres have more 
sovereign powers in administration, so self-discipline and morality are not enough to limit 
powers. Overall, China does not have an anti-corruption culture (Kubat, 2018). In this sense, 
traditional ideologies can not stop corruption and provide practical solutions for social issues.  
From the intertextual analysis, a paradox related to gender relations emerges: 
traditionally, men are superior, and women are inferior; however, in reports about corruption, 
women appear to have more power in marital and sexual relations, as they are attributed as 
having responsibility for corruption while men are more likely shown as following women’s 
decisions. On the other hand, men’s responsibilities for corruption are associated with 
circumstances in which they do not follow the party’s regulations. In sum, news articles 
consistently highlight corruption as the fault of individual women and men. By doing so, the 
news draws attention from more systemic problems related to the political system, seldom 
discussing the CCP’s failure to monitor cadres or to change procedures that make corruption 
possible. News framing is a political strategy for the CCP. By repeatedly emphasizing 
individual faults, the CCP is mitigating political pressure, as corruption scandals are serious 
in democratic countries and may trigger the crackdown of the ruling party. Although some 
journalists are aware of gender issues while writing news reports, such consciousness is not 
enough to change the ways in which news is framed given domination by the state (Chen, 
2009). Women are oppressed by patriarchal and political power, which is reinforced by the 
ways in which discourses about women appear in news and public images.  
The news articles about corruption analyzed in this study frequently included 
quotations from leaders’ speeches, including slogans and speeches employed in support of 
President Xi Jinping 's anti-corruption campaign. While many of those quotations are not 
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directly associated with women, they reinforce expectations about women's family roles by 
stressing the importance of good family values to prevent corruption. Inserting Xi Jinping's 
slogans in news articles provides a way to demonstrate an official determination to eliminate 
corruption and to build a positive image for CCP even if these do not represent what is really 
happening. In addition to speaking to women’s family roles, Xi also uses metaphors to 
describe corrupt cadres as tigers and flies in order to demarcate the boundary between upright 
cadres and corrupt cadres. More importantly, those slogans also provide important reminders 
about China's policy process. Contrary to democratic countries, policy-making in China is a 
top-down process from which the general public is excluded (Han & Ye, 2017). The CCP has 
exclusive decision-making power, and governments just follow the leadership’s guidelines to 
make or execute policies (Han & Ye, 2017).  
According to Foucault (1980), political power “traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (p.119). In this sense, political 
discourses make policies, trigger social changes and new social controls (Lu, 1999). This is 
certainly true in the case of China. For instance, in 1947, after Chairman Mao Zedong had 
launched land reform in liberated areas, he wrote more than 40 instructions to guide the 
reform (Rittenberg, 2013). Similarly, Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign started from the 
instruction laid out in the Central Government's Eight-Point Regulation (Zhongyang baxiang 
guiding), which was used to limit corruption by reducing the cost of government, such as 
meals and trips (Lee, 2018; J. Shi, 2013). Some scholars suspected that the Eight-Point 
regulations might just be a political farce, as the Eight-Point regulations did not address a 
core issue related to corruption - disclosing personal assets of cadres and limiting the power 
of the ruling party (Jacobs, 2013). However, temporary changes brought by the Regulations 
did prove that in China, politicians, slogans, and speeches are policies which could cause 
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social change. Thus, citing President Xi Jinping's words represents correct political 
behaviour. 
Nevertheless, party cadres who do not follow those instructions, slogans and 
speeches, would be disciplined. In the new version of Regulations on Disciplinary Actions by 
the Chinese Communist Party (zongguo gongchandang jilv chufen tiaoli), cadres who 
"discuss central government's policies based on their interpretations which are different from 
the central government (wangyi zhongyang)" will be given a warning or serious warning; if 
the circumstances are serious, cadres will be removed from the party position, placed in the 
probation within the party, or expelled from the party (www.12371.cn, 2018). In 2016, Lv 
Xiwen, the former Deputy Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee of Beijing, was 
removed from the position and expelled by the party for various reasons, one of which was 
discussing policies from a perspective different from the central government (BBC News, 
2016). In this sense, disciplinary power ensures that political discourses and policies are 
definitely correct and not to be understood from different perspectives. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FINDINGS TWO: MAINSTREAM 
COMMERCIAL MEDIA 
This chapter explores gender relations in the news coverage about corruption by 
mainstream commercial websites, answering the research question about gender differences 
between women’s images and men’s images. Similar to Chapter 6, the analysis focuses on 
the main themes of text representations, discourses, and intertextuality. 
7.1 Text Representations of Four Websites - Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi 
Net 
Table 7.1 summarizes the frequencies of keywords from the four commercial 
websites. As all of these words have been explained in previous sections, the table only 
reports the frequencies of each code. The total number of cadres in the list is 1,214, but I only 
found news articles for 131 cadres. 
Table 7.1 Frequency distributions for themes and codes related to male and female 
cadres, reported by commercial webistes 
 
Themes Codes Frequencies 
Descriptions of 
Women 
Women 79 
Wife 209 
Mistress and sexual relationship 451 
Total 739 
Descriptions of Men Men 9 
Husband 245 
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Official/leader  2068 
Metaphors for Corrupt Cadres 202 
Total 2,524 
Cadres’ misconducts 
and illegal behaviours 
(not related to 
women) 
Descriptions of misconducts and illegal 
behaviour 
3495 
Reasons of misconduct and illegal 
behaviours 
524 
Total 4019 
Note: the total number of news articles is 313. 
 
 Comparing frequencies of codes from commercial websites with those from the 
CCDI website, several interesting findings emerge. First, in news articles of CCDI, the code 
“wife” is the most frequent code, while the code “mistress and sexual relationships” is the 
most frequent among codes related to commercial websites’ descriptions of women. Such a 
finding suggests that reporting corruption cases with regards to mistresses and sexual 
relationships may be intended to attract more readers, as click volume and visitor volume are 
important for commercial websites to make a profit.  
In recent years, descriptions of mistresses (xiaosan; ernai; qingfu) have become 
critical words for articles related to corruption. In China, if the cadre is not under 
investigation, people will not know if they have mistresses from news media; however, after 
the cadre has been investigated, news media starts to report on their personal life. So, news 
reports about mistresses or sexual relationships can be commercially attractive. Another 
aspect is the recent trend that some mistresses report their lovers’ illegal behaviour and 
misconduct to the Commission of Discipline Inspection, which is called “ernai anti-
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corruption campaign (ernai fanfu),” “xiaosan anti-corruption campaign (xiaosan fanfu),” or 
“qingfu anti-corruption campaign (qingfu fanfu).” For instance, Liu Tienan, the former 
director of the National Energy Administration, was reported by his mistress, Ms. Xu, to have 
engaged in corruption (Sohu News, 2013). At first, Liu Tienan committed corruption together 
with Xu. However, later, they had conflicts of interest, and Xu received death threats from 
Liu. So, out of fear or retaliation Xu reported Liu’s corruption (Sohu News, 2013). This kind 
of case is interesting for readers, as mistresses are supposed to be in the same boat with 
cadres and  not usually report their lovers.  
Another reason for the popularity of mistresses as a topic within news articles is that 
so many cadres have mistresses. Mistresses are often described in commercial news reports 
with reference to  “ernai” even though, as noted in chapter 2, this term is discouraged for its 
discriminatory connotations. In 2017, China Women’s News (Zhongguo funv 
bao;中国妇女报), which was established by the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), 
published a set of gender discriminatory words, including “ernai” and “xiaosan” that could 
not be used by official channels like the Xinhua News Agency, but private sources like Sohu 
did not have the power to ban those words in news articles. Because of this, even in 2019, 
Xinhua News Agency has used “ernai” in its articles. The use of such disparaging words to 
describe women in news about corruption is an overt way in which both state-owned media 
and commercial websites continue to discriminate against women, further revealing that 
gender equality is a hollow discourse. 
Second, in terms of descriptions of men, the most frequent code is “official/leader,” 
which is the same as for the CCDI news articles. On the one hand, commercial websites 
follow the official news agency in reporting news about corruption; on the other hand, being 
an official/leader is still a heated topic, as shown in the previous analysis. 
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Third, reasons related to misconduct and illegal behaviour are cited less frequently in 
commercial sites than in the CCDI website, which implies that articles in commercial 
websites are more likely to describe corruption behaviours to attract readers. 
 Generally, for corruption news, the four commercial websites and the CCDI follow 
the same guidelines. For commercial news websites and news agencies, if the content of 
news articles conflicts with government propaganda, they may be subject to heavier 
censorship. For instance, Southern Weekend (nanfang zhouwo;南方周末) is a newspaper 
which is well-known for its objectivity in reporting social issues that may be ignored by the 
government. In its New Year Greetings of 2013, the newspaper mentioned political reform 
and free press and free speech, which were recognized as sensitive issues by the government 
(Tang, 2013). The Propaganda Department of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee 
forced the newspaper to revise its New Year Greetings. However, the staff refused to revise it 
and threatened to stop the newspaper. Finally, under duress, the New Year Greetings was 
revised, and the newspaper continues to publish (Tang, 2013). But the government tightened 
its censorship of this newspaper, which caused the newspaper to be marginalized in the media 
market. This case could be identified as an exercise of regulatory power by the CCP. 
However, because it occurred without legislation, this is a hidden power exercise.  
7.2 Discourses of Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi Net  
7.2.1 Women’s Descriptions 
Compared to CCDI, discourses related to women on commercial websites are closer 
to the conversation on commoners’ life, such as the word “tough girl (nv hanzi;女汉子).” 
These discourses are more likely to stigmatize, discriminate, and tease women, although both 
CCDI and commercial websites engage in frequent criticism of women. 
The first kind of discourse is related to “women.” 
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Case 22 
 (Ni Mou jingran qude le Zhao Minghua shexian weiji de yixilie 
shipin ziliao, qizhong baokuo pinfan gaodang xiaofei, zuo yong 
duotao fangchan, yu qizi yiwai de nvxing cunzai buzhengdang 
jiaowang dengdeng.) 
Mr. Ni had a lot of videos that are related to Zhao Minghua’s 
misconduct, including having top-grade consumption items, 
having many houses, and having improper sexual relationships 
with women other than his wife, and so on. (Shi, August 8, 
2013) 
Case 22 is a narrative discourse presented in the reporter’s voice. Without an event-
line, the orientation which guides readers’ perceptions of women is framed through 
relationships with the corrupt cadres (improper sexual relationships). In the discourse, 
“women,” together with “consumption” and “houses,” are evidence of committing 
corruption. Women are commodified and are viewed as sexed objects.  
The discourse presents a paradox: the evidence, including some videos related to 
improper sexual relationships, was collected by an individual rather than by the Commission 
for Discipline Inspection, but it does not speak to who recorded those videos. By not 
suggesting that the videos were taken by the mistress, it leaves open the question of whether 
Ni was the person who recorded them. Because it is illegal for people to use the pinhole 
camera to record other people, to some degree, the discourse confirms the ineffective 
supervision of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and hides a potential problem: can 
people get evidence of misconduct illegally? 
Case 23 
 (Guan zhi zhengtingji, zai di shi zhong yi shu jiaojiaozhe, 
duiyu yiming cong jiceng yibubu zoushanglai de nvxing er yan, 
Ding Fengyun geng shi bei henduo ren shi wei “ren zhong 
feng”. Yin qi pola nenggan de “nv hanzi” xingxiang he 
leilifengxing de zuoshi fengge, Ding Fengyun bei ren cheng wei 
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“pinming san niang”, zhe yi chengwei ye bing fei xuming. 
Keshi, zai jinqian yu youhuo mianqian, ta you biaoxian chu 
renxing tanlan de zhiming ruodian, yanyi zhe “shuangmian 
rensheng”.) 
For a woman, who was a departmental level cadre and had 
been promoted from a low position, Ding Fengyun was 
outstanding in the city. Because she was working hard and was 
exceptionally vigorous at work, she was called “an eager 
beaver.” However, she had a weakness in front of temptations 
and money. (Ifeng.net, June 16, 2016) 
This discourse describes a corrupt female cadre. This represents a case in which 
discourse that evaluates corrupt cadre is congruently applied (i.e., For a woman, who was a 
departmental level cadre and had been promoted from a low position, Ding Fengyun was 
outstanding in the city). The first sentence emphasizes that it is not easy for a female cadre to 
be a “departmental level cadre,” which appears as praise for Ding Fengyun. The sentence 
implies that very few women can be promoted to a high position, suggesting that Ding is an 
exception, as emphasized in the use of the phrase “ren zhong feng.”  In Chinese, “feng” 
means phoenix, “ren” means people, “zhong” means among, so the phrase “ren zhong feng” 
means “phoenix among people.” In ancient society, the dragon was the sacred symbol of the 
emperor, and the phoenix was the sacred symbol of the queen. As very few people can be the 
emperor and the queen, dragon and phoenix are used to describe outstanding people. There is 
a well-known proverb “long feng cheng xiang (龙凤呈祥);” that is, dragon and phoenix bring 
prosperity. So, using the proverb “ren zhong feng” ensures readers understand that the 
corrupt cadre is outstanding among commoners.  
The second sentence uses “nv hanzi” (which translates as the tough girl) to describe 
Ding Fengyun’s appearance and behaviour. In Chinese, “nv” means women, “hanzi” means 
men; “nv hanzi” is used to describe women who behave like men - unrestrained, direct and 
indifferent to trivial matters. Many women use this word to describe themselves to show 
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gender performativity that is closer to masculinity. However, such a word can also be 
employed in relation to gender stereotypes; that is, men are strong, direct and indifferent to 
trivial matters; women, on the other hand, are weak, indirect and care for trivial things. Using 
this word reinforces gender stereotypes and exercises normative power on women’s 
behaviour.  
To portray Ding as hard-working, the author uses the phrase “pinming san niang” in 
the discourse. This word came from another phrase “pinming san lang” which originally was 
employed to describe people who are brave or who work hard; nowadays, “pinming” means 
working hard, “san” means three, and “lang” means men (360chengyu.com, n.d.). The 
difference between “pingming san niang” and “pinming san lang” is “niang” means women. 
“Pinming san niang” implies that women should be working as hard as men. The above four 
words praise Ding’s work before she became corrupt, while settling boundaries to regulate 
women’s behaviour and encouraging women to behave in a genderless manner. The 
discourse describes the female cadre as an outstanding woman that had fallen into financial 
temptation due to her own weakness. The discourse focuses on the individual while, as with 
other discourses in state media reports, there is no mention of problems with the political 
system that may have contributed to corruption. 
Case 24 
 (Zhou Yongkang bei tongbao wei “yu duo ming nvxing 
tongjian bing jinxing quanse, quanqian jiaoyi”, Ling Jihua shi 
“yu duo ming nvxing tongjian, jinxing quanse jiaoyi”, Sun 
Zhengcai shi “yanzhong weifan shenghuo jilv, fuhuaduoluo, 
gao quanse jiaoyi”.) 
Zhou Yongkang was reported as “committed adultery and 
traded power with many women.” Ling Jihua was reported to 
have  “committed adultery and traded power with many 
women.” Sun Zhengcai was reported to have “seriously 
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violated life discipline, led a corrupt life and traded power for 
sex.” (Sina.com, January 11, 2018) 
Case 24 is a regulatory discourse focusing on specific characters (Zhou Yongkang, 
Ling Jihua, Sun Zhengcai) and specific issues (i.e.,“committed adultery and traded power 
with many women”). Here, women are stigmatized through trading sex for power and money 
from a corrupt cadre. Zhou Yongkang, the former secretary of the Central Political and Legal 
Affairs Commission (Zhengfa wei) and the former member of the 17th Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC), was supposed to be President Xi Jinping’s political enemy. His crackdown 
had broken the unspoken rule that corruption investigations should not be conducted into 
PSC members. As a high-profile politician, Zhou Yongkang was called a “tiger” in the media 
discourse. Ling Jihua was the former chief of the General Office of the Communist Party of 
China. His corruption was revealed after he tried to cover up his son’s death. His son, Ling 
Gu, died in a car accident, and the car was luxurious---- a Ferrari. Ling Jihua did not want 
this scandal to influence his career, but finally, he was investigated. Sun Zhengcai was the 
former Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing, and later, was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Here, the reference to “women” appears only as part of the evidence that 
proved Zhou, Ling, and Sun’s misconduct. This discourse illustrates how political power 
controls the right to define political scandals and gender relations in those scandals.  
The above three examples reinforce the stereotyping of women into a narrow range of 
roles confined to being mistresses of cadres or as less competitive in the working place. 
However, in their roles as wives, women are expected to prevent corruption, as illustrated by 
the following three examples. 
Case 25 
 (Zhe xie anli ye tixing renmen: yao zhuzhong jiating jiaoyu, 
xingcheng lianjie jiafeng, qianghua qinqing zhu lian cuoshi, 
rang jiaren danghao guanyuan de “shoumenyuan”. Fouze, 
xianneizhu biancheng le “tanneirzhu”, buchu menti cai guai.) 
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Such cases warn us that we should pay more attention to the 
family education, form an honest and upright family 
atmosphere, and strengthen measures that relatives help cadres 
to be honest and upright. In this sense, family members and 
relatives are gatekeepers of cadres. Otherwise, a good wife will 
become a greedy wife, and it will become normal for a cadre to 
commit corruption. (Sina.com, February 20, 2017) 
In case 25, regulatory discourses are articulated in the form of a summary application 
(Such cases warn us that…), an evaluation application (In this sense, family members and 
relatives are gatekeepers of cadres) and a cause-effect application (family members and 
relatives are gatekeepers of cadres. Otherwise, a good wife will become a greedy wife, and it 
will become normal for a cadre to commit corruption). The first sentence advocates President 
Xi Jinping’s prescription to build good family values to help cadres keep honest and upright. 
The second sentence mentions that the transformation from a good wife to a greedy wife will 
cause trouble, directly attributing the responsibility for corruption issues to wives. By 
employing reference to the word “warn,” the author reinforces the official directive for 
family members to be gatekeepers of the cadre, shifting the responsibility for keeping cadres 
upright and honest away from the official himself. Considering that this article was published 
by a commercial media company, sina.com, it illustrates how a private company can 
reproduce state propaganda circulated to a larger population. This case illustrates Foucault’s 
analysis, in History of Sexuality (1990), of how institutions can help to reproduce discourses 
related to sex across the population.  
Case 26 
 (er zuowei xianwei shuji niangzi, danghao “xianneizhu”, 
“xiangfujiaozi”, zuohao houqin gongzuo shi fennei zhishi, ying 
shishichuchu tixing dang lingdao de zhangfu baochi qingxing 
de tounao, weihu danggui dangji. Er Liu Mou de qizi Jiang 
Mou, ba zhangfu de gangwei dangzuo “yaoqianshu”, zai 5 
nian jian ti zhangfu shou le 42 ming dangdi guanyuan caiwu 
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114 ci gong 739 wan yuan, “yao dangguan zhao dasao” de 
xinxi zai dangdi shi renrenjiezhi, shi zai ba zhangfu “wang 
huokeng li tui’.) 
As the wife of the deputy director of the Standing Committee of 
the People’s Congress of the County, Ms. Jiang should be a 
good wife, assisting her husband to keep honest and upright in 
his work and bringing up their children. However, Jiang 
treated her husband, Mr. Liu, as a ready source of money, and 
she accepted more than 7.39 million yuan and gifts in five 
years from 42 local officials. In the county, everybody knew 
that “if you wanted to get promoted, find Ms. Jiang.” Jiang’s 
behaviour is likely “pulling her husband into the pit.” (Du, 
February 28, 2016) 
Case 26 represents a corruption discourse configured as an evaluation discourse (Ms. 
Jiang should be a good wife) and narrative discourse (i.e., she accepted more than 7.39 
million yuan and gifts in five years from 42 local officials). The first sentence describes the 
expected duties for a cadre’s wife, containing two keywords “xianneizhu (good wife)” and 
“xiangfujiaozi,” an ancient proverb which means that wives should assist their husbands and 
educate children. If the husband is a cadre, the wife should help the husband keep upright and 
honest. “Xiangfujiaozi,” as a criterion for wives’ morality in ancient society, was used for 
praising good wives. In this sense, “xiangfujiaozi (wives should assist their husbands and 
educate children)” has a similar meaning as “xianneizhu (good wife),” in both cases to 
emphasize women’s virtue. Being virtuous is an important criterion for judging women 
(Barlow, 2004). According to Ban Zhao’s Lessons for Women (Nv Jie), women were 
recognized as yin (阴), identified as weak, while men were recognized as yang (阳), 
identified as strong. In other words, women should be inferior and subordinate, while men 
should be superior and dominant. The harmony between “yin” and “yang” is the most 
important element of morality and justice, so the wife and the husband should be virtuous. 
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Instructing Stories to Enlighten the Word (yu shi ming yan;喻世明言), which consisted of 
numerous stories and was written by Feng Menglong during the Ming dynasty, claims that if 
the wife is virtuous, the husband can avoid many troubles (qi xian ze fu huo shao;妻贤则夫
祸少) (Feng, n.d.). The discourse continues by depicting how a greedy wife can ruin the 
husband’s career. “Yaoqianshu” came from fairy tales, which means a magic tree can 
produce money if people shake it. Nowadays, “yaoqianshu” means something or somebody 
can produce money for a family or a company, so the description of the husband as a 
“yaoqianshu” refers to his capacity to produce money for his wife. “If you wanted to get 
promoted, find Ms. Jiang” and “pulling her husband into the pit” are colloquial discourses 
employed to illustrate the selfish wife’s negative influence on the husband contrary to CCP 
requests that the wife maintain family discipline inspection and be loyal to the party. Case 26, 
then, blames the cadres’s corruption on the wife who does not fulfill wifely duties.  
The next case describes how a good wife became a greedy wife. 
Case 27 
 (zai wairen kanlai, Sun Lanyu youyige xingfu de jiating, suiran 
ta yin gongzuo changnian buzaijia, dan zuowei “xianneizhu” 
de qizi neng ba jia dali de jingjingyoutiao, erzi he Sun Lanyu 
de lao muqin dou neng dedao henhao de zhaogu. Chuyu dui 
qizi de kuiqian, zai Sun Lanyu kanlai, ta zhineng yi gengduo 
jinqian lai huibao ta. Yushi “zhangfu banshi, qizi shouqian”, 
renmen ye bu bihui di qianwang Sun jia songqu qian wu, 
buzhibujue zhong, qizi chengwei zhangfu liancai de “dailiren”, 
qizi meiyou dang hao “lianneizhu”, rang Sun Lanyu zai nitan 
zhong yuexianyueshen.) 
Sun Lanyu had a happy family, although he was seldom at 
home because of work, his wife is a good wife ---- takes care of 
the house, son, and Sun’s mother. Sun thought he owed his 
wife, so he wanted to give her more money in return. So, they 
were the type of couple where the“wife accepts money, and the 
175 
 
husband does the deed.” People directly went to their house to 
give money and gifts, and the wife became the agent of Sun. 
Apparently, Sun’s wife is not an honest wife and made Sun fall 
more and more deeply into the pit of corruption. (Sina.com, 
May 5, 2017) 
Case 27 is a narrative discourse that does not indicate an event-line. The orientations 
that guide readers’ perception of the wife are framed through discussion of the reason offered 
by the corrupt cadre to give money to his wife (Sun thought he owed his wife, so he wanted 
to give her more money in return), the corruption process (wife accepts money, and the 
husband does the deed; People directly went to their house to give money and gifts, and the 
wife became the agent of Sun) and the evaluation of the wife (Sun’s wife is not an honest 
wife, and made Sun fall more and more deeply into the pit of corruption). The wife is initially 
represented as the “xianneizhu (good wife)” at first, reinforcing traditional gender norms in 
which wifehood and motherhood were the core of womanhood; actually, motherhood was an 
aspect of wifehood (Evans, 2002). As a wife, a woman should obey her husband, give birth to 
children, and serve the husband's family to show filial respect (Ko et al., 2003). In the Book 
of Changes, one of the five ancient Chinese books of Confucianism, women were supposed 
to play an essential role in keeping the harmony of “yin-yang” binary (Yun, 2012). In this 
sense, women should be responsible for the crackdown of the family. The dangers of failing 
to fulfill these obligations are highlighted in the reporting on this case, which highlights that, 
although the husband was responsible for the corrupt behaviour it was the fault of the wife 
because she was not a good wife who prevented corruption  
While this discourse refers to the role of the wife in maintaining family 
responsibilities to prevent corruption, the following examples depict how other women, in the 
form of mistresses and improper sexual relationships, can also cause trouble for cadres. 
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 Case 28 
 (Jinnianlai, tanguan houyuan qihuo de shiqing pinpin 
chuanchu, zhuru zao qizi jubao de Hefeishi shushanqu 
weishengju juzhang Hao Mou, baoyang qingfu zuizhong bei 
tingzhi; zao qianqi he erzi shimingjubao de Anhuisheng 
dangshanxian fangchanju juzhang Liu Jianghui, tanwu shouhui 
piaochang, zuizhong bei pan 19nian ling liugeyue; Guangdong 
zhanjiangshi majiangqu gongwanju juzhang Huang Yongchun 
youyu zhizi shimingjubao, bei la xia le xia …… qizi, qianqi, 
erzi, zhizi chengle dangjin shehui riyi zhuangda de fanfu dajin 
lu de xinchengyuan.) 
Recently, more and more corrupt cadres were reported by their 
family members. The secretary of Health Bureau in Shushan 
District, Hefei, Hao, who was reported by his wife, because of 
keeping a mistress; finally, he was suspended. The secretary of 
Real Estate Board, Liu Jianghui, was reported by his former 
wife and son, for accepting bribery and soliciting a prostitute; 
finally, Liu Jianghui was sentenced for 19 years and six 
months. The deputy chief, Mazhang Branch of Zhanjiang 
Municipal Bureau of Public Security, Huang Yongchun, was 
reported by his nephew, and finally, he was out of 
business …… wife, former wife, son and nephew now became 
members of the anti-corruption army. (Sohu.com, September 
12, 2014) 
Case 28 employs a narrative discourse, using examples to illustrate the ideological 
focus on the family associated with surveillance related to corruption (i.e. Hao, who was 
reported by his wife, because of keeping a mistress). The article contains the word “mistress” 
while also citing an “example” for wives to follow in reporting on the husband’s misconduct 
and illegal behaviour. The discourse also reminds readers that keeping a mistress is 
misconduct for cadres. The case illustrates how CCP utilizes domestic issues as part of its 
anti-corruption tools. China has a long history of encouraging family members to report each 
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other’s misconduct. There is a proverb “dayimieqin”, which means to punish one’s own 
relatives or friends or family members in the cause of justice. Nowadays, the proverb is 
extended to praise people who report family members. During the Cultural Revolution, if 
people were identified as “anti-revolutionary” (fan geming;反革命) or “persons in power 
within the party taking the capitalist road” (zou zi pai;走资派), even their children had to 
report their parents’ problems (Kan, 2015). However, the family-report system also produced 
many wrongful convictions (yuanjiacuoan;冤假错案). For the anti-corruption campaign, the 
family-report system reveals limits to the CCP’s capacity to supervise its cadres effectively, 
but it also demonstrates the extension of party surveillance and disciplinary measures into the 
household.  
Whereas case 28focuses on the illegality of keeping a mistress, the next case provides 
details about how a mistress can cause trouble for the cadre. 
Case 29 
 (tongshi, Wang Zhizhong shenghuo fuhua duoluo, chang 
liulian yu denghongjiulv, chenmianyu shengsequanma, 
baoyang qingfu. 2007 nian, Wang Zhizhong yu An Moumou 
(nv) xiangshi hou, yaoqiu An Moumou ciqu gongzuo, bing wei 
qi goumai zhiban fangchan, jiaoche deng dajian caichan, zhi 
2014 nian 9 yue gongji huafei 340 wan yuan, qijian liangren 
yizhi baochi buzhengdang xingguanxi).  
Meanwhile, Wang Zhizhong lived in a corrupt lifestyle, 
indulging himself in debauchery and keeping a mistress. In 
2007, when Wang Zhizhong met Ms. An, he asked her to quit 
the job and rented a house for her, in order to make dating 
more convenient. Later, Wang Zhizhong paid for Ms. An’s 
living expenses, and bought a house and a car for her, and so 
on. From 2007 to September 2014, he spent 3.4 million Chinese 
yuan on Ms. An, while keeping improper sexual relations with 
her. (Wangyi.net, August 5, 2016) 
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In case 29, narrative discourse is articulated in representations of corruption with 
reference to specific characters (Wang Zhizhong, Ms.An) and action verbs (quit, rented, make, 
paid, bought). The article tries to establish as a “truth,” in Foucault’s sense, that corruption is 
connected with women. By highlighting a large amount of money the cadre spent on the 
house, car and living expenses for the mistress, the article clearly signals that mistresses can 
tempt cadres into corruption by entering into a relationship in which the woman benefits from 
cash and luxuries. Despite the label, such a mistress-cadre relationship may also reveal some 
structural inequalities that have left women in vulnerable positions. Since the market 
transition in the 1980s, many state enterprises started to privatize. In order to increase 
productivity during this process, many state enterprises and factories laid-off workers, 
especially female employees (Chen, 2017). Many of these women lacked education and skills 
due to the Cultural Revolution, so earning a living became difficult for them. The gender gap 
in earning power has exacerbated this situation (Shu & Bian, 2003). Becoming a mistress has 
provided options for women who lack other choices due to the intersection of gender and 
class (Chen, 2017). Viewed from this perspective, which understands women as victims of 
social inequalities, there is a parallel with concubines who always came from poor families in 
traditional society. However, as represented in the media report, the discourse seems to 
reinforce the “tradition of male selection that prioritizes the economic and social status of the 
male” (Chen, 2017, p. 80).  
The next case illustrates how other types of sexual relationships between cadres are 
represented in news about corruption. 
Case 30  
 (11 yue 26 ri, Shanxi liangge nv guanyuan bei zhongjiwei 
xuanbu “shuangkai” qie “yu taren tongjian”. Qizhong, 
Jinzhong shiwei yuan fushuji Zhang Xiuping bei cheng yu 
liangren jiwei shuji de jingli “duo you jiaoji”. Gongkai ziliao 
xianshi, Zhang Xiuping ceng ren shanxi jiwei jianwei fu 
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mishuzhang, shengjiwei, jianwei jianchi zongheshi zhuren. 
Jucheng, Zhang Xiuping yu shanxi yuan jiwei shuji Jin 
Daoming, Jin yinhuan “guanxi miqie”. Jin Yinhuan ren 
Shanxisheng jiwei shuji qijian, ta ceng ren Jin Yinhuan de 
mishu; Jin Daoming zou shang Shanxisheng jiwei shuji 
Gangweihou, ta yu Jin Daoming gongshile jin 7nian.) 
On November 26, two female cadres of Shanxi Province were 
announced to be dismissed from public office and expelled from 
the party and committed adultery. One of the cadres is Zhang 
Xiuping, who was the former Deputy Communist Party 
Secretary of Jinzhong, and she had “relationships” with the 
two former Secretaries of the Shanxi Provincial Commission 
for Discipline Inspection. Based on public information, Zhang 
Xiuping had been Deputy Secretary of Supervisory Commission 
of the Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline, a member 
of the Standing Committee of Shanxi Provincial Commission 
for Discipline, and the Director of General Supervisory Office 
of Shanxi Supervisory Commission. It is said that she has a 
“close relation” to Jin Daoming, the former Secretary of the 
Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, and 
Jin Yinhuan. When Jin Yinhuan was the Secretary of the Shanxi 
Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, she was her 
secretary; when Jin Daoming was the Secretary of the Shanxi 
Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, they worked 
together for almost seven years. (Wangyi.net, December 11, 
2014) 
Case 30 is a regulatory discourse focusing on specific characters (Zhang Xiuping, Jin 
Yinhuan, Jin Daoming), a suggestive sentence (she had “relationships” with the two former 
Secretaries) and the violation (adultery). This discourse stigmatizes women for their role in  
“committing adultery.” In ancient society, to commit adultery was supposed to violate moral 
principles (as a threat to the fundamental element in society- the family) and would be 
seriously punished. For instance, during the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC), people could kill a 
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husband who committed adultery without bearing legal responsibility (Sohu History, 2014). 
During the Tang dynasty (618-907) both men and women would be sentenced to prison for 
committing adultery (Sohu History, 2014). It should be noted that adultery in ancient society 
was a crime, but today it violates the regulations of the party. The immoral nature of the 
women’s actions is reinforced in the use of other suggestive words in this report. Enclosed 
with quotation marks, the words “relationships” and “close relation” suggest that Zhang had 
abnormal relationships with Jin Yinhuan and Jin Daoming. As the first sentence tells readers 
that Zhang committed adultery, abnormal relationships could be adultery but, because no 
convincing evidence is presented, the author adds suggestive words in the discourse. The 
interesting thing is Jin Yinhuan was a female cadre. Obviously, the author did not notice this.   
Generally, women in the news articles about corruption news do not receive equal 
treatment to that of men, no matter whether the reports are presented by the state-owned news 
agency or a commercial news agency. News reports about corruption news are exempt from 
gender equality, demonstrating the widespread exercise of patriarchal power. 
7.2.2 Men’s Descriptions 
This section focuses on discourses related to corrupt male cadres. Unlike the CCDI, 
the discourses in the commercial website make reference to the understanding of male-
dominated society from the perspective of corrupt female cadres, revealing how authors on 
non-state websites may express different ideas about corruption scandals. 
The following are examples related to the use of the code “men.” 
Case 31 
(Hunan diyi nv tanguan Jiang Yanping youju jingdian 
mingyan:”zai nanren dangquan de shehui, zhiyou dongde 
chongfen kaifa liyong nanren jiazhi de nvren, caineng suanshi 
zhenzheng gaoming de nvren.” Weici, Jiang Yanping chongfen 
liyong sexiang youshi, “kaifa” chu xuduo ziyuan gong ziji 
shiyong, xianhou yu 40 duo ming tingji lingdao ganbu fasheng 
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xingguanxi, yici huande guanzhi, quanli he qiancai, cong yige 
cangku baoguanyuan yaoshenyibian chengwei futingji lingdao 
ganbu. Jiang Yanping de xingwei buzhi shibushi “tongjian”, 
guqie ba zhezhong jiliang jiao “wanshang”.) 
The No.1 corrupt female cadre in Hunan Province, Jiang 
Yanping, had a famous sentence: “in the male-dominated 
society, if a woman wants to be a smart woman, she should 
know how to take advantage of the value of a man.” Hence, 
Jiang Yanping fully utilized her body to “develop sources for 
use” - she had sexual relations with more than 40 department 
level cadres in order to get promoted and to obtain money. She 
advanced to a deputy department director from a storage staff. 
I don’t know if Jiang Yanping’s behaviour constitutes adultery, 
but we can call this behaviour as “play with 
superiors.”(Sohu.com, November 28, 2014) 
Case 31 makes reference to Jiang Yanping’s famous sentence, which admits that 
Chinese society is a male-dominated society in which women have to be innovative in order 
to be able to compensate for the denial of women’s efforts to advance in conventional ways. 
This statement expresses how Jiang was proud of her behaviour rather than ashamed. She 
utilized sexual power to get money and power in officialdom. To convey the case as a 
retrogression of gender equality, this article describes corruption through interrelated 
discourses of narration, evaluation, colloquialism. The narrative discourse (Jiang Yanping, 
had a famous sentence: “in the male-dominated society, if a woman wants to be a smart 
woman, she should know how to take advantage of the value of a man.”) is presented 
quotation marks to indicate by means of direct speech the relationships between a woman and 
success (take advantage of the value of a man). The evaluation discourse (Jiang Yanping 
fully utilized her body to “develop sources for use”) confirms the statement, with the phrase 
“Develop sources for use” placed in quotation marks to indicates an ironic application of this 
discourse as an element in representing Jiang’s misconduct negatively, to emphasize that she 
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should not take advantage of her body to get promotions. The colloquial discourse (i.e., we 
can call this behaviour as “play with superiors.”) also contains an ironic application, with the 
author teasing Jiang’s behaviour as a form of “play.” The case presents to readers a woman 
who used promiscuity to advance herself but does not make reference to any other 
dimensions of corruption. As in many of the other cases, the danger appears to lie in a 
woman’s sexuality and lack of moral virtue. 
While case 31 makes reference to “men” as a tool for a woman to get promoted, the 
word “man” in case 32 is related to criteria for success. 
Case 32 
 (Dan ta xinfeng de na tao “chenggongxue” biaozhun, que 
rangren jing’e: ju qi “jinzhu”, shenmumei laoban Gao Zhilin 
fushu, Wang Dengji ceng shuo:"shanbei nanren zenme cai suan 
chenggong? Dangguan yao dang dao shengbuji, zhuanqian yao 
duo shi ge yi, wo li fushengji jiu cha yibuzhiyao le.”) 
Gao Zhilin, the boss of a coal mine said, “ (Wang Dengji told 
him) for a man from Northern Shaanxi Province, to achieve 
success, this man must be the provincial level cadre, earn more 
than 1 billion, so I have only one step left to be vice-ministerial 
level cadre.” (Sohu.com, December 6, 2016) 
This narrative discourse employs direct speech (“for a man from Northern Shaanxi 
Province …”), quoting Wang Dengji’s criteria for the success of men - power and money. 
Such criteria have two-fold meanings. First, Wang’s definition of success reveals popular 
masculine ideals in post-Mao China that associate a successful man with social status, power, 
and wealth (Liu, 2019). This ideal implies social changes and social issues in contemporary 
China. After the market reform and the development of consumerism, individuals need to pay 
for their own welfare, so money is important to buy services which were previously publicly 
funded, such as childcare. However, as China is a non-democratic country and social 
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inequalities widely exist, power is essential to access better services. This ideal also reflects 
the persistent gender inequalities in the job market; that is, man is the breadwinner. 
 Second, unlike the CCDI which describes good men by traditional criteria, the 
discourse of the successful man alludes to popular criteria in contemporary society, especially 
in relation to the marriage market. According to a survey conducted by China Youth Daily, a 
man who is tall, handsome, and rich is more likely to find a wife (China Daily, 2012). 
Another survey, conducted by Southwest Securities (Xinan zhengquan), claimed that about 
25% of single women required their future boyfriend or husband to have at least 15, 000 yuan 
(Southwest Securities, 2017). Although those two surveys were conducted by different 
sources in different years, there is one commonality: a rich man will be more popular in the 
marriage market. Since China has shifted to a market economy, houses, health care and 
education have become goods, so leading a better life requires money. For commercial 
websites, such a discourse caters to social trends and may attract more readers.  
The above discourse is about “a successful man,” while the “man” in the following 
example is not recognized as successful. 
Case 33 
 (Shijie shang hanyou miaoling meinv hui zhenxin milian yige 
qingchunyishi, shenghuo yayi, xingge chenmen de lao nanren, 
ershi dingshang ni shouzhong de quanli). 
Worldwide, it is almost impossible for a beautiful young 
woman to love a boring old man. This woman must want to 
trade sex for the old man’s authority. (Shi, May 20, 2014) 
In case 33, the reporter articulates a judgment or evaluative discourse which contains 
negative comments (i.e., it is almost impossible for a beautiful young woman to love a boring 
old man) on the relationship (love) between characters (a woman, a man). The case mocks 
the “love” between women and older corrupt male cadres. Young beautiful women are 
stereotyped as covetous, depicted for their desire to benefit from the cadres’ power. While 
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women are portrayed as materialistic, old men are stereotyped as stupid and condemned by 
the author. The age difference underscores the naivety of the older cadre as to the intention of 
the young woman in question. The article draws on colloquial discourses in which people 
tease young women and corrupt cadres, enabling the construction of labels through which to 
frame mistress-cadre relationships while seeking to raise people’s interest in reading the 
article.  
All three cases show that men in positions of authority are attractive to women. As 
mentioned earlier, officials do not have a very high salary, but many people apply to be 
officials because of the authority associated with the positions. This fact, on the other hand, 
reflects problems that frequently arise in the political system with respect to the supervision 
of authority. 
While discourses of men demonstrate popular beliefs related to masculinity in post-
reform China, discourses related to “husband” express traditional marital relations. The next 
case refers to men who were described as “husband.” 
Case 34  
 (Zhi suoyi chxian zheyang de qingkuang, shouxian shi xianzai 
de ganbu xuanba jizhi bugou wanshan. Henduo shihou, ganbu 
xunba kan guanxi, jiang jiaoqing, shenzhi shezhi xingbie bilei, 
daozhi yixie you nengli you caihua de nvxing wufa tongguo 
zhengchang tujing  huode tishen. Zenmeban? Zheshi, ta ruo 
meiyou yige hao baba, hao zhuangfu, kongpa jiu zhineng yikao 
youge hao qingren le ba.) 
The first reason for this situation is related to problems in the 
system of selecting cadres. Sometimes, selecting cadres relies 
on relations, friendships and the gender of the candidate. Such 
problems encumber women to get promotions in normal ways. 
What can they do? Without a good father (a father who has 
power or relation to help kids get promoted), good husband, 
women may only think of a good lover. (Chen, June 17, 2014) 
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Case 34 combines regulatory discourses (i.e., The first reason for this situation is 
related to problems in the system of selecting cadres) and colloquial discourses (i.e., What 
can they do?) while drawing attention to gender inequalities in government-related jobs. In 
such a system, women need to have relations or friendships with male cadres to get 
promoted. These relations could be a father-daughter relationship, husband-wife relationship, 
or mistress-cadre relationship. The last sentence is a colloquial discourse presented as if it 
were a daily conversation reflecting gender inequalities that are obvious in China. On the one 
hand, this discourse indicates Chinese society is male-dominated, and men have more power. 
Many previous studies confirm a resurgence of patriarchal norms in China, as many gender 
inequalities have deteriorated in the post-socialism period (Fincher, 2018; Ji, 2015; Ji & 
Yeung, 2014; Leung, 2013; Li & Jiang, 2019).  
Case 35 
 (“yuefu kaochi tiba nvxu, zhangfu tiba laopo”, you meiti ruci 
miaoshu Wei Shumin, Wang Yongjin, Wei Wu zhe sanren de 
shitu lianxi.) 
“The father-in-law inspects and promotes his son-in-law, while 
the husband promotes his wife,” some newspapers use this 
sentence to describe the relationships between Shumin Wei, 
Yongjin Wang, and Wu Wei. (Ifeng.com, June 12, 2017) 
Case 35, a narrative discourse, directly quotes an ironic statement from newspapers to 
make light of a pattern of corruption represented in nepotism. By emphasizing family 
relationships between corrupt cadres, the author’s discourse helps to normalize the slogan 
“building good family values to prevent corruption.” In China, nepotism is closely related to 
corruption. As Pei (2014) observes, corrupt cadres and their cronies have formed a self-
reinforcing web of relations. Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has greatly increased 
investments in infrastructure, providing opportunities for cadres and their cronies to get 
illegal money (Pei, 2014). 
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In sum, both case 34 and case 35 describe “husband” in relation to nepotism, while 
husband-wife relations and marital power are the focus of the next case. 
Case 36 
 (“zheng de qian bi zhangfu duo, hunyin bian duoyifen 
baozhang.” Zheshi Cao Yanfang de jingdian yulu. Hou Fucai 
tanwu 2000 wan yuan, Cao Yanfang que liyong zhangfu de 
zhiquan tanwu 3000 wan yuan. Cao Yanfang renwei, zhiyao 
zheng de qian bi zhangfu duo, jiu bupa zai jiali shuohua 
meiyou fenliang.) 
“Making more money than one’s husband means making the 
marriage more secure,” this is Cao Yanfang’s famous 
sentence. The husband, Hou Fucai, got 20 million yuan illegal 
money, while Cao utilized Hou’s authority to get 30 million 
yuan illegal money. Cao thought that if she made more money 
than her husband, her words would carry weight at home. 
(Ifeng.com, April 20, 2015) 
Case 36 indicates narrative discourses in representations of the husband (Hou Fucai), 
beginning with a quotation offering a perspective on the importance of a wife’s earning 
potential to a stable marriage. However, the report reveals how this has been distorted 
through the illegal acquisition of money (Cao thought that if she made more money than her 
husband, her words would carry weight at home). In China, during the Maoist period, gender 
equality is largely demonstrated by women’s rights in labour participation (Sun & Chen, 
2015). Obviously, Cao has simplified gender equality to economic equality. However, 
economic equality cannot bring equal rights to women automatically. Cao’s thoughts 
displayed a low level of confidence towards gender relations and reflected on the famous 
propaganda - the economic base determines the superstructure - which Chinese students learn 
from their middle school politics course. Originally, the propaganda was to promote 
Marxism, but nowadays, the reference to the superstructure has been extended to gender 
relations in the family, and the economic base is extended as the economic status of an 
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individual. The interesting thing in the discourse is that Cao’s corruption is based on her 
husband’s authority, which does not reflect gender equality. 
The above three examples reflect the fact that Chinese women continue to face gender 
inequalities in the workplace and household. In China, the logic behind gender inequalities in 
processes related to hiring and getting promotions is the consideration of women’s domestic 
roles - the idea that giving birth to children, doing housework, taking care of the kids and 
elderly makes them less productive (Robinson, 1985; Chen, 2012). As observed in chapter 
two, employers seek to avoid extra costs associated with maternity leave, so they ask women 
if they are married and if they have kids during the hiring process (CCTV.com, 2019). What 
is more, a provincial hospital even said to a woman that “we could hire you, but your job 
needs you to carry machines, so you cannot have a baby for five years” (CCTV.com, 2019). 
The execution of the two-child policy could reinforce the gender discriminations in the 
workplace, as employers may need to give women two maternity leaves. On February 21, the 
Notice of Regulating Hiring Process to Promote Women’s Labour Participation (guanyu 
jinyibu guifa zhaopin xingwei cujin funv jiuye de tongzhi;关于进一步规范招聘行为促进妇
女就业的通知) was released by nine bodies, including the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, the Ministry of Education, the All-China Women’s Federation, and the 
Supreme People’s Court, prohibiting companies from asking those discriminatory questions 
(CCTV.com, 2019; Pingzhang, 2019). However, some people still worry that such a notice 
cannot stop gender discrimination in the hiring process, as employers could still reject young 
women who just graduated from universities since employers may think young women who 
do not yet have kids will want to have them in the near future (Pingzhang, 2019). Gender 
inequalities in the hiring process have two levels: they favour male applicants over female 
applicants, and they also favour mothers in comparison with single women. As mentioned in 
chapter 5, very few women in the government are promoted to leading positions in core 
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departments. What is more, in terms of companies, very few women are CEOs, and most 
women in high management positions are in human resources or accounting departments 
(Sohu News, 2012). The media discourses related to corruption cases reinforce dominant 
perceptions of gender inequalities while distracting readers from focusing on the economic 
and political systems that contribute to such unequal relations. 
The third kind of men are related to “official /leader.” 
Case 37 
 (Zuowei daxing guoyouqiye yibashou, Yin Liang jishi zuzhi 
renming de zhengtiji ganbu, yeshi zuoyong jibaiyiyuan zichan 
de guoqi laozong, zhezhong zhanju zhongyao jingji he zhengzhi 
ziyuan de tiaojian, rang ta zai yu shangren, guanyuan deng 
gefang zhouxuan zhong yourenyouyu, ta you le ziji de quanzi, 
jinerxingcheng le liyi gongtongti, zhiyou ta quanzi li ren 
caineng youxian dedao tiba, huoqu gezhong liyi. “quanzi 
wenhua” bei ta yanyi de “chushenruhua”.)  
As the director of a state-owned enterprise, Yin Liang was not 
only the departmental level cadre but operated a property 
worth more than 10 billion. Such identities made him easy to 
make friends with businessmen and various levels officials, so 
he had a community of interests. Many circles were involved in 
this community, including his circle of friends, his circle of 
trusted followers, and his circle of Mahjong. Only people he 
thought were promising entered his circles, only people who 
were insiders could get promoted first. (Ifeng.com, May 18, 
2018) 
Case 37 presents a narrative discourse in the representation of the corruption case 
illustrated with reference to the word “officials.”  This discourse emphasizes a pattern of 
corruption involving “circles” between cadres: Yin Liang only got bribes from close friends, 
relatives, and close colleagues. This corruption is covert, as cadres want to avoid 
investigation and punishment. Such “circles” stemmed from “guanxi” (also translated as 
189 
 
connections or relations), which is traditionally seen as a characteristic of Chinese society 
(Lee, 2018). According to Confucianism, an individual is living in a system which is full of 
interdependent relationships, and everyone has a place in the hierarchy of social relationships 
(Yeung & Tung, 1996). To some degree, Confucian doctrines are based on five types of 
relationships: ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, brother-brother, and friend-friend 
(Yeung & Tung, 1996). Good “guanxi (connections or relations)” means “xinren (trust)” and 
“ganqing (sentiment),” and cultivate and maintaining “guanxi” is associated with an 
asymmetrical exchange of favours, which could be material or non-material (Barbalet, 2018; 
Zhao & Timothy, 2015). 
 “Guanxi (connections or relations)” is everywhere in Chinese society. Guanxi can be 
cultivated based on familial ties, friendship, kinship (tong zong), “native place (tong xiang), 
education background (tong xue), working place (tong shi) and political party (tong zhi)” 
(Lee, 2018, p. 351). For companies, “guanxi (connections or relations)” with the authorities 
can influence the success of the business. As China’s business law is ambiguous and policies 
are open to interactions by those who are in positions of power, guanxi with high-ranking 
officials helps the success of the business (Yeung & Tung, 1996). For instance, Li Jiacheng, 
the Hong Kong billionaire, was supposed to have “guanxi” with the former President Jiang 
Zemin when Li started to invest in real estate in Beijing in 1993 (Suofei, 2014). Politicians 
often form groups based on the network of “guanxi (connections or relations),” and the 
mutually beneficial nature of “guanxi” provides opportunities for cadres to commit 
corruption (Lee, 2018). For instance, Wang (2016) claims that the practice of “guanxi,” 
including gift-giving, could distort the promotion system in the army. Corruption could be 
conducted under the mask of good “guanxi,” and all people in the network of “guanxi” are in 
the same boat. The description of corruption in Case 37 reinforces the significance of Chinese 
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“guanxi” culture but also warns of the dangers of abusing it within existing political and 
institutional systems. 
Case 38 
 (Sanwen: song qingfu zhihou, qingfu yu Zhu Xuqing haiyou 
laiwang ma? Ruguo qingfu sixintadi genzhu Wu Sha, Zhu 
Xuqing huibuhui shebude huozhe chicu? Ruguo qingfu zai Wu 
Sha he Zhu Xuqing zhijian lailaiwangwang, zuowei shangji de 
Wu Sha hui he xiaji Zhu Xuqing gongxiang qingfu ma? Meiti 
baodao guo guanyuan gongxiang qingfu de shiqing ---- Jieyang 
shiwei shuji Chen Hongping yu Guangzhou shiwei shuji Wan 
Qingliang gongxiang qingfu “Xu Xiaowan”, nandao Wu Sha 
he Zhu Xuqing shi xiang Chen Gongping he Wan Qingliang 
xuexi? Guangzhou, Jieyang tongshu Guangdong, Guangdong 
weisha zhuanmen chu zhezhogn gongxiang qingfu de shiqing?) 
The third question: after sending out the mistress, did the 
mistress contact Zhu Xuqing? If the mistress lives with Wu Sha, 
was Zhu jealous? If the mistress lives with Wu but still 
contacted Zhu, did Zhu and Wu share a mistress? Some media 
reports were about shared mistresses among officials. For 
instance, the former Party Secretary of Yang Jie, Chen 
Hongping, and the former Party Secretary of Guangzhou, Wan 
Qingliang, shared the mistress Xu Xiaowan. Don’t Wu and Zhu 
want to learn from Chen and Wan? Both Guangzhou and 
Jieyang belong to Guangdong, why do officials in Guangdong 
always want to share mistresses? (Mao, January 30, 2016) 
Case 38 employs colloquial discourses, highlighting the phrase “gongxiang qingfu 
(shared mistress)” which stems from another phrase, “gongxiang danche (bicycle-sharing 
system),” referring to the popularity of bicycle-sharing in China. In the Chinese context, 
“gongxiang qingfu (shared mistress)” is sometimes understood as an ironic statement that 
refers to mistresses and corrupt cadres. However, “gongxiang qingfu” and the word “song 
(send)” as employed in this discourse indicate a lack of respect for both women and men, 
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presenting the women as materialized as commodities while men are disparaged as 
emasculated and reproached for not valuing womanhood. In ancient China, sending women 
as gifts was a normal practice. As discussed in previous chapters, women in ancient society 
did not have status and belonged to the family, making it possible for families to sell or send 
off some women (for some women, once married, they entered the husband’s family). 
Concubines, prostitutes and slaves had a relatively lower status than the wife and most of 
them were purchased by the family and could be sent to anybody if the head of the family or 
the husband or the wife wanted. In some rare situations, even the wife could be sent to other 
people. For instance, during the Warring States Period, in order to cultivate “guanxi” 
(connections or relations) with the king of Qin country, Lv Buwei sent his wife, Zhao Ji, to 
the king as the wife. Later, Lv Buwei became the prime minister (chengxiang) of Qin 
country. In ancient society, except for the wife, other women had very low status, were not 
treated as human and could be abused by the men, by the family, by the owner (i.e., the boss 
of a brothel), and by the wife. In today’s China, people still discriminate against those 
identified as xiaosan, qingfu and ernai (translated as second wife and mistress). Once women 
are labeled as xiaosan, qingfu, and ernai, many people show no respect for them, referring to 
them in terms such as “gongxiang qingfu (shared mistress).”  In recent years, harsher titles 
that insulted women as mistresses have emerged in news media, including the CCP’s 
mouthpiece. For instance, on December 1, 2007, Renmin Net posted a news article which 
suggested that Zhang Yufen “Use the Bolo Knife to Cut the Head of Ernai” (Zhang Yufen 
“dadao xiang enai toushang kanqu”) (Liu, 2007). This article was not meant to promote 
gender equality but to “promote” conflicts among women. Similar to the abuse of concubines 
in ancient society, news reports related to beating mistresses on the street (dangjie da 
xiaosan) have also emerged. The discourse in case 38 reminds people to hate those mistresses 
and corrupt cadres. 
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Case 39 
 (Zai jinnian guanguo lianghui shang, quanguo zhengxie 
weiyuan, shenjishu fu shenjizhang Dong Dasheng toulu, qunian 
dui 6 ge sheng de kuangchanziyuan shenji faxian, gai lingyu 
fubai yanzhong, bushao lingdao ganbu zhijie chashou ganyu 
kuangyequan churang, daozhi guoyou zichan liushi. Jinnian, 
shenjishu jiang kuangchan ziyuan zuowei shenji de zhongdian 
zhiyi.) 
In this year’s National People's Congress (NPC) and National 
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), the member of CPPCC National 
Committee and the deputy director of National Audit Office of 
the PRC said that they found mineral resources from 6 
provinces that had corruption issues via auditing, and many 
leaders intervened in the sale of mining rights, and such 
behaviour led to the loss of state-owned properties. This year, 
the audit office put mineral resources as one of the main 
focuses. (Wangyi.net, April 17, 2014) 
Case 39 uses a metaphorical application in the article title, employing the word 
“mouse” to refer to corrupt cadre as a means to arouse people’s hatred towards corruption. 
The case consists of regulatory discourses (i.e., they found mineral resources from 6 
provinces), describing corruption in state-owned enterprises made possible due to lack of 
effective supervision and concerns about cost and profit. Many types of state firms suffer 
from corruption related to such activities as the purchase of raw materials, property transfer 
(i.e., selling mining rights), and fund management. After state firms started to execute The 
Go Out Strategy (Zouchuqu zhanlue) in 2000, many state firms have invested in programs 
overseas. Compared to domestic operations of state-owned enterprises, state firms’ overseas 
investments and other activities have relatively less supervision -Xinhua News has reported 
that 4 trillion yuan of assets were not audited by the government (Reuters, 2017) - increasing 
possibilities for corruption. In one high profile example, Bo Qiliang, the former PetroChina’s 
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overseas operations chief, was accused of committing corruption after letting his brother 
purchase raw material. His brother hired agents to operate a company to purchase raw 
material for PetroChina’s overseas programs resulting in supposed earnings of 20 billion 
yuan a year (Sohu Business, 2014).  
Although the word “official” is often embedded directly in the descriptions of 
corruption processes and corrupt lifestyles, as illustrated in the three cases just considered, 
descriptions that employ metaphors to depict corrupt cadres are more interesting. The 
following are three examples of how media discourses use such metaphors to represent 
corrupt cadres:  
Case 40 
 (Jiaotu you le sanku, hai neng yu maiyin de nvzi chuang lai 
chuang qu. Zhe yijing bushi tuzi, shi laohu.) 
A rabbit has three burrows and still has sexual relationships 
with prostitutes. This is not a rabbit but a tiger. (Liu, August 7, 
2013) 
Case 40 is a traditional discourse that is hard to understand when translated into 
English. In Chinese, “jiaotusanku” is a proverb which states that a cunning rabbit has three 
burrows to hide in compared to a normal rabbit who has only one. The proverb refers to 
people who have more places to hide or can think of many solutions. The discourse at first 
appears to apply the proverb incorrectly, but the meaning of the metaphor is not hard to 
understand. Although the judges are supposed to be cleverer than normal people, their 
misconduct, in visiting whores, reveals them to be tigers which, as mentioned in relation to a 
previous discourse, is a metaphor to represent high-level corrupt cadres.  
Dhont et al. (2019) observe that people’s perceptions of animals are always 
influenced by the social-culture environment. For instance, in western cultures, people value 
companion animals, such as cats and dogs, while devaluing other animals or treating them as 
commodities to satisfy people’s interests and desires (Dhont et al., 2019). On the other hand, 
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the Chinese language contains a lot of proverbs that involve animals. In traditional culture, 
the tiger was also used to describe strong enemies or bad people, and many proverbs are 
related to the tiger. For instance, the proverb “weihuzuochang” (translated as to be the aid of 
the tiger), means help, bad people or enemy, to do bad things or illegal things. In China, 
animal proverbs are based on ancient people’s perceptions of animals and are related to the 
social environment (Zhang, 2013). In ancient society, tigers were very dangerous for people, 
and people and some animals could be eaten by tigers. Thus, the tiger is the king of animals, 
represented as strong, fierce and sacred (chinanews.com, 2010), so many phrases and 
proverbs make comparisons to tigers in a positive sense, such as hutouhunao, which means 
boys look strong. However, some animals are characterized in relation at can to their negative 
influences on human - flies, for example, transmit disease and rats steal food, and should be 
killed. In this sense, many negative proverbs refer to flies and rats to describe bad people. 
According to Nigert (2002), animals are exploited or oppressed via social and cultural 
processes that often involve speciesism, signifying “an ideology, a belief system that 
legitimates and inspires prejudice and discrimination.” In the case of these Chinese proverbs, 
a hierarchy between animals is employed to convey norms related to human social traits and 
hierarchies. For cadres who commit corruption, their portrayal as people who are not moral is 
represented in descriptions as tigers, flies and rats, depending on their levels.  
Given that proverbs and metaphors are common in daily life, media reports often 
employ colloquial discourse to attract readers. There is an additional message embedded in 
the title of the article described in Case 40 which is also interesting, as it uses guns to 
describe the discipline inspection department and the person who revealed the misconduct of 
the judges. By describing those guns as being fired on the judges, the title reinforces the 
legitimacy and strength of the discipline inspection department and the law. 
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 Case 41 
 (ruguo shike xiangdao women de qunli shi renmin fuyu de, dui 
quanli you jingwei zhi xin, shike laoji zeren, yange yueshu ziji, 
qingbai wei guan, gongzheng yong quan, dui quanli “si zhizu yi 
zijie”, dui qiancai “si zhizu yi jiejie,” bu zhuang hongdeng, 
buyue leichi, name Niu Qizhong jiubuhui “xinli shiheng”, you 
“laoniu” biancheng “laohu”de.) 
If we think the authorities were empowered by people, respect 
authorities, always remember our responsibilities, restrict 
ourselves, do not commit corruption, use authority peoperly, be 
satisfied with our current occupation positions and income, and 
do not cross the bottom line, Niu Qizhong will not be 
psychologically unbalanced and change to tiger from cow. 
(Wangyi.net, March 23, 2016) 
Case 41 presents a regulatory discourse which employs several discursive techniques. 
First, in Chinese, Niu has the same pronunciation as the cow, so metaphorically, Niu Qizhong 
is the cow. In this sense, the “cow (niu)” is a metaphorical application of the regulatory 
discourse in the representation of the character (Niu Qizhong). Also, because the cow in 
Chinese culture represents people who are loyal, perseverant, and hardworking without 
complaint, the metaphorical application refers not only to the cadre’s name but also to 
expectations for cadres. Similar to previous examples, the tiger is another metaphorical 
application to represent the corrupt cadre. Second, “hongdeng” means red light, and “leichi” 
is the name of a lake; both of them signify the boundaries of corruption in the discourse. 
“Hongdeng” and “leichi” are also metaphors to warn against committing corruption - do not 
run the red light and do not cross. Third, “si zhizu yi zi jie,” an old saying which means to be 
satisfied with what you have and restrict yourself, reminds people to be self-disciplined. As 
morality is an important quality in ancient society, to be moral, people need to be self-
disciplined. Fourth, while the reminder that cadres should maintain self-discipline is 
associated with the statement that “authorities were empowered by people,” a discourse that 
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might otherwise inspire people remains empty with the provision of any practical 
suggestions. 
Case 42 
 (you dao le xiawu 6 dian zhege “laoshijian”, yijing jiu wei you 
“laohu” luoma xiaoxi chuanlai de zhongjiwei fangliao, guojia 
zongjiaoju dangzu chengyuan, fu juzhang Zhang Lebin shexian 
yanzhogn weiji jieshou diaocha.) 
Again, it was 6 p.m. - the so-called “old-time.” But the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party 
of China had not released any tigers’ crackdown for a long 
time. This time, it announced that Zhang Lebin, the deputy 
director of State Administration for Religious Affairs, was 
under investigation for suspected serious violation of 
discipline. (Sohu.com, September 23, 2015) 
Case 42 employs a colloquial discourse beginning with the author’s speculative use of 
“old-time” to suggest that the CCDI typically releases news about corruption at 6 p.m. In 
fact, the CCDI releases such news reports all day, but this portrayal adds a sense of interest to 
the news article. The metaphor of the  “tiger” describes Zhang’s position as a high-level 
official in the central government, drawing upon a concept that is frequently employed in 
news about corruption. As with many representations associated with men, the image 
conveys a sense of power that tends not to be employed when women are the focus of the 
media’s attention. 
Overall, the analysis of discourses related to men in commercial media coverage of 
corruption cases reveals that, compared to the official media platform, the language is more 
colloquial, with frequent reliance on irony, metaphors, proverbs, and ancient sayings. In the 
next part, I will focus on the intertextual analysis of the news articles on corruption that 
appear on commercial websites, discussing coverage associated with major types of 
corruption issues. 
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7.3 Intertextuality Analysis of Commerical Websites’ Corruption News Articles 
7.3.1 Examples of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was Related to Personal Issues 
I focus first on a lengthy article that presents the case of the former director of the 
Guizhou Communications Department, Cheng Mengren, and his mistress, He Wen, written 
by a correspondent for Sohu.com, Luo Lizhi. The title is revealing- “Luo Lizhi: Being the 
Mistress of the Deputy Mayor, Female Journalist was ‘Harmed’ (Luo Lizhi: nv jizhe zuo 
fushizhang qingfu queshi shi “shouhai” le).” By introducing the word “harmed” in quotation 
marks, the author employs irony to suggest disbelief in the mistress’s position that she was 
the victim. The title reflects the widely-shared public stereotype that mistresses are 
materialistic, choosing to become a mistress because they want to lead a life of luxury views.  
The article begins with the court verdict of Cheng and He Wen, then refers to He 
Wen’s interview for other news media: He Wen said she was together with Cheng because of 
love, but she was also the victim of Cheng’s corruption. The author questioned this love 
because Cheng passed the buck to He Wen, who passed the buck to Cheng when both of 
them were at court. Describing He Wen as a journalist from Zunyi TV station, Guizhou 
Province, the article proceeds to outline the process of how He Wen knew Cheng and became 
his mistress. He Wen said that she never thought of marriage with Cheng, and said that she 
moved to Beijing after divorcing her husband in order to avoid seeing Cheng. The author 
does not believe what He Wen said, analyzing in ironic tones He Wen’s claims about how 
she became the victim of Cheng’s case: 
(cong shagnmian de wenzhang kanlai, yaoshuo He Wen zhen mei “shouhai”, shi 
nanyizhixin de. He Wen yinwei piaoliang, dedaole fushizhang de qinglai, congci jiu baizing 
le ziji de xingfu rensheng. Meiyoule ziji de zunyan renge, meiyou le zhenzheng de aiqing, yu 
qianfu lihun, zheshi cuoai dailai de kuguo. Qianfu pobudeyi fenshou, shijishang shi dui He 
Wen de paoqi. Beijinglixiang daizhe haizi shang Beijing, guozhe bing bu guangcai bing bu 
ruyi de shenghuo, neng shuo bushi shouhai ma?) 
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From the above articles, it is unbelievable to say that He Wen was not the victim. The 
deputy mayor liked He Wen because she was beautiful; from then on, He Wen buried her 
happy life, lost her dignity, lost the chance to obtain true love, and divorced her husband. 
These were the results of wrong love. He Wen’s husband had to divorce He, but she was 
abandoned by her husband actually. So, He Wen had to leave her hometown and live in 
Beijing with her kid, and her life in Beijing was not glorious; hence, Wen He was the victim, 
wasn’t she? (Luo, September 27, 2015) 
The author repeatedly reveals his disagreement with He Wen’s statement to the court 
that she was the victim of Chen Mengren’s corruption by employing words like “beautiful,” 
“happiness,” “dignity,” “true love,” and “divorce” which convey deep significance. First, the 
assertion that He Wen can obtain true love only in marriage reminds readers of the traditional 
values for women, that is, to be virtuous and belong to the family. Second, in describing how 
being a mistress brings unhappiness and has no dignity, and in speculating that He Wen’s 
subsequent life was “not glorious,” the author reveals his disdain for women who are 
mistresses. In stating that her husband “had to” to divorce He Wen, the author makes it look 
like He Wen’s husband did not have any other option or responsibility. Throughout this 
discourse, the author caters to the general public’s preconceived ideas about mistresses. 
The article continues by referring to  an ancient phrase in China that “a beautiful 
woman always has an unfortunate life (Hongyan boming;红颜薄命).” In referring to a mayor 
and his mistress who were tried in the court of law, the article presents He Wen’s situation as 
a warning to women about how to be good women. 
(He Wen gei fushizhang zuole 18 nian qingren, cong 30 sui zuodao 48 sui, zheshi 
rensheng de huangjin jieduan. Ruguo shuo zhenxi ziji de aiqing shenghuo, re’ai ziji de 
jiating, dui zhangfu duoyidian zhongxin, jingdeqi lingdao quanli yinyou de chanrao, hui you 
jintina de laoyu zhi zai ma? Laoyu gaizao, queshi shi rensehngzhihai! Zaozhijinri, 
hebidangchu.) 
He Wen had been the mistress of the deputy mayor for 18 years, from age 30 to age 
48, which was the golden period of her life. If she had cherished her love with her husband, if 
she had cherished her family, if she had been more loyal towards her husband, if she could 
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resist the temptation of a leader’s power, she wouldn’t have today’s result. Today’s result 
was that she had to spend life in prison, and prison harmed her life. If she had known it 
would come to this, she wouldn’t have done it! (Luo, September 27, 2015) 
In employing language to persuade women not to betray their husbands, the discourse 
also reproduces and reinforces patriarchal norms. Words “cherished,” “loyal,” and 
“temptation” are associated with obligations for women’s fault in marriage, while in this 
case, the husband (who is not described) appears very innocent. There is a paradox here: the 
author claims that when He Wen betrayed marriage, she was betraying love, but surmises 
(without substantiation) that the husband is He Wen’s true love.  
In China, divorce has been recognized as immoral for a long time. Before the 1990s, 
it was almost impossible for Chinese to divorce. To divorce, people needed permissions from 
their working unit and before giving people permission, leaders of the working unit would try 
to persuade people not to divorce. Even if people filed divorce petitions to the court, judges 
would mediate or pressure spouses to reach reconciliation (He & Ng, 2013). In the 1990s, 
after “broken emotional relationship (ganqing polie)” was allowed to be one of the reasons 
for divorce, the rate of divorce climbed. Since 2000, with rapid economic development and 
social changes, people’s ideas on divorce have become more liberal, and the rate of divorce 
has increased year by year. Although people’s ideas on divorce may have changed, mistresses 
still suffer discrimination from the public. These public attitudes conveyed in the author’s 
attribution of blame to He Wen for being a mistress and breaking up her family. Replicate the 
traditional gender hierarchy in which mistresses hold low social status (He-Yin, 1907).  
The article further belittles women by focusing on women’s beauty, warning women 
to keep away from corrupt cadres: 
 (Nvren liandan re ren ai, tebie shi you lingdao xiai, qishi shi weihai de mogui lai 
qiaomen le. Gei lingdao dang qingren, qing bu you ji, ming bu you ren. Zhiyou you yidian 
wenhua hui sikao wenti de ren, jiu hui bunan dedao qingxing de renshi, litong meise qu bajie 
tanguanwuli, yuanyi yishenxiangxu, mudi zhiyou yige, mouqu sili.) 
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People, especially leaders, love beautiful women’s faces; in fact, this is the signal of 
a ghost. Some women had to be mistresses of leaders. However, even women who have little 
education can think of this issue for a little bit and will have a clear understanding of 
mistresses. So, women who utilized beauty to cater to corrupt cadres only had one purpose --
-- get the money and benefits. (Luo, September 27, 2015) 
The use of the words “beautiful,” “love,” and “ghost” discriminate against beautiful 
women, suggesting that improper relations between women and cadres are women’s fault. As 
in many media reports analyzed previously, beautiful women are further blamed for 
developing “guanxi (connections or relations)” with cadres purposely- beautiful women are 
materialistic, wanting to be close to cadres for money. As in the other articles, there is no 
discussion of other issues, including mention of a political system which provides 
opportunities for cadres and mistresses to commit corruption. As in the accounts in the CCDI 
news reports, corruption, even when committed by male cadres, is presented as the women’s 
fault. 
This discourse problematizes women’s beauty as an essential feature in the mistress-
cadre relationship, as beauty can be utilized to get money and benefits. While posed as an 
individual issue, beauty has been commodified in contemporary China and serves as a 
driving force in the consumer market. According to Meng and Huang (2017), beauty products 
represented the highest sales category in the 2015 Double Eleven shopping festival, 
organized by the biggest e-commerce company Alibaba, for which total sales in 2015 reached 
91.2 billion in one day (Hu, 2018)! Media discourse on gender and corruption reinforces a 
powerful paradox in which patriarchal gender hierarchies intersect with the market economy 
and consumerism.  
These issues are extended as the article continues by commenting more generally on 
relationships between mistresses and corrupt cadres: 
(zhongsuozhouzhi, qingfu bei panxing, yijing chengwei “gongli”, laobaixing feichang 
yonghu! Shige tanguan, jiuge shi qingfu xiangsui. Shangban zuozhe chezi zhuan, zhongwu 
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weizhe zhuozi zhuan, wanshang raozhe qunzi zhuan. Zheyang de lingdao ganbu, shiji shang 
shi yu dang de zongzhi beidaoerchi, shi yurou renmin, shi shizu de tanguanwuli. Cheng 
Kejie, Hu Changqing, Chen Liangyu deng jiushi bai zai qingfu de qundai xia!) 
As we all know, the public advocates the principle ---- mistress should be sentenced 
to prison. For every ten corrupt cadres, nine of them had mistresses. Such cadres go to work 
by car, have meals by sitting around tables, and live with mistresses at night. Such corrupt 
cadres betray the party propaganda, and cruelly oppress and exploit the public. Such corrupt 
cadres’ downfall was because of mistresses, and such corrupt cadres are Cheng Kejie, Hu 
Changqing, and Chen Liangyu, and so on. (Luo, September 27, 2015) 
In the above paragraph, the words “mistress,” “principle,” and “advocate” invoke 
people’s hatred towards mistresses and reinforce discrimination, both of which stem from the 
ancient society. The sentence “wanshang raozhe qunzi zhuan” (translated as live with 
mistresses at night) expresses disrespect toward women, employing metaphorical terms  
“qunzi” (in English dress) for mistress and “zhuan” (in English around) while denouncing 
corrupt cadres who are around the mistress at night. The author later describes three 
corruption cases to further demonstrate how women take a leading role in cadres’ corruption. 
The discourse is paradoxical: it describes how women can lead male breadwinners into 
corruption The article repeats lessons about patriarchal power that appears frequently in other 
news articles on corruption - women oppression by patriarchal power is concealed as women 
are represented as causes of corruption;  women are subordinate to men’s power yet treated 
as scapegoats for the party.  
The article underlines these lessons by telling women how to behave properly: 
(cong zhe yigege anli lai kan, bang gaoguan yishenxiangxu de nvzi, queshi shi duo 
boming! Yao gaibian zhege “boming” zhi yun, genben dafa zaiyu shouzhu daode dixian, yao 
weihu nvzi de zunyan, yao yuanli gaogjan de youhuo, qiemo chengwei tanguanwuli de 
wanwu, chengwei fubai fenzi de bangxiong, chengwei jiating de pantu.) 
From some cases, we can see that women have unfortunate lives if they become 
mistresses of cadres. In order to get rid of an unfortunate lifestyle, the essential solution is to 
keep the moral bottom, keep the female dignity and keep away from cadres, and women 
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should not be the toys of corrupt cadres, helpers of corrupt cadres, and betrayers of the 
family. (Luo, September 27, 2015) 
The discourse advises women to maintain dignity, to avoid having relations with 
cadres as represented through words like “the moral bottom,” “toys,” “helpers,” and 
“betrayers.” Ironically, this language presents women as agents, who are blamed for engaging 
in improper relations with cadres and corruption scandals. In relation to the cause of 
corruption, women are suddenly “empowered” by authors to occupy positions of power, at 
the same time that these discourses reproduce patriarchal norms that women are inferior to 
men who stand at the head of the family and society. 
In blending traditional gender discourse, colloquial discourse, and regulatory 
discourse, the article represents the exercise of patriarchal power by reinforcing the 
regulation of women’s behaviour from a male-centred perspective. As with CCDI reporting, 
the article reduces corruption issues to gender issues and provides cover for the party which 
has formal responsibility for political scandals. 
The next article illustrates another dimension of these issues, highlighting how male 
cadres can utilize their power or authority to promote their mistresses.  
The article focuses on three cases, the first of which is Li Rongting, the former vice-
chairman of Baise CPPCC, Guangxi Province. Li was investigated and penalized not for 
getting bribes, but rather on account of “intervening in the election of cadres and illegally 
promoting his mistress, and the illegal promotion created a bad influence” (ganyu, chashou 
xiaji gonghui de huanjie xuanjue gongzuo, zhiling tiba qi qingfu, yingxiang elie;干预、插手
下级工会的换届选举工作，指令提拔其情妇，影响恶劣) (Ifeng.com, June 24, 2017). In 
this case, “having bad influence” means that many people knew about the illegal promotion 
but did not say anything until the cadre was investigated. Li provided money to the “female 
confidant” (hongyanzhiji;红颜知己) but also power (promotion) as well. In referring to the 
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mistress as “female confidant” - - also known as “hongyanzhiji” in Chinese -the article 
employs irony, for it elicits a meaning of a male’s good female friend (not girlfriend or 
mistress). However, the use of quotation marks remind readers that this particular mistress is 
not “hongyanzhiji”, even though compared to other terms, including “ernai, qingfu, xiaosan 
(mistress or second wife),” “hongyanzhiji” is relatively less demeaning.  
The second case is that of Ji Jianye, the former mayor of Nanjing, who had promoted 
several of his mistresses. One mistress was promoted from an office clerical position to the 
Deputy Director of the Municipal Development and Reform Commission, was promoted 
from waitress to officer of Shouxihu Management Committee of Yangzhou and the most 
famous mistress, Jin Qiufen, was sentenced to prison together with Ji, after she was promoted 
to a position as the director of the Yangzhou Environmental Protection Agency. The article 
highlighted how these promotions illustrated instances in which officials did not meet 
requirements for government positions.  
The article then introduced the case of Ji’s political enemy, Yang Weize,  the former 
Party Secretary of Nanjing, who also promoted his mistress, Yu Minyan, to the department 
head of the propaganda department for Xin District in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. The article 
described Yu with reference to terms like “hongyanzhiji (female confidant),” “beautiful,” 
“studied arts in university,” and “transferred to the government positions from university 
positions” to suggest reasons for why Yang promoted her.  
In each of these cases, relationships were based on situations in which female and 
male cadres came together through work roles. The persons who utilized power to promote 
others were male cadres! What is more, we do not know whether any of the cadres had used 
his power to threaten a woman to be his mistress. Nonetheless, the article adopts a double 
standard by suggesting that the corrupt behavior was the fault of women, who are warned to 
keep away from male cadres. As in other reports, the discourse makes no reference to other 
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important issues, and in particular conceals problems related to a political system which 
provides opportunities for illegal promotion and the patriarchal society which provides men 
with opportunities to abuse power. Besides a lack of supervision, the concentration of power 
also contributes to the abuse of power. For instance, Ji Jianye was not only the mayor but the 
Deputy Secretary of the Nanjing Committee of the Communist Party of China as well, so he 
managed the municipal committee as well as the government. The CCP does not have clear 
criteria to select cadres for promotion. According to the Regulation on the Selection and 
Appointment of the Party and Government Leaders (dangzheng lingdao ganwu xuanba 
renting gongzuo tiaoli;党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例), selecting cadres should be based 
on ability and moral integrity (decaijianbei;德才兼备). However, the regulation does not 
explain what kind of ability a cadre needs and what moral integrity is, so the discourse is 
vague. In other words, anybody can be cadres, as the understanding of the regulation is open 
to people who are in positions of power. 
The article ends not by focusing on issues related to power but by citing regulatory 
discourse, reinforcing the party’s role to ensure justice, focusing on corrupt individuals, who  
“should pay the price together (yici fuchu daijia).” (Ifeng.com, June 24, 2017) 
In the case of mistress-cadre relationships, there is a clear pattern in media reports to 
depict mistresses as the cause of problems for seeking to get money or promotions from 
cadres who are unable to resist mistresses' desires. So mistresses should be responsible or 
partly responsible for corruption. Another type of corruption, not related to keeping 
mistresses, is examined in the next section.  
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7.3.2 The Example of a Male Cadre Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal 
Issues 
One article, discussing corruption scandals in China’s universities, is entitled 
“Corruption cases of presidents in Universities resulted from lacking of supervision (高校校
长落马"问责"监管缺失; gaoxiao xiaozhang luoma “wenze” jianguan queshi) (Ifeng.com, 
June 14, 2013). In contrast to other media reports, the title clearly attributes the cause of 
corruption to lack of supervision. However, the analysis of corruption within the article 
remains superficial. The article begins with a question:  
(gaoxiao benshi jiaoshu yuren de shensheng suozai, weirenshibiao zhe ben ying 
xuehaoweishi, weixingshifan, er yixiaozhizhang, yiyuanzhizhang jiu geng ying jieshenzihao, 
weirenbiaoshuai, zenme ye zai tanfu lushang yilu “chongfeng” ?)  
“given that universities are sacred places for educating students and both the 
president and the head of colleges should be a model of clean living, how can those people, 
who should impart knowledge, become corrupted?” (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013) 
This question reinforces traditional stereotypes of people who are highly educated. In 
ancient society, people who were highly educated were called intellectuals (dushuren), and 
they were supposed to resist material, sexual, and other forms of temptation. 
“Zuohuaibuluan,” originally referred to a man who does not have improper sexual 
relationships with any woman (zdic.net, n.d.), is a proverb that describes intellectuals who 
kept upright and honest all the time. In this sense, faculty in universities should automatically 
resist any temptations because they are highly educated. In addition to expressing regret 
about the corruption scandal, the language conveys an image reproduced through colloquial 
conversation. The article proceeds to answer the question by focusing on the issue of 
supervision:  
(jinguan baoshougoubing de “daxue xingzhenghua” shi qizhong yuoyin zhiyi, dan 
jianguan queshi, jiandu buli de wenti geng yao yinqi gaodu zhongshi)  
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“One reason is universities had become subject to administration, but an essential 
reason should be the lack of supervision.” (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013) 
This answer looks paradoxical, as the purported cause of the lack of supervision is the 
administrationalization (daxue xingzhenghua) of universities, describing a process in which 
academic institutions come to be increasingly managed by administrative power. In this 
system, academia becomes subject to state administrative power as university leaders are 
placed at the same level as government officials and presidents are appointed by the 
government. In China, the president of a university has the same, or even higher, 
administrative level as a mayor. For instance, the president of Lanzhou University has a 
higher administrative level than the mayor of Lanzhou. As with government officials, 
university presidents have multiple positions. For instance, Lin Haibo, who is the Deputy 
Secretary of Lanzhou University Party Committee, is the Deputy Secretary of Lanzhou 
University Discipline Inspection Commission (Lanzhou University, n.d.). The 
administrationalization of universities contributes to a concentration of power in leaders’ 
hands and ineffective supervision from the University-level Discipline Inspection 
Commission (China Business Network, 2013). The discourse employed in the Ifeng.com 
news report separates the issue of lack of supervision from a focus on the universities’ 
administrationalization, serving to make the corruption look less serious.  
The article proceeds to explain how universities’ cadres now have more chances to 
commit corruption, unlike previously when universities were considered as “poor” places. 
First, universities have many projects “in the areas of infrastructure and purchasing” (zai 
jijian, caigou deng lingyu) due to “university mergers” (gaoxiao hebing) and “the enrollment 
expansion” (kuozhao), so “universities become a place where power rent-seeking exists” 
(henrongyi huode quanli xunzu kongjian) (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013). Second, university 
leaders can get bribes from selling spaces reserved through “some rare enrolment quotas” 
(xique de zhaosheng ming’e) to parents (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013). Third, because 
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“universities opened their logistics services market” (ge gaoxiao zhubu kaifang xiaonei 
houqin fuwu shichang), corruption may exist in bidding processes (Ifeng.com, June 14, 
2013).  
 By highlighting four areas in which corruption is possible (“infrastructure, purchase, 
logistics, and enrolment,” jijian, caigou, houqin he zhaosheng) (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013), 
the article appears to suggest that universities have become a supervision-free area with 
leaders who are more powerful than before. However, the discussion is silent on one 
significant area, related to companies that were initially founded by the university, usually for 
benign purposes, which also face corruption scandals. Many university corporations, which 
were originally founded to utilize a university’s research capacity to promote the 
development of firms, have performed poorly (xiaoyi bu jia) (Xinhua News Agency, 2018, 
August 15). In some cases, these problems have opened the door to corrupt activities. For 
instance, the crackdown of Chu Jian, who was the former vice president of Zhejiang 
University, is related to the illegal transfer of benefits to university corporations (Sohu 
Education, 2019). 
Universities’ corruption is, indeed, associated with faulty supervision, but the article 
concludes with only superficial reference to ways to improve supervision, by means of  “a 
system of accountability after corruption” (shifa hou yange wenze de zhuijiu zhidu) and 
various supervision measures, including “third-party auditing bodies, public opinion, …the 
teachers’ congress and the union, and supervision from teachers and students”(shehui 
disanfang shenji jigou, yinru gongzhong yulun, tongshi dali fahui xuexiao nei jiaodaihui, 
gonghui, shisheng yuangong de jiandu zuoyong). (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013) 
            The proposed solutions are vague and do not speak to processes that could guarantee 
any effective changes, especially as long as the process of administrationalization of 
universities makes it possible to commit and conceal corruption. There are some discussions 
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in China about de-administrationalization as a means to solve the problem, but such an idea 
remains naive. As in the situation of state-owned companies where a separation of 
government from the company will not help to eliminate corruption, de-
administrationalization will not necessarily help to eliminate university leaders’ misconduct 
and illegal behaviour. With independent supervised institutes, government officials can get 
bribes from university leaders even in situations where a university has experienced de-
administrationalization. 
The experiences associated with universities suggest that corruption occurs in a wide 
range of settings in China, and suggests, further, that under current political and institutional 
systems, it is difficult to make effective changes to minimize corrupt activity. The next 
section examines an article which details in more depth why it is hard to eliminate corruption 
in China from the perspective of officialdom.   
7.3.3 The Example of a Female Cadre Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal 
Issues 
            Corruption occurs in unlikely places in China. One article reports on a corruption 
scandal within the Red Cross Society, which in China, as a charity organization, is expected 
to maintain a clean image (Sina.com, August 21, 2016). The article describes the case of Wen 
Jiabi, who was the former party secretary of the Society's Sichuan branch. The title, 
“Comment: Knowing Wen Jiabi, the former vice president of Sichuan Red Cross Society, is 
more valuable than knowing Guo Meimei” (the internet celebrity who is related to Sichuan 
Red Cross Society) (评论：红十字会文家碧比郭美美更值得深挖), compares Wen’s case 
to another well-known case. Guo Meimei became famous for showing off a lavish lifestyle 
on Weibo (Chinese version Twitter) even though she was identified as the General Manager 
of the Red Cross Commerce. Her lavish lifestyle consisted of the use of numerous luxury 
goods, luxury cars (i.e., Maserati) and luxury houses. Therefore people questioned if Guo had 
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embezzled donations to the Red Cross Society for her personal use. While the Red Cross 
Society claimed that Guo was not associated with them, she was arrested in 2014 for illegally 
gambling on the World Cup. Although the Red Cross Society denied Guo’s identity, the 
credibility of the Red Cross Society was greatly reduced, as donations decreased every year. 
Here, the author mentioned Guo Meimei not only to attract readers, as Guo Meimei was a 
notorious internet celebrity but to emphasize the assertion that Wen Jiabi was a confirmed 
corrupt cadre in the Red Cross Society.  
The article reports that Wen was sentenced to 16 years in prison for embezzling three 
million Chinese yuan and getting bribes worth five million Chinese yuan, accepting money 
no matter who gave it to her. She got commissions from almost every problem related to the 
Red Cross Society, and she even embezzled donations from the public. Although Wen was 
definitely immoral, the narrative suggests that problems behind her corrupt behaviour maybe 
even more complex.  
(buguo, Wen Jiabi zai tingshen he chanhui zhong de bianjie, que zhanshi le wenti de 
fuzaxing. Zai yifeng xiegei sheng lingdao de xin zhong, Wen Jiabi biaoshi, ta taoqu zijin 
daduo yin zai, yin zhigong liyi he honghui gongzuo de xietiao, er ta tanwu de daduoshu 
kuanxiang ye yongzai le zhexie defang. Zai ta de fansi shougao zhong, Wen Jiabi duoci cheng 
shouhui de yuanyou wei “qu Beijing Chuchai, xietiao guanxi”.) 
Wen’s defence and confessions showed the complexity of the problem. In a letter 
which [she] wrote to provincial management level cadres, Wen said that the money she 
embezzled was used for coordinating with other departments. In her confessions, she 
mentioned that the reason for corruption was “business trips to Beijing, to coordinate 
relations between different departments” many times. (Sina.com, August 21, 2016) 
The article observes that Wen’s case implies a more significant problem; that is, 
cadres cannot do anything without getting bribes and bribing other cadres. Unlike most of the 
reported corruption cases, this report does not simply criticize the cadre, but draws attention 
to a more systemic potential problem reflected in Wen’s case in suggesting that Wen may be 
immoral, but also a victim of a latent principle in officialdom. In Chinese, the latent principle 
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called “xietiao guanxi” (translated as coordinate relations between different departments), is 
related to two issues. First, the procedure of getting administrative approvals is quite complex 
and takes a long time. For instance, without “guanxi” (connections or relations), a real estate 
program needs more than 30 approvals and 100 seals, and it takes at least 272 working days 
from obtaining the land to executing the program (Fenghuang News, 2014). Such a complex 
procedure requires people to xietiao guanxi to shorten the time to get approvals. In Wen’s 
case, she had helped the establishment of the Meishan Elderly Rehabilitation Centre 
(Meishan laonian kangfu zhongxin;眉山老年康复中心). The second issue is that China is 
very big, but it is not a federal country, so the execution of policy needs people to coordinate 
relations among different provinces and different departments. Local governments and major 
state-owned enterprises established Liaison Offices in Beijing (zhujingban), and those offices 
were supposed to coordinate central government policies with local government’s conditions. 
However, Bejing Liaison Offices face corruption issues, as officers accept bribes from 
business to “xietiao guanxi.” (Sohu News, n.d.) Since 2013, many of these offices have been 
cancelled (Sohu News, n.d.). Generally, there are many ways to “xietiao guanxi,” such as an 
invitation to a meal (qingke chifan) or sending gifts and money. It is significant that, while 
“xietiao guanxi” is related to corruption and flaws in the political system, the article uses a 
neutral term to describe it as an “ecology of officialdom” (guanchang shengtai;官场生态).  
News articles, in general, tend to be more objective if the cadre’s corruption is not 
related to personal issues, compared with those that focus on cadres who have personal 
issues. For news articles related to personal issues, gender images differ in regard to the 
causes of corruption, and females are regularly blamed for male cadres’ corruption.  Male 
cadres who engage in corrupt activity, on the other hand, appear as emasculated and weak, 
ready to cave into their mistresses’ material desires or to their lack of self-discipline. These 
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gender discourses prevail in the coverage of corruption cases by both state-owned and 
private-owned media platforms.  
7.4 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions 
This chapter has utilized critical discourse analysis to explore gender discourses in 
news about corruption that appears on commercial websites. Unlike CCDI, the most frequent 
coded term associated with descriptions of women is “mistresses,” which indicates in part the 
media outlets’ desires to attract readers as part of commercial media’s focus on maintaining 
profitability. Otherwise, many findings related to how commercial media represent gender 
are similar to those for official media. Women are regularly assessed in terms of their ability 
to fulfill their traditional roles as wives and mothers while men are judged with reference to 
traditional ideologies related to family, work and patriarchal roles. In terms of corruption, 
women in both state and commercial news media are repeatedly blamed for causing the 
corruption of male cadres while men are portrayed as committing corruption to satisfy the 
desires of women in their lives due to their own personal failings to uphold male standards. 
There are some differences within these media discourses. Commercial media companies 
tend to use more sensational words and salacious sentences to describe women involved in 
corruption scandals. However, their criticisms of women remain the same as those advanced 
through state-owned media.  
There are three significant features of these findings. First, the media’s economic role 
has oriented them to cater to mass public tastes and lifestyles. Since the market reform in 
1978, the media started to embrace the market economy by means of commercialization and 
marketization. Media need an audience to make a profit (Yang, 2012; Shao et al., 2016). To 
attract these audiences, authors use colloquial descriptions to link their content and news 
articles more closely with people’s daily lives. The news articles on corruption illustrate how 
media incorporate some well-known ancient proverbs and phrases to increase the audience’s 
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understanding, in the process also reinforcing traditional views about how gender issues are 
part of corruption scandals. Second, although parts of the media have been commercialized, 
Chinese media is still largely controlled by the party-state. While reporting social issues, the 
media has to avoid criticizing the ruling party (Shao et al., 2016). A useful strategy to do this 
is self-censorship. According to Hassid (2008), media workers, including journalists, may 
deliberately omit some aspects of a phenomenon being reported on in news articles to avoid 
punishment from authorities within the power structure. In this sense, commercial media in 
China are problematic, as they face pressures from both political and commercial forces 
(Shao et al., 2016). These characteristics of Chinese political and media structures contribute 
to the stigmatization of women in news reporting about corruption in both state media and 
commercial media. Third, discourses about women disseminated by commercial media show 
that women are not treated the same as men, and are frequently disrespected. Commercial 
media companies serve as an apparatus that reproduces discriminatory discourses on women 
transmitted not only through state media but also across other political and institutional 
systems. China’s media system is far from independent, conveying media discourses that are 
part of a broader web of power.  
The analyses of both official state media and commercial media demonstrate that 
traditional gender norms play an important role in constructing both women and men’s 
images in news reports on corruption, revealing that in important ways, contemporary China 
remains a patriarchal country. Similar to previous studies (Du, 2016; Yun, 2013; Ji, 2015; 
Summerfield, 1994; Leung, 2003; Sun & Chen, 2015), my findings reveal that Confucianism 
still has a far-reaching influence on almost all spheres of life, with gender relations that 
continue to be regulated by traditional gender norms.  
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CHAPTER 8 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND THE RELATION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL 
CULTURE AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
News coverage on corruption in China reveals that images of women are strongly 
influenced by traditional Confucian gender norms, with women frequently being held 
responsible for male cadres’ corruption scandals. News articles attribute blame to individual 
women and men in corruption scandals, but they describe the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) as upright in its dedication to addressing corruption cases. These results give rise to 
several questions: how can authors of those articles attribute corruption to women? How do 
they know so many ancient proverbs, ancient stories, and traditional gender norms? How 
come the CCP remains so blameless in corruption scandals despite its stated commitment to 
eradicate corruption? I want to address these questions by focusing on both formal and 
informal structural factors, focusing especially on how the All-China Women’s Federation, 
along with family, education, and the media, work to represent traditional culture and 
political propaganda. Because women in the news reports about corruption are regularly 
judged by Confucian gender norms, I will also explore the relationship between traditional 
culture and political ideology, that is, what is the function of traditional culture from the 
perspective of politics? 
8.1 The All-China Women’s Federation 
The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) and the CCP are associated. Before the 
foundation of the PRC, leaders of feminist movements had worked with the CCP for a long 
time (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998). May Fourth Feminism and Marxism had a 
significant influence on CCP policies concerning women (Zheng, 1997; Gilmartin, 1995; 
Johns, n.d.). Leading intellectuals in the 20th century, such as Liang Qichao and Kang 
Youwei, proposed that women’s emancipation would boost China to be a strong nation 
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(Johns, n.d.; Tsui, 1998). Such ideas were absorbed by the May Fourth Movement, and 
intellectuals frequently criticized traditional family structures for the oppression of women 
(Li, 2000; Johns, n.d.; Tsui, 1998). The influential Marxist thinker, Engels, explained that 
women were oppressed because they were excluded from labour market participation (Johns, 
n.d.; Zheng, 1997). In a sense, for the CCP, women’s roles outside the home were the main 
focus. Many leaders of May Fourth Feminist activities, such as Deng Yingchao, had become 
party members and married men within the CCP elite (Johns, n.d.), prior to helping to shape 
the subsequent development of the ACWF. 
Given the connections between the ACWF and the CCP, a question for the ACWF is 
whether it represents women’s interests and protects women’s rights. Some scholars claim 
that the ACWF, in general, represents women’s interests, although it is guided by the CCP 
(Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998; Zheng, 1997). A common feature of this literature is that authors use 
interviews with the ACWF’s cadres as evidence to prove that the ACWF had significantly 
improved Chinese women’s status and represent Chinese women as a whole. On the other 
hand, other scholars argue that the ACWF is a propaganda tool of the CCP (Johns, n.d.; 
Stacey, 1984). In this part, I will explore the ACWF’s missions, the ACWF’s role in various 
construction programs during the Maoist period, and ideologies after the market reform to 
examine whether the ACWF represents women’s rights and interests. This question can help 
understand why in corruption news, the party is blameless and appears as upright. Using 
Foucaudian’s disciplinary power and biopower, I would like to know how these power 
dynamics work together in the ACWF to control the female population. 
The ACWF is guided by nine missions which can be divided into three categories: 
guidance by and support for the policies of the CCP; protection of the rights of women; and 
representation of women internationally (Tsui, 1998). Among these missions, the political 
interests are expressed as organizing women to study President Xi Jinping’s “Thought on 
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Socialism with Chinese Characteristic on a New Era” (Zuzhi yindao funv xuexi guache Xi 
Jinping xinshidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang); unifying and mobilizing women to 
make contributions to socialist economy, political, culture, social and ecological 
constructions (Tuanjie dongyuan funv toushen gaige kaifang he shehui zhuyi jingji jianshe, 
zhengzhi jianshe, wenhua jianshe, shehui jianshe he shengdai wenming jianshe); educating 
women to practice the core ideology of socialism (jiaoyu yindao funv shehui zhuyi hexin 
jiazhiguan); and actively participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (jiji canyu yi dai yi lu) 
(All-China Women’s Federation, 2013).  
Those political missions are up-to-date, as the core ideology of socialism and the Belt 
and Road Initiative were proposed since President Xi Jinping took power in 2012. The core 
ideology of socialism is intended to compete with the universal values in western societies 
(Zhu, 2014), while the Belt and Road Initiative utilizes the ancient silk road to promote 
economic development (BBC News, 2017a). Contrary to these specific and clear political 
requirements, the mission of gender equality is vague. Mission No. 4 stated that the ACWF 
protects women’s and children’s legal interests and listens to women’s issues (weihu funv 
ertong hefa quanyi, qingting funv yijian) (All-China Women’s Federation, 2013). Such a 
mission does not define what women’s legal interests are and how they protect women’s 
rights. In the Foucauldian sense, the ACWF is an apparatus of gender discourses, and those 
discourses help to guide women’s behaviours. For the CCP, exerting political interests on the 
ACWF’s missions helps control the female population at a distance. The ACWF’s missions 
indicate women should behave in supporting the CCP first. 
The ACWF plays a significant role in proposing programs to support the discourse of 
the “liberation of women,” defining women’s identity and promoting CCP’s policies. From 
1949 to 1966, the CCP’s policies on women relied on the discourse of the “liberation of 
women.” Women’s liberation was defined to counteract feudalism, as Mao Zedong stated in 
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the 1949 Common Program (gongtong gangling): “The People’s Republic of China should 
ban the feudalist system. The feudalist system limited women. Women should have equal 
rights with men in political, economic, cultural, educational, and social life areas. We should 
exert free marriage” (Tencent News, 2011). Thus, women were identified as an unutilized 
labour force who could be freed from the confines of the home so they could make 
contributions to socialist constructions (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998). The ACWF 
echoed this thought, with the Vice-Chairman, Deng Yingchao, emphasizing that the ACWF’s 
role is to “give expression to their [women’s] aspirations, protect their rights and interests as 
well as those of their children, and supervise the implementation of the policy and decrees 
regarding the equality of men and women” (Croll, 1978, p. 258). In this discourse, the role of 
ACWF is connected with the implementation of CCP’s policy, and the hypothesis is the 
government could design policies that fit women’s interests, so the ACWF creates direct 
programs to achieve women’s emancipation (Yee, 2003). Normalization of biopower at the 
macro level functions by enforcing the ruling party’s policies. Normalization is next 
implemented through the ACWF’s disciplinary power and is then enforced via literary 
programs. From 1949 to 1966, the ACWF organized literacy programmes for four times and 
thousands of lectures to publicize the freedom of marriage. After the literacy programmes, 
the literacy rate was increased to about 48% (Wu, n.d.). In Shanghai, more than 40,000 
women participated in the study of marriage law (Deng, 2012). From the Foucauldian 
perspective, these programmes launched by the ACWF had normalized women’s liberation 
as being able to know words and being able to work. Women who were not literary and 
working would be identified as abnormal, as Deng Yingchao used “feudalism limited 
women’s rights” to criticize some patriarchal thoughts, such as women can do nothing (Yee, 
2003). During the Maoist period, the ACWF’s role was to educate women through political 
propaganda and make sure that women were not excluded from various campaigns (Tsui, 
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1998, p. 55). Because of the ACWF, women’s behaviour was normalized as supporting the 
nation, and women’s bodies belonged to the country, while women started to follow the 
CCP’s policies without disagreement.  
Since many scholars suggest that the ACWF stopped working during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998; Zheng, 2010), I focus on the 
role of ACWF after the market economic reform in 1978. Although the CCP did not launch 
mass socialist construction projects and movements, the ACWF is still the mouthpiece of the 
Chinese government (Trui, 1998). As the economic transition opened up many job 
opportunities for Chinese citizens, the ACWF kept mobilizing women to participate in the 
production. However, the retreat of the welfare state re-emphasized women’s family roles; 
consequently, the ACWF also kept promoting women’s family life. Normalization of 
biopower functions through the ACWF’s disciplinary power in two ways. First, on 
International Women’s Day each year, the ACWF awards successful women in various 
industries recognition as “March 8th Red Flag Bearer” (Sanba hongqi shou) (Tsui, 1998). 
Second, the ACWF selects “Five Good Families” to also highlight women’s contributions to 
the family. In the 1990s, when many state companies privatized, many women were laid off, 
so the ACWF launched numerous programs to provide training for these women. Through 
these programs, women’s behaviour was normalized in a contradictory way, and women 
experienced a double burden through their responsibilities in the home and in the workplace. 
In addition, the ACWF failed to address many gender inequalities and gender issues, such as 
the One-Child Policy and domestic violence. Although Zheng (1997) claimed that many of 
the ACWF’s leaders were shocked once they heard the One-Child Policy, the ACWF did not 
resist this policy. In regards to domestic violence, the ACWF treats the issue as a family 
affair with its main focus to strengthen the family unit. Thus, the ACWF’s function in 
representing Chinese women is problematic. Chinese women lack an active independent 
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organization to represent their interests and to protect their rights. The ACWF’s primary 
focus is CCP policy, and the ACWF frequently ignores gender inequalities that lie outside 
key policy areas. In China, the definition of gender equality is limited to education rights and 
labour participation rights. Given the ACWF’s role in following CCP’s policies, unequal 
treatment in the media image had not been fully aware by the authority.   
8.2 The Family 
Many news articles examined in this study emphasize contributions of the good wife 
to a healthy family, with the definition of the good wife being associated with traditional 
wifehood; that is, a good wife takes care of her parents-in-law, her kids and helps the 
husband in furthering his career. Given that traditional gender norms reflect uneven gender 
relations and labour divisions, what does the resurgence of wifehood in news articles signify 
about family power structures in the contemporary Chinese society? 
Unlike the ACWF, the education system and the media system, the family is an 
informal structural factor. However, the family is actually embedded into the post-socialist 
system, as family structures are influenced by macro social events and social changes. 
Besides state-own companies largely laying off female workers in the 1990s, the retained 
traditional gender ideology and the proposal of women returning home to save more jobs for 
men, work hand in hand against women and reinforce women’s duties in the family (Ji et al., 
2017). Nowadays, President Xi's political thought of the family makes covert traditional 
gender ideologies become overt. Women’s positions in the family power structure reflect on 
marital power. 
Marital power in the Chinese family is complicated. Hu and Scott (2016) suggest that 
China has a deep-rooted patriarchal culture, and men always hold power in making decisions, 
while older people in an extended family hold power. However, no matter what kind of 
family, the wife does not have much marital power.  
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Lui (2018) proposes that the traditional power structure would be strengthened if the 
wife comes from a rural place and the husband from an urban place. The interesting thing is 
that each kind of power structure reflects cultural norms and social inequalities. For multi-
generational families, elder power is disguised by filial piety, which requires young people to 
obey senior parents (Whyte & Ikels, 2004). Filial piety is an important aspect of Confucian 
norms. In contemporary China, as the household registration system (Houku), city residences 
have more benefits than rural residents, and such resources empower people who come from 
cities (Lui, 2018). Indeed, socio-economic backgrounds influence marital power, as women 
who come from low-income families would have lower status in marriage (Mann, 1997). 
However, even if women participate in the labour force, lower economic contributions would 
also erode their power in marriage (Chien & Yi, 2014). Power structures also influence 
labour divisions, as women have to do more housework (Chien & Yi, 2014). On the other 
hand, some scholars propose that by doing housework, women could also gain power (Shu, 
Zhu, & Zhang, 2013; Zuo & Bian, 2005). As Shu et al. (2013) observe, by making decisions 
on mundane affairs and childcare affairs, however, such power is based on housework rather 
than income, and women are still excluded by making important economic decisions. 
Although women have some power in making trivial decisions, men are still the 
breadwinners in the household. Such an imbalanced family power structure makes women 
suffer more housework than men. Such family labour division reflects traditional patriarchal 
norms; that is, women are supposed to manage the household, and men are supposed to 
support the family. Power in making important decisions and in allocating resources helps 
men build authority in the family, and such an authority maintains the family. The existence 
of traditional culture, the gender income gap, social inequalities, social changes, social events 
and politician’s thoughts reproduce the family power structure. Patriarchal gender culture 
penetrates everyday life through labour divisions and decision-making patterns in the family. 
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Thus, these everyday activities influence perceptions of women, especially the way to be a 
good wife. 
Critical discourse analysis demonstrates that many news articles utilize ancient words 
and precepts to comment on women (e.g., if the wife is virtuous, the husband can avoid many 
troubles - qi xian ze fu huo shao). Those words and precepts are common in Chinese people’s 
daily life. People’s familiarity with ancient sayings may suggest the prominent status of 
traditional culture in contemporary society. Traditional culture is connected with positive 
meanings in family education. In China, many parents like to teach their kids ancient poems 
and classical readings before school age (Dongping, n.d.). Based on a survey conducted by 
the Research Centre of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC, 88.7% parents 
and 96.7% teachers thought repeating ancient poems, and ancient classical works would be 
good for children’s self-cultivation (xiuyang) and personality development (renge fayu) (Xu, 
2011). Repeating those ancient works was supposed to promote children’s sense of language 
towards their mother tongue, cultivate children’s sense of beauty, and increase children’s 
emotional intelligence (Tencent, n.d.). According to Xu (2011), many classical readings were 
identified as good for children to learn, such as Three-Character Canon (Sanzijing), Students’ 
Rules (Dizi gui) and Zhu’s Family Instructions (Zhu zi jiaxun). Three-Character Canon dates 
back to the Song Dynasty, while Students’ Rules came from the Qing Dynasty. Both of them 
employ three-character sentences, making it easy for children to repeat. Although these 
works are from different dynasties, they are about traditional cultural norms and Confucian 
morality, which emphasize filial piety, the husband-wife relationship, and collective interests. 
In the Three-Character Canon, two sentences emphasize filial piety:  
(Xiangjiuling, nengwenxi, xiaoyuqing, suodangzhi)  
Xiang, who was nine-year-old, could warm his parents’ bed; 
We should show filial piety towards parents forever. 
(shouxiaoti, cijianwen, zhimoushu, shimouwen)  
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People should begin with filial piety and fraternal love, and 
then see and hear. (tom61.com, n.d.) 
The meanings of these two sentences are straightforward; that is, filial piety should be 
the most important quality for children. Compared to the Three-Character Canon, Students’ 
Rules propose more behaviours that constitute filial piety. For instance: 
(Shouxiaodi, cijinxin) People should first respect parents and 
then should be trustworthy. (fumuhu, yingwuhuan) When 
parents call, they should answer them quickly. (fumuming, 
xingwulan). When parents give an order, they should do it right 
now. (fumuxiao, xujingting) When parents teach something, 
they should listen to them. (fumuze, xuwocheng) When parents 
blame you, you should obey and accept their blame. (dizigui, 
n.d.) 
These obligations demonstrate parents’ exclusive power over their children. By 
repeating those sentences, Confucian norms are reproduced invisibly. People accept those 
norms unconsciously. On the other hand, Zhu’s Family Instructions contain many sentences 
related to the husband-wife relationship. For instance: 
(ting fuyan guai gurou, qishi zhangfu)  
A husband should not listen to what the wife says and should 
not spoil kids. 
(xi qiu shunv, wuji houlian)  
A wife should be virtuous, and the husband’s family should not 
ask for a lot of dowry. (guoxuemeng.com, n.d.) 
The above sentences state that in regards to the husband-wife relationship, the 
husband should make decisions independently, and that to listen to tone’s wife was not 
proper, and women should be virtuous. The Instructions also stigmatized beautiful women, as 
“maidens should not be beautiful” (nupu wuyong junmei). Guidelines such as these 
demonstrate the  deep-rooted patriarchal culture in China. In the power hierarchy, children 
are expected to  obey their parents; the wife should obey the husband. Those traditional 
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norms are widely perceived to influence people's behaviour and thoughts in a positive way by 
means of repeating ancient works as a guide for self-improvement. Parents monitor children 
to learn and repeat classical readings, thereby reproducing patriarchal norms. 
8.3 Ideological-Political Education 
News reports about corruption represent the CCP as upright and just in dealing with 
corruption scandals - investigating and prosecuting corrupt cadres, and subsequent sentencing 
to prison of all corrupt cadres. However, news coverage related to corruption is not the only 
place that the CCP represents itself as honourable; CCP has built its image from various 
aspects. One of the most common ways to indoctrinate people with state propaganda is 
through ideological-political education. 
Changing the discourse textbooks is a method that the CCP uses to portray itself as an 
honourable ruling party. In 2017, the Ministry of Education released a new version of the 
textbook for the middle school history class. The new version changed the length of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War from eight years to fourteen years and increased descriptions of 
battles organized by the CCP, such as the Battle of Wuhan (1938) (Yang, 2017). Moreover, 
the new version deleted many details related to CCP activity in launching the Cultural 
Revolution. For instance, the new version deleted the CCP's roles in the foundation of the 
Central Group of the Cultural Revolution (Luo, 2018). The new textbook summarized the 
Cultural Revolution by observing that, “nothing can proceed smoothly without a hitch; 
everything will be finally advanced although in a tortuous way (renshi jian meiyou 
yifanfengshun de shiye, shijie lishi zongshi zai diedangqifu de quzhe guocheng zhong qianjin 
de).” (Luo, 2018) By using ideological rhetoric, the extremism of the Cultural Revolution 
was downplayed, and the CCP leaders' mistakes in launching the Cultural Revolution were 
minimized (Schell, n.d.). In the Foucauldian sense, ideological-political education maintains 
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the positive image of the CCP in emancipating Chinese people and leading Chinese people to 
a bright future. 
Universities are recognized by the CCP as important battlefields for propagating 
ideologies (Schell, n.d.; Li, Feng & Li, 2013; Lai & Lo, 2011; Tiffert, 2019). Normalization 
of the honourable ruling party is implemented through the  disciplinary power of the 
university, enforced by introducing ideological-political courses. Before 2006, ideological-
political education in universities consisted of two classes - Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents (Schell, n.d.). In 2005, the Publicity Department 
of the CPC central committee and the Ministry of Education released a policy document, 
named On Further Strengthening and Improving Ideological-Political Education in 
Universities and Colleges (guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin gaodeng xuexiao sixiang 
zhengzhi lilunke de yijian). By implementing this policy, ideological-political education had 
been reorganized, and undergraduates were required to complete four compulsory 
ideological-political classes, including Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Marxism, An 
Outline of Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents, Moral 
Accomplishment and Law Basics, and Contemporary Chinese History (Sina.com, 2005; 
Schell, n.d.). Although students had to devote more time to studying and passing these 
courses, they did not develop affection towards these courses. According to Lai and Lo 
(2011), students generally felt bored while taking these classes and felt these classes were 
impractical. While students were not attracted by the ideological-political classes, these 
classes may have a positive influence on CCP's image among students. As Huang (2015) 
observes, students may not think that socialism is the best system, but they tend to believe 
that the CCP is very strong and can solve social issues, so they may not be interested in being 
a political dissident. From the perspective of Foucault's biopower and disciplinary power, the 
CCP’s desires for the future generation not to challenge the ruling party and to continue to 
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support the CCP and the regime are reinforced by naturalizing a sense of stability and 
appropriateness related to common knowledge and current conditions. 
8.4 The Internet 
The present study verifies that commercial news websites are not able to release news 
about corruption based on their own independent investigations. Any reports they present 
must come from the state media, and their new articles should convey the same message as 
presented by the state media. This result opens up a question: how does the CCP control the 
media system? Here it is instructive to consider the role of visible regulations and invisible 
censorship in relation to social media. 
China has many regulations to manage the Internet with respect to content, copyright, 
IP addresses, Internet forums, and so on. According to the Administration of Internet 
Information Services (hulianwang xixin fuwu guanli banfa) (China.com.cn, n.d.), which was 
released on September 25, 2000, Internet content providers cannot provide the following 
content:  
(di shiwu tiao hulianwang xinxi fuwu tigongzhe bude zhizuo, 
fuzhi, fabu, chuanbo hanyou xialie neirong de xinxi: fandui 
xianfa suo queding de jiben yuanze de; weihai guojia anquan, 
xielu guojia mimi, dianfu guojia zhengquan, pohuai guojia 
tongyi de; sunhai guojia rongyu he liyi de; shandong minzu 
chouhen, minzu qishi, pohuai minzu tuanjie de; pohuai guojia 
zongjiao zhengce, xuanyang xiejiao he fengjian mixin de; 
sanbu yaoyan, raoluan shehui zhixu, pohuai shehui wending 
de; sanbu yinhui, seqing, dubo, baoli, xiongsha, kongbu huozhe 
jiaosuo fanzui de; wuru huozhe feibang taren, qinhai taren hefa 
quanyi de; hanyou falv, xingzheng fagui jinzhi de qita neirong 
de.) 
Article 15 Internet content services providers cannot produce, 
reproduce, disseminate or broadcast content which includes 
the following parts: oppose to the basic principles of the 
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Constitution; endanger state security, leak national secrets, 
subvert the PRC, break the unity of the nation; damage state 
honours and interests; incite hate and discriminations between 
ethnic groups, break the unity of ethnic groups; jeopardize 
religious policy, propagate cult and superstitious ideas; spread 
rumours, disrupt social order and stability; disseminate 
obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder or fear or 
instigate crimes; insult or slander others; content prohibited by 
other laws or regulations. 
Article 15 states nine kinds of improper content. In sum, three aspects of content are 
banned: that which opposes the ruling party, opposes the policies and opposes the law. The 
regulation does not mention how these behaviours are judged or determined. The same 
provisions are specified in other regulations, such as Interim Administration Provisions on 
Internet Culture (hulianwang wenhua guanli zanxing guiding). Although Vuori and Paltemaa 
(2015) claim that the regulations explain the reason for censorship, the vagueness with 
respect to monitoring, identifying and prosecuting each provision makes the censorship more 
complex. 
The Chinese government has a long history of controlling Internet content and 
services, even before the Internet was popular among the public (Taneja & Wu, 2014; 
Hachigian, 2001). While exerting more ideological control on the Internet, the government 
has continuously invested in Internet infrastructure in a nation which has the largest 
population of Internet users (Taneja & Wu, 2014; Harwit & Clark, 2001; Zhang, 2006). 
Before the popularity of social media, censorship concentrated on website content - whether 
the content violates social and moral norms or challenges the authority (Taneja & Wu, 2014; 
Faris & Villeneuve, 2008; Bamman, O'Connor, & Smith, 2012). Websites are restricted by 
two types of censorship: domestic website content and blockage of access to outside websites 
(Taneja & Wu, 2014). The system that filters and blocks websites is named as "the Great 
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Firewall of China." Nowadays, with the popularity of social media, censorship has become 
omnipotent. 
The Chinese government has developed multiple methods to monitor the Internet. The 
government deployed Internet police (wang jing), "50 cent party members" (wumao dang) 
and Internet monitors (wang guan ban) to monitor Internet content (King, Pan & Roberts, 
2013). It should be noted that “50 cent party members” is a name which was coined by 
Chinese Internet users. Fifty cent party members, who anonymously comment on social 
events online and “promote a pro-government discourse” (p.106), represent a soft way for the 
state to cope with the rise of the Internet while inserting indoctrinating propaganda (Han, 
2015). While it turns out that comments written by these 50 cent party members have not 
changed people's opinions, and those members consistently get exposed (Han, 2015), the 
CCP has not stopped its controls on the Internet.  
For content that does not follow the government guidelines, Internet media companies 
can be fined or shut down (King et al., 2013). For instance, on June 10, 2019, one of the 
famous financial sites, Wallstreetcn (huaerjie jianwen), was cracked down on by the 
authorities due to allegations that the site “violated laws.” (Yu, 2019) Although both 
Wallstreetcn and the government did not provide details or reasons for this crackdown, it was 
believed that the crackdown is related to government policies. As US-China relations 
worsened in 2019 because of trade and technology, Wallstreetcn still reports optimistic news 
about the US financial market (i.e., the US stock market rose on June 7 due to President 
Trump announcement not to increase tariffs on Mexico products) (Yu, 2019). The 
standpoints represented in such reports were not the same as the Chinese authority during the 
“Trade War” with the US. Wallstreetcn is not the first social media platform to be shut down 
by the government. In 2018, the Chinese version of Twitter - Weibo - announced that it 
would “rectify” part of its services, such as most searched hashtags (re sou bang), after it was 
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blamed by the authority for not censoring its content and spreading wrong social values 
(Zhuang, 2018). As many celebrities have Weibo accounts, Weibo had become a platform for 
celebrities to announce key events such as divorce, marriage, or giving birth to children while 
paparazzi exposed celebrities' extra-marriage affairs or wrongdoing via Weibo. For the 
general public, Weibo had become a platform to spread commentary about social issues and 
social problems, so those topics always appeared among the most searched hashtags. After a 
one-week rectification, Weibo brought its services back, and it added a top hashtag on the 
most searched hashtags; the top one was for the government's policies or news only. All of 
these actions demonstrate enforcement of a policy that the media should work for the 
government rather than for the general public. 
Given that censorship is everywhere, scholars have explored the most sensitive issues 
for the CCP. By analysing posts on social media, King et al. (2013) claim that government 
censorship does not try to eliminate criticism towards the government but rather, seeks to 
eliminate positions that may trigger collective actions or collective movements. In this sense, 
the reason to delete all posts about the #METOO movement on Weibo was to minimize the 
chance to trigger collective mobilization in support of women’s rights in China. On the other 
hand, by examining sensitive words on Weibo, Vuori and Paltemaa (2015) argue that those 
words are related more to the ruling party rather than to protests. It is fair to say that China 
does not have a free Internet, and Chinese people cannot express their ideas freely. 
Similar to the Panopticon in which prisoners have to engage in certain behaviours to 
avoid punishment under surveillance (Foucault, 1979), Internet media companies develop 
self-censorship in order to survive. For instance, WeChat, which is the most popular social 
media in China with 1 billion monthly active users, has developed a program to censor the 
content sent by users (Knockel & Xiong, 2019). The censorship includes group chat, 1-to-1 
chat, and moments (pengyou quan). While users send pictures or messages in the group chat, 
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1-to-1 chat, and moments, the program compares those words and pictures with a blacklist 
that contains sensitive words and pictures. Any words and pictures found in the blacklist will 
be filtered from WeChat by the program (Knockel & Xiong, 2019). The interesting thing is 
that the blacklist is renewing all the time. If users change the words or pictures a little bit and 
send, the revised words and pictures can be received for the first time, but cannot be received 
for a second time (Knockel & Xiong, 2019). The blacklist consists of words and pictures 
which mock political leaders and policies or related to social events, such as the Cultural 
Revolution, as Knockel and Xiong (2019) observe. 
While censorship shapes people's behaviour, some scholars are worried that 
continuous controls would undermine the exercise of citizenship in China, as censorship 
reduces the function of media in representing different voices (Yu, 2006). In the Foucauldian 
sense, regulators are to normalize the media in China to be in line with the CCP requirements 
and policies, and censorship disciplines media users and content providers to let them know 
what the government does not like. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1979) referred to the 
role of the circus in emphasizing how people had to show "correct behaviours" in the 
Panopticon. Nowadays, the media has become another circus, and the circus is very hard to 
get rid of. 
8.5 Tradtional Culture and the Legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
In China, traditional culture has long been a key feature associated with political 
propaganda. President Xi Jinping continues to refer to Chinese cultural and philosophical 
heritage to improve CCP governance (Kubat, 2018; Buckley, 2014; Brown, 2015; People’s 
Daily, 2016; Zhang, 2015). Specifically, President Xi quotes ancient stories for the 
management of cadres and anti-corruption measures (Kubat, 2018; Angle & Zhang, 2013; 
Anderlini, 2017; Schuman, 2015). Ironically, this represents a reversal of a prior stance in 
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which the CCP was seriously against traditional culture, calling traditional norms remnants of 
feudalism. 
Marxist ideology eroded in the context of market transition, and the CCP needs new 
sources to reinforce its legitimacy (Kubat, 2018; Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Laliberte & 
Lanteigne, 2008; Yang, 1996; Wu, 2015; Zhao, 1998). From the 1990s into the beginning of 
the 21st century, the CCP used economic growth and improved living standards to get support 
for the regime (Kubat, 2018; Wright, 2010; Zhao & Yang, 2013; Twohey, 1999; Chen, 
1997). However, due to the intersection of slower economic growth, corruption, 
environmental pollution, and the emergence of numerous social issues, the former ideological 
concepts were not suitable, and the CCP has turned to traditional culture as a new way to 
reinforce its governance (Kubat, 2018; Tiffert, 2019; Shi, 2019). 
Traditional culture, mainly consisting of Confucianism, is praised as “excellent 
traditional culture (youxiu chuantong wenhua),” narrowed down as moral norms (Kubat, 
2018). In the articles of the Central Party School, the CCP is recognized as the rightful 
successor of the excellent traditional culture (Kubat, 2018). 
Party leaders use ancient words and phrases to propose their thoughts and ideas. For 
instance, the party proposes “building a well-off society in an all-round way (quanmian 
jianshe xiaokang shehui).” This slogan can be traced back to the Book of Poetry, which 
contains the saying, “people are working hard so they can enjoy the prosperity now (min yi 
lao zhi, qi yu xiaokang)” (Kubat, 2018). While former President Jiang Zemin proposed 
governing the country with morality (yide zhiguo), which can be found in Analects (Zhou, 
2001; Xu, 2018), former President Hu Jintao, Jiang's successor, used "building a harmonious 
society" as the goal of governance (Tang, 2006; Xu, 2018; Wu, 2015). 
President Xi Jinping also utilizes traditional cultural norms to manage party cadres 
and justify solutions to corruption. Xi used the Confucian concept of “clean government 
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(lianzheng)” as an ideal for the government's performance (Kubat, 2018). Many official 
documents use moral norms and moral cultivation, such as “Notice about Reinforcing 
Education of Ideals, Beliefs and Moral Behaviours during the Training of Cadres (Guanyu 
zai ganbu jiaoyu peixun zhong jiaqiang lixiang xinnian he daode pinxing jiaoyu de tongzhi)” 
and “Guidelines on Clean, Uncorrupted and Self-Discipline of the Chinese Communist Party 
(Zhongguo gongchandang lianjie zilv zhunze),” to educate cadres. For the anti-corruption 
campaign, Xi proposed to “bit the tiger and the fly together (laohu cangying yiqi da),” which 
means to crack down on corrupt cadres at all levels. In directing cadres to be “clean and 
uncorrupted (qinglian),” he also cited traditional culture. Since the Han Dynasty, being 
“uncorrupted” (lian) was always an important criterion for the selection of officials which 
continues into the present-day evaluation of cadre's performance (www.wenming.cn, 2017). 
The best solution to corruption continues to be a focus on “building good family values.” 
Although Confucianism was a state doctrine in traditional society (Xu, 2018), it can 
also provide an ideal for political and social order for the contemporary society without 
having to provide practical suggestions for the CCP to solve up-to-date social issues (Shi, 
2019). Confucianism, in ancient society, was also supported by the clan system and imperial 
examination system; however, scholars worry that Confucianism may not work for today's 
China in the absence of those institutional supports (Shi, 2019; Wu, 2015; Gan, 2003). Wu 
(2015) argues that Confucianism simply represents an ideological tool for the CCP to 
strengthen its power structure. Traditional cultural norms are utilized by the CCP for its 
legitimacy and governance. In this sense, using traditional cultural norms to evaluate women 
in news articles about corruption is to follow the political ideology which deems the excellent 
cultural heritage represented in traditional culture. Patriarchal power is not enough to confirm 
women’s subordinate status in this corruption news, and political power is employed as a 
further form of domination in trapping women as the cause of corruption scandals.  
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8.6 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the last research question concerning the power structures 
and power relations behind gender discourses in corruption news. Chapters 5 and 6 have 
shown that women did not receive equal treatment in news coverage. Gender inequality in 
China is influenced by multiple aspects: the ACWF’s ignorance of women’s equal rights; the 
role of male domination within family structures; the influence of ideological-political 
education on the acceptance of the ruling party; and the limited capacity of media to provide 
oppositional perspectives on social issues. Thus, political propaganda has become the main 
voice in daily life, while patriarchal norms still prevail in the domestic sphere.  
By analyzing womanhood and its relationship with social control in ancient society, 
Zhan (1996) claimed that traditional gender norms were not enough to produce gender 
inequality; the state itself plays an active role in reinforcing the unequal status of women. 
Similar results can be found in contemporary society, as the family-work conflict is 
reinforced by the retreat of the welfare state. ACWF, which is intended to represent women’s 
interests, is an organization that follows the CCP’s guidelines. More generally, due to the fear 
of social unrest, the feminist voice is muted by the CCP. In this sense, superficially, the 
exercise of both political power and patriarchal power is everywhere, shaping people’s 
behaviours and thoughts. Political power limits the ways in which people are able to discuss 
corruption scandals, as people avoid criticizing the ruling party. If blame is to be found for 
the cause of corruption, women, whose own roles are subordinated within Chinese society, 
become an easy target. The existence of traditional gender norms provides a strong reference 
point in news reports about corruption. Traditional culture provides standards by which to 
judge women’s behaviours, while in the process also maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP. 
The party draws on patriarchal norms to govern society as it attempts to explain the serious 
problem of corruption. The problematic descriptions of women in the news about corruption 
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news represent part of the CCP’s efforts to sustain domination through ideological 
mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has been concerned to answer questions about unequal gender 
representations in mainstream media news coverage of corruption in China, despite 
continuing claims by the government that it is committed to promote gender equality. Very 
little academic research has addressed this issue in a comprehensive way or provided 
integrative explanations and suggestions. Prior research has emphasized traditional cultural 
descriptions of women as the predominant reason accounting for the ways women are 
represented in the news reporting on corruption. Women who are ernai (the second wife) of 
the male cadre are depicted as “a source of trouble”. While my findings confirm that many of 
these cultural factors continue to be important, they also reveal that cultural reasons cannot 
fully explain the issue. In particular, the focus on cultural factors without any attention to the 
wider structural context ignores the way cultural descriptions of women became part of the 
dominant discourse and circulate in society. More in-depth explanations are needed to 
explore why and how gender images appear in imbalanced and unequal ways in news 
reporting on corruption in Chinese media. 
I have drawn from Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge to address this gender 
inequality in the discourses represented in news about corruption. In corruption news 
discourse, biopower works in controlling deviant population ---- people who committed 
corruption, resulting in stigmatized women and gender stereotypes. On the other hand, 
power-knowledge provides explanations for how dominant discourses of gender can be 
circulated around the society from political, societal, cultural and media perspectives.  
Specifically, gender differences are found in both state news reports and commercial 
news articles. Content Analysis which examined gender representation in news reports from 
Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) reveals very few reports about women 
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involved directly in corruption scandals, and when these appeared, the women were 
described in relation to having improper sexual relations with others and committing 
adultery. Critical Discourse Analysis reveals how these representations are more deeply 
rooted in wider gender inequalities. My research findings demonstrate that news articles on 
corruption in both the state and commercial media analysed in my study reinforce gender 
stereotypes in ways that do not tally with the government’s claims that it widely promotes 
gender equality. There is extensive coverage of women portrayed as accessories or causes of 
corruption through their representations as mistresses, bad wives, or greedy women. Some of 
these representations, such as labelling a wife who commits corruption for the husband as a 
greedy wife (tanneizhu), are associated with traditional cultural images. Mistresses have a 
status similar to that of the concubine in traditional society, subjecting them to negative 
stereotypes and insulting words in news reports about corruption, especially in commercial 
media. In this sense, news reporting helps to sensationalize particular aspects of corruption, 
while women are stereotyped and judged in accordance with traditional gender ideology.  
On the other hand, a notable feature of the news reports on corruption is that in some 
ways women are empowered in corruption scandals; that is, men act as followers who 
commit corruption in order to support their wives or their mistresses’ luxury lifestyles. By 
contrast, the reports question or weaken masculinity when they comment on male cadres who 
have extramarital affairs. However, these findings demonstrate that media - both state-
controlled and in other sectors - reinforce strong expectations about the proper roles for men 
and women in relation to one another. They suggest that China is still male-dominated, with  
men holding the power to define corruption. Gender inequalities related to patriarchal power 
are reinforced by and help to reinforce political power as well. 
In accordance with power-knowledge theory, which emphasizes that social context is 
essential for understanding how power relations and knowledge interact in specific social 
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contexts, my study has analysed the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), the 
ideological-political education, the family system and the media system in order to provide 
macro-level explanations of gender-related discourses in news about corruption.  
Finally, I discussed the legitimacy of the CCP to explore the relations between the 
traditional culture and the ruling party. Results suggest that the exercise of patriarchal and 
political power in daily life mutually reinforce one another in part through constraints on 
gender equality. For instance, the ACWF, which is a quasi-governmental organization that 
follows CCP’s policies and educates women to support rather than represent women’s 
interests, continues to be guided by traditional culture which the CCP draws on to help 
sustain its legitimacy. The intersecting dimensions of Chinese social life and structure are 
reinforced by and reflected in the discourses revealed in my analysis, showing that 
stereotypical and unequal gender representations are maintained in news reporting about 
corruption.  
Attention to gender equality in China is not a new topic. A hundred years ago, one 
Chinese feminist, He-Yin Zhen, highlighted four kinds of gender inequalities, in marriage, in 
the husband-wife relationship, in work and responsibility, and in the system of rituals (He-
Yin, 1907). Some progress in addressing these inqualities has been achieved. Women now 
have the right to choose husbands and jobs, and many traditional rituals have eroded. 
However, inequalities remain in the husband-wife relationships and other areas of life. The 
development of technology has introduced a new platform in which gender relations should 
be examined. Here, I would like to propose that a fifth kind of gender inequality has emerged 
through gender inequality in media content.  
This study has sought to make unique contributions. It has provided an integrated 
analysis of gender images in news about corruption news in part by applying Foucault’s 
power-knowledge theory to explain a contemporary social phenomenon in the context of 
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China. It has also linked the understanding of gender discourses in news about corruption in 
China with a critical analysis of relationships among traditional culture, political and media 
systems. Nonetheless, this study has several limitations, some of which open new avenues for 
future research. First, the scope of the study is restricted by the available data sources, which 
has made it possible to undertake only limited quantitative content analysis to verify 
women’s under-representation in news about corruption despite my original intent also to 
conduct more advanced tests such as regressions. However, because of the limited number of 
cases involving women, I was not able to explore models that would make it possible to see if 
high-level women cadres, who have more power than low-level women cadres, are more 
likely to commit corruption. These issues limit the conclusions that can be made on the basis 
of content analysis. Second, critical discourse analysis revealed distorted descriptions of 
women, but because of the need to select particular kinds of cases for analysis in the 
dissertation, there may be other interesting insights and discourses in the more than five-
hundred news articles in my data set that could not be explored in this thesis. Future research 
may make it possible to study particular features of these discourses, such as the way in 
which the “good wife” is represented. I believe more insightful conclusions will be drawn 
from a full presentation. Third, by focusing on the ways in which corruption news coverage 
constructs narratives about women and men this research has employed Foucault’s theory 
and critical discourse analysis in order to explore power relations and the exercise of power 
behind official discourses. While I drew on Foucault’s work in order to analyze major themes 
and types of discourses focused on gender representation, my research did not focus on other 
potential themes, such as different discourses related to class or other social distinctions, that 
would be worth exploring in future research. Fourth, the present study verifies women’s 
unequal treatment in media discourse, but more empirical evidence is needed, especially 
related to people’s perceptions about these discourses related to women. For instance, Chen 
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(2017) claims that some women have protested against the treatment of mistresses as sources 
of trouble in media reporting on corruption. In this sense, studies that examine people’s 
perceptions of discourse about women, such as the good wife and the greedy wife, are 
needed. Fifth, I discuss the family's influence on imparting traditional culture via monitoring 
their children repeating Confucian classics and poems, but more studies need to be done to 
examine perceptions of traditional culture by younger generations. Sixth, the ACWF is 
recognized as an organization that does not represent women's interests. However, as the 
ACWF plays an essential role in understanding women's living experience, studies that 
investigate women's images associated with various ACWF prizes and awards are needed. In 
sum, the dissertation has provided a first step in exploring a topic that contains considerable 
potential to be further developed in subsequent research while drawing attention to major 
problems that confront Chinese society.  
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APPENDIX: NEWS ARTICLES EXAMINED IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS BY CASE 
Case/Article Date Source Title 
Case 1 2013, 
August 
20 
Central 
Commissio
n for 
Discipline 
Inspection 
(CCDI) 
Ruin his Career by Indulgence ---- Analysis of the 
case of former head Cheng Haibo of Department of 
Agriculture in Hunan Province (在放纵中自毁前程 --
--湖南省农业厅原厅长程海波受贿案剖析 ; zai 
fangzong zhong zihuiqiancheng----hunansheng 
nongyeting yuan tingzhang Cheng Haibo shouhui an 
pouxi) 
Case 2 2017, 
Novem
ber 16 
CCDI Alternative Economics make him lose himself in 
calculations ---- Analysis of the case of Duan 
Peixiang, the former office director and deputy 
secretary of Dehong city, Yunnan Province (“另类经
济学”，让他迷失在算计中——云南省德宏州人民
政府原副秘书长、办公室主任段培相案件剖析; 
“linglei jingjixue”, rang ta mishi zai suanji zhong ---- 
Yunansheng Dehongzhou renmin zhengfu yuan 
fumishuzhang, bangongshi zhuren Duan Peixiang 
anjian pouxi) 
Case 3 2017, 
Februar
y 4 
CCDI A Scholar Mayor Who Was Indulged In Greediness  ---- Warning 
From Former Mayor Luan Qingwei, Fushun, Liaoning Province.
一个在贪欲中沉沦的“学者市长” 
——辽宁省抚顺市原市长栾庆伟案件警示录. (Yige 
zai tan yu zhong chenlun de ‘xuezhe shizhang’---- 
Liaoningsheng Fushunshi yuan shizhang Luan 
Qingwei anjian jingshilu) 
Case 4 2013, 
August 
16 
CCDI District Mayor Qian was Investigated because of 
Money (In China, Qian is pronounced as money) ---- 
Analysis of the case of Qian Zenghong, the former 
district mayor of Hailing District, Taizhou City, 
Jiangsu Province (因钱落马的"钱区长"——江苏省
泰州市海陵区原副区长钱增宏受贿案剖析 ; yin qian 
luoma de “Qian quzhang”---- Jiangsusheng Taizhoushi 
Hailingqu yuan fuquzhang Qian Zenghong shouhui an 
pouxi) 
Case 5 2014, 
Novem
ber 4 
CCDI A Corruption Sample from the Talent ---- Analysis of 
the case of Zhu Weiping, the Former Secretary of 
Commission of Binghu area of Wuxi, Jiangsu 
Province (一个"能人腐败"的"标本" ——江苏省无锡
市滨湖区委原书记朱渭平受贿案剖析; Yige 
“nengren fubai” de “biaoben” ---- Jiangsusheng 
Wuxishi Binghu quwei yuan shuji Zhu Weiping 
shouhui an pouxi) 
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Case 6 2016, 
May 20 
CCDI Family-style corruption ---- warning from the case of 
Yu Shaodong, the former director and Party secretary 
of People’s Congress in Chengkou County, Chongqing 
(一损俱损的“家庭式腐败”——重庆市城口县人大
原党组书记、主任于少东案件警示录; Yisunjusun 
de “jiatingshi fubai” ---- Chongqingshi Chengkouxian 
renda yuan dangzu shuji, zhuren Yu Shaodong anjian 
jingshilu) 
Case 7 2013, 
Septem
ber 23 
CCDI Getting promoted while committing corruption ---- an 
investigation of Wang Guoyan, former Secretary of 
Commission of Nanchang Hangkong University (一路
升迁一路腐败 ——南昌航空大学原党委书记王国
炎腐败案调查; yilu shengqian yilu fubai ---- 
Nanchang hangkong daxue yuan dangwei shuji Wang 
Guoyan fubai an diaocha) 
Case 8 2014, 
August 
15 
CCDI Iron Fence made of Greed ---- Analysis of the case of 
Lei Yi, former CEO and Secretary of Yunnan Tin Co., 
Ltd. (贪欲编织的"铁篱笆"——云南锡业集团（控
股）有限责任公司原党委书记、董事长雷毅贪腐案
例剖析; tanyu bianzhi de “teliba” ---- Yunnan xiye 
jiguan (konggu)you xian zeren gongsi yuan dangwei 
shuji, dongshizhang Lei Yi tanfu anli pouxi) 
Case 9 2014, 
July 15 
CCDI Life Which is Eroded by Greedy and Extravangance --
-- Analysis of the cases of Bo Liangen, Wu Zhizhong 
and Jin Zhao (被贪婪和奢靡腐蚀的人生——薄连
根、武志忠、金昭违纪违法案件剖析; Bei tanlan he 
shemi fushi de rensheng ---- Bo Liangen, Wu 
Zhizhong, Jin Zhao weiji weifa anjian pouxi) 
Case 10 2014, 
July 2 
CCDI Broken Dream of being Billionaire ---- analysis of the 
case of Zhang Kaizhou, the former deputy director of 
Pinghu News Broadcast Station, Zhejiang Province ("
顶管"捅破"发财梦"——浙江省平湖市广播电视台
原副台长张凯洲等人贪污、受贿案剖析; 
“dingguan” tongpo “facaimeng”---- Zhejiangsheng 
Pinghushi guangbo dianshidai yuan futaizhang Zhang 
Kaizhou dengren tanwu, shouhui an pouxi) 
Case 11 2014, 
August 
12 
CCDI What made him loose his career ---- Analysis of the 
case of Xu Weilin, former deputy minister of 
Municipal Propaganda Department of Pinghu, 
Zhejiang Province (是什么让他输掉人生——浙江省
平湖市市委宣传部原副部长徐卫林受贿案剖析; shi 
shenme rang ta shudiao rensheng ---- Zhejiangsheng 
Pinghushi shiwei xuanchuanbu yuan fubuzhang Xu 
Weilin shouhui an pouxi) 
Case 12 2013, 
Decem
ber 9 
CCDI “Grassroot Official got lots of Bribes” is a Tragedi ---- 
Analysis of the case of Cui Lianhai, the former town 
party secretary mayor of the Qinjiatun Town, 
Gongzhuling, Jilin Province. ("小官大贪"演绎人生悲
295 
 
剧——吉林省公主岭市秦家屯镇原党委书记、镇长
崔连海腐败案剖析; “xiaoguan da tan” yanyi 
rensheng beiju---- Jilinsheng Gongzhuling shi 
qinjiatun zhen yuan dangwei shuji, zhenzhang Cui 
Lianhai fubai an pouxi) 
Case 13 2013, 
August 
10 
CCDI Falling down from the three barriers ---- Analysis of 
the case of Tang Shaobo, former secretary of CPC 
Lishui County Committee, Jiangsu Province ("三道坎
"前栽下马 ——江苏省溧水县委原副书记汤少波受
贿案剖析; “sandaokan” qian zai xia ma ---- 
Jiangsusheng Lishui xianwei yuan fushuji Tang 
Shaobo shouhui an pouxi) 
Case 14 2013, 
August 
23 
CCDI Wrong-planning of Life ---- Analysis of the case of Gu 
Xiangling, the former secretary of Changsha Building 
and Construction Authority, Hunan Province ("规划"
错了的人生 ——湖南省长沙市市政建设局原局长
顾湘陵腐败案剖析; “guihua” cuole de rensheng ---- 
Hunansheng Changshashi shizheng jiansheju yuan 
juzhang Gu Xiangling fubai an pouxi) 
Case 15 2015, 
June 15 
CCDI The Crackdown of an “expert” cadre ---- Warnings 
from Zhu Fulin, the former deputy Mayor of Jinhuang, 
Zhejiang Province. (一个“专家型”干部的陨落——
浙江省金华市原副市长朱福林案件警示录; yige 
‘zhuanjiaxing’ ganbu de yunluo ---- Zhejiangsheng 
Jinhuashi yuan fushizhang Zhu Fulin anjian jingshilu) 
Case 16 2017, 
May 4 
CCDI From “proud of the family” to “shame of the family” -
--- Analysis of the case of Du Min, the former Party 
secretary of Yunnan Police Institute (从“家族骄傲”沦
为“家族耻辱”——云南警官学院原党委书记杜敏严
重违纪问题剖析; cong ‘jiazu jiaoao’ lunwei ‘jiazu 
chiru’ ---- Yunan jingguan xueyuan yuan dagnwei 
shuji Du Min yanzhong weiji wenti pouxi) 
Case 17 2014, 
Novem
ber 18 
CCDI The Family Corruption ---- Analysis of corruption 
cases from Department of Communications (触目惊心
的“塌方式腐败”——湖南省交通运输厅系列腐败案
剖析; chimujingxin de “tafang shi fubai” ---- 
Hunansheng jiaotong yunshu ting xilie fubai an pouxi) 
Case 18 2013, 
Novem
ber 27 
CCDI How can Top Research Talent become Academic 
“Tiger” (corruption) (顶尖科研人员为什么成了学界
"老虎"; dingjian keyan renyuan weishenme chengle 
xuejie “laohu”) 
Case 19 2013, 
Septem
ber 13 
CCDI Cut off the Invisible hands and Smash the unspoken 
rule ---- Casess of illegal biding in construction area, 
Yuhuan County, Zhejiang Province. (斩"无形手"砸"
潜规则" ——浙江省玉环县查处工程建设领域围标
串标系列案件纪实; Zhan “wuxingshou” za 
“qianguize” ---- Zhejiangsheng yuhuanxian chachu 
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gongcheng jianshe lingyu weibiao chuanbiao xilie 
anjian jishi) 
Case 20 2013, 
Novem
ber 11 
CCDI “Peck Worms” from forest ---- Corruption cases of 
Forestry Industry in Leping, Jiangxi Province. (山林"
蛀虫"被"啄"记——江西省乐平市严查林业系统腐
败窝案纪实; Shanlin “zhuchong” bei “zhuo” ji ---- 
Jiangxisheng Lepingshi yancha linye xitong fubai 
woan jishi) 
Case 21 2013, 
October 
9 
CCDI Punch Corruption ---- record on the work of  the 
inspective and supervisory structure of discipline in 
Henan Province. (收拢五指 重拳惩腐——河南省纪
检监察机关加强案件查办工作纪实; shoulong wuzhi 
zhongquan cheng fu ---- Henansheng jijian jiancha 
jiguan jiaqiang anjian chaban gongzuo jishi) 
Article 1 
(examples of 
male cadres 
whose 
corruption 
was related 
to personal 
issues) 
2013, 
October 
16 
CCDI The Way to Bribe Me is to Bribe My Mistress ---- the 
investigation of the case Liu Jiakun, the former deputy 
director of the Standing Committee of the People’s 
Congress of the Fuyang and former secretary of CPC 
County Committee in Taihe County (情妇成了找我办
事的"敲门砖"——安徽省阜阳市人大常委会原副主
任、太和县原县委书记刘家坤腐败案调查; Qingfu 
cheng le zhao wo banshi de “qiaomenzhuan” ---- 
Anhuisheng Fuyangshi renda changweihui yuan 
fuzhuren, taihexian yuan xianweishuji Liu Jiakun 
fubaian diaocha) 
Article 2 
(examples of 
male cadres 
whose 
corruption 
was related 
to personal 
issues) 
2016, 
Septem
ber 7 
CCDI One Wants to Make Money but Made a Cage for 
himself ---- Analysis of several people’s corruption, 
including Li Zehua, the former Party branch secretary 
of Liangjiang Community, Peiyuan sub-district office, 
Changning, Hunan Province (“坐地生财”换来”作茧
自缚”——湖南省常宁市培元街道办事处两江社区
党支部原书记李泽华等人违纪问题剖析; 
“zuodishengcai” huanlai “zuojianzifu” ---- 
Hunansheng Changningshi Peiyuan jiedao banshichu 
liangjiang shequ dangzhibu yuan shuji Li Zehua deng 
ren weiji wenti pouxi) 
Article 3 (the 
example of 
male cadres 
whose 
corruption 
was not 
related to 
personal 
issues) 
2015, 
Februar
y 25 
CCDI Cut the hand which Embezzles State-owned Assests---
- analysis of typical corruption cases of state-owned 
enterprises (斩断伸向国有资产的 “黑手” ——国有
企业领导干部腐败问题典型案例剖析; zhanduan 
shenxiang guoyou zichan de “heishou” ---- guoyou 
qiye lingdao ganbu fubai wenti dianxing anli pouxi) 
Article 4 (the 
example of 
female 
2016, 
October 
20 
CCDI Being attracted by luxury, beautiful secretary is not 
beautiful ---- analysis of the case Zhu Fangyun, the 
former deputy director of Environmental Protection 
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cadres whose 
corruption 
was not 
related to 
personal 
issues) 
Agency, Rucheng County (迷恋奢侈品，爱美局长丢
了丑——汝城县环保局原副局长朱芳云严重违纪问
题剖析; milian shechipin, aimei juzhang diu le chou --
-- ruchengxian huanbaoju yuan fujuzhang Zhu 
Fangyun yanzhong weiji wenti pouxi) 
Case 22 2013, 
August 
8 
Sina.com The Loser for the Case of Judge Prostitution (法官“嫖
娼门”最大的输家; faguan “piaochagn men” zuida de 
shujia), authored by Shi Shusi. 
Case 23 2016, 
June 16 
Ifeng.net Working hard but finally enter the Abyss ---- the 
isolation life of corrupt cadre, Ding Fengyun (“拼命三
娘”终坠入深渊——贪官丁凤云的割裂人生; 
“pinming san niang” zhong zhuiru shenyuan ---- 
tanguan Ding Fengyun de gelie rensheng) 
Case 24 2018, 
January 
11 
Sina.com Corrupt Cadres were Indulged in Trading Power for 
Money and for Sex, Zhou Yongkang and Sun 
Zhengcai are Typical Cases 贪官痴迷权色和钱色交
易 周永康孙政才成反面典型 (Tanguan chimi quanse 
he quanqian jiaoyi, Zhou Yongkang Sun Zhengcai 
cheng fanmian dianxing) 
Case 25 2017, 
Februar
y 20 
Sina.com The common characteristics of three corrupt high 
profile cadres who had been arrested last week (解
局：上周被判刑的 3位省部级大老虎有何共同点; 
jieju: shang zhou bei panxing de 3 wei shengbuji 
dalaohu you he gongtongdian) 
Case 26 2016, 
Februar
y 28 
Sohu.com Du Caiyun: warnings of “get promoted by seeking 
help from your elder sister” (杜才云:“升官找大嫂”警
示了谁?; Du Caiyun:”shengguan zhao dasao” jinshi le 
shei?) 
Case 27 2017, 
May 5 
Sina.com Corrupt cadres got Bribes for 48 times in three years: I 
did the thing and my wife got money (贪官 3年受贿
48次年均百万:自己办事妻子收钱; tanguan 3 nian 
shouhui 48 ci nian jun baiwan: ziji banshi qizi 
shouqian) 
Case 28 2014, 
Septem
ber 12 
Sohu.com Departmental level cadre was tip-off by relatives, like 
a knife into corrupt cadre’s heart (正厅级裸贪遭近亲
举报 “尖刀”直插贪官心脏; zhengtingji luo tan zao 
jinqin jubao “jiandao” zhi cha tanguan xinzang) 
Case 29 2016, 
August 
5 
Wangyi.net Warnings from Wang Zhizhong’s case: he is modest at 
work, but indulged in gambling and lived a corrupt life 
at home (王志忠案警示录：人前低调诚恳，人后嗜
赌成瘾腐化堕落; Wang Zhizhong an jinshilu: ren 
qian didiao chengken, ren hou shi du cheng yin fuhua 
duoluo) 
Case 30  2014, 
Decem
ber 11 
Wangyi.net Most female cadres who were shut down were leading 
roles of departments and many of them are related to 
trade sex for power (落马女官员逾半数为厅级 多人
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涉及以色谋权; luoma nv guanyuan yu banshu wei 
tingji   duoren sheji yi se mou quan) 
Case 31 2014, 
Novem
ber 28 
Sohu.com Summary of Female Corrupt Cadres: some of them 
trade power with sex, and some of them got money for 
beauty (盘点落马女贪官：有的以色谋权 有的为美
容; pandian luoma nv tanguan: youde yise mou quan 
youde wei meirong) 
Case 32 2016, 
Decem
ber 6 
Sohu.com Corrupt Departmental level cadre’s success science is 
not success (落马厅长王登记的“成功学”很失败; 
luoma tingzhang Wang Dengji de “Chengongxue” hen 
shibai) 
Case 33 2014, 
May 20 
Sohu.com Shi Shusi: the Sexual Scandal of Corrupt Cadres is 
more Important than the Prostitution of Huang Haibo 
(石述思：贪官情色之祸重于黄海波嫖娼; Tanguan 
qingse zhi huo zhongyu Huang Haibo piaochang) 
Case 34 2014, 
June 17 
Ifeng.com Xiaoer Chen: reflections on female cadres’ trading sex 
for power (陈小二: “女官员以色谋权”背后的反思; 
Chen Xiaoer: “nv guanyuan yi se mou quan” beihou 
de fansi) 
Case 35 2017, 
June 12 
Ifeng.com Outstanding backgrounds, inflated couple (显赫的背
景，膨胀的夫妻; xianhe de beijing, pengzhang de 
fuqi) 
Case 36 2015, 
April 
20 
Ifeng.com When the corrupt couple will be crackdown (腐败 “夫
妻档” 何日谢幕; fubai “fuqin dang” heri xiemu) 
Case 37 2018, 
May 18 
Ifeng.com The Results of Overbearing President (霸道董事长的
下场; badao dongshizhang de xiachang) 
Case 38 2016, 
January 
30 
Sohu.com Mao Kaiyun: what shall we see from sending mistress 
to the Police Commissioner (毛开云: “给公安局长送
情妇” 的看点在哪儿; Mao Kaiyun: “gei gong’an 
juzhang song qingfu” de kandian zai na’er) 
Case 39 2014, 
April 
17 
Wangyi.net A mineral mouse (metaphor of corrupt cadre in 
mineral industry) and a lot of corrupt cadres (一只“矿
老鼠”与一批落马贪官; yizhi “kuang laoshu” yu yipi 
luoma tanguan) 
Case 40 2013, 
August 
7 
Sohu.com Liu Xuesong: Judges Visit Whores Together, Who 
fires on Them (刘雪松：法官集体嫖娼，该倒在谁
的枪下; Liu Xuesong: faguanjiti piaochang, gai dao 
zai shei de qiang xia) 
Case 41 2016, 
March 
23 
Wangyi.net From “old cow” became “tiger” due to the “nutrition 
of power” (“老牛” 变 “老虎” 缘于 “权力营养丰富”  
“laoniu” bian “laohu” yuanyu “quanli yingxiang 
fengfu”) 
Case 42 2015, 
Septem
ber 23 
Sohu.com Media: The Fallen Deputy Director of the State 
Administration of Religious Affairs has Close 
Relation with the Ling family (Ling Jihua’s family) 
(媒体：落马国家宗教局副局长跟 “令” 关系密切; 
299 
 
meiti: luoma guojia zongjiaoju fujuzhang gen “ling” 
guanxi miqie) 
Article 5 
(examples of 
male cadres 
whose 
corruption 
was related 
to personal 
issues) 
2015, 
Septem
ber 27 
Sohu.com Luo Lizhi: Being the Mistress of the Deputy Mayor, 
Female Journalist was “Harmed” (罗立志：女记者做
副市长情人 确实是 “受害” 了; Luo Lizhi: nv jizhe 
zuo fushizhang qingfu queshi shi “shouhai” le) 
Article 6 
(examples of 
male cadres 
whose 
corruption 
was related 
to personal 
issues) 
2017, 
June 24 
Ifeng.com What kind of positions that corrupt cadres can 
promote their mistresses? (官员可以将情妇提拔到什
么位置; Guanyuan keyi jiang qingfu tiba dao shenme 
weizhi) 
Article 7 (the 
example of 
male cadres 
whose 
corruption 
was not 
related to 
personal 
issues) 
2013, 
June 14 
Ifeng.com Corruption cases of presidents in Universities resulted 
from lacking of supervision (高校校长落马"问责"监
管缺失; gaoxiao xiaozhang luoma “wenze” jianguan 
queshi) 
Article 8 (the 
example of 
female 
cadres whose 
corruption 
was not 
related to 
personal 
issues) 
2016, 
August 
21 
Sina.com Comment: Knowing Wen Jiabi, the former vice 
president of Sichuan Red Cross Society, is more 
valuable than knowing Guo Meimei (the internet 
celebrity who is related to Sichuan Red Cross Society) 
(评论：红十字会文家碧比郭美美更值得深挖; 
Pinglun: hongshizihui Wen Jiabi bi Guo Meimei geng 
zhide shen wa) 
 
 
